Copilot commented on code in PR #55671:
URL: https://github.com/apache/arrow/pull/55671#discussion_r4628441520
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cpp/src/arrow/ipc/options.cc:
##########
@@ -26,6 +26,42 @@ IpcWriteOptions IpcWriteOptions::Defaults() { return
IpcWriteOptions(); }
IpcReadOptions IpcReadOptions::Defaults() { return IpcReadOptions(); }
+Status IpcReadOptions::Validate() const {
+ if (max_recursion_depth < 0) {
+ return Status::Invalid("max_recursion_depth must be non-negative, got ",
+ max_recursion_depth);
+ }
+ if (max_metadata_length < -1) {
+ return Status::Invalid("max_metadata_length must be -1 or non-negative,
got ",
+ max_metadata_length);
+ }
+ if (max_body_length < -1) {
+ return Status::Invalid("max_body_length must be -1 or non-negative, got ",
+ max_body_length);
+ }
+ if (max_decompression_ratio < -1) {
+ return Status::Invalid("max_decompression_ratio must be -1 or
non-negative, got ",
+ max_decompression_ratio);
+ }
+ return Status::OK();
+}
+
+Status IpcReadOptions::CheckMetadataLength(int64_t length, const char* prefix)
const {
+ if (max_metadata_length >= 0 && length > max_metadata_length) {
+ return Status::Invalid(prefix, length, " exceeds maximum allowed metadata
length ",
+ max_metadata_length);
+ }
+ return Status::OK();
+}
+
+Status IpcReadOptions::CheckBodyLength(int64_t length) const {
+ if (max_body_length >= 0 && length > max_body_length) {
+ return Status::Invalid("IPC body length ", length,
+ " exceeds maximum allowed body length ",
max_body_length);
+ }
+ return Status::OK();
+}
Review Comment:
`CheckBodyLength` only enforces the upper limit, so a negative `body_length`
is accepted. The new public file-reading overloads call this helper before
computing `metadata_length + body_length`; in particular, `ReadMessageAsync`
can therefore perform a signed-underflowed/negative-size read for a
caller-supplied negative length. Reject negative lengths here before applying
the maximum.
##########
cpp/src/arrow/ipc/metadata_internal.cc:
##########
@@ -1290,6 +1290,7 @@ Result<std::shared_ptr<KeyValueMetadata>>
GetKeyValueMetadata(
metadata->reserve(fb_metadata->size());
for (const auto pair : *fb_metadata) {
+ CHECK_FLATBUFFERS_NOT_NULL(pair, "custom_metadata.pair");
Review Comment:
The new null checks run after `metadata->reserve(fb_metadata->size())`, so
they do not prevent an attacker-controlled custom-metadata vector from causing
a large allocation before any pair is inspected. A verified FlatBuffers buffer
can still contain a very large number of tiny pairs, amplifying the untrusted
metadata size into the `vector<shared_ptr<...>>` capacity. Please validate/cap
the pair count against the available metadata budget or avoid this
unconditional reserve.
##########
cpp/src/arrow/ipc/reader.cc:
##########
@@ -1038,6 +1073,10 @@ class StreamDecoderInternal : public
MessageDecoderListener {
swap_endian_(false) {}
Status OnMessageDecoded(std::unique_ptr<Message> message) override {
+ if (ARROW_PREDICT_TRUE(message != nullptr)) {
+ RETURN_NOT_OK(options_.CheckMetadataLength(message->metadata()->size()));
+ RETURN_NOT_OK(options_.CheckBodyLength(message->body_length()));
Review Comment:
These checks only cover messages delivered through `StreamDecoderInternal`.
The public `ReadRecordBatch(const Buffer&, ..., options, file)` and
`ReadRecordBatch(const Message&, ..., options)` entry points below call
`ReadRecordBatchInternal` directly, which never checks the metadata size or
advertised body length against these options. Thus a caller can configure
`max_metadata_length`/`max_body_length` and still bypass both limits through
the documented direct-reading APIs. Move the option validation and length
checks into the shared `ReadRecordBatchInternal` path (using the FlatBuffers
bodyLength) so all entry points enforce the same limits.
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