On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 03:06:09PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed
> came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to
> assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a
> particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call
> the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my
> 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so
> the signature on the object alone is insufficient.
> This series introduces a cryptographic assurance for ref updates
> done by "git push" by introducing a mechanism that allows you to
> sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time
> you push. Think of it as working on an axis orthogonal to the
> traditional "signed tags".
Sounds a lot like the "branch object" concept I suggest earlier, where
each push would also push a commit to a branch object describing the
updates to the branch, including signing of the updates to the branch
(hey, it's just a signed commit), groups of commits pushed together / to
be backed out together, rebase history, ... (What about pushing
Code-wise, would that be more or less generic?
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