Ignore your 
investors<http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/15/news/economy/fox_value.fortune/index.htm>
Shareholder
value isn't so dumb. Using today's stock price to gauge success is. By
Justin Fox, contributor
Last Updated: May 18, 2009: 2:36 PM ET

NEW YORK (Fortune) -- There was a time (the 1990s, to be precise) when the
concept of shareholder value made a bit of sense: Corporations focused on
keeping shareholders happy, and their stock prices rose through the roof.

Things haven't worked that way in a while. Even with the stock market's
recent bounceback, the total return on the S&P 500 since the turn of the
millennium has been negative. The disasters early this decade at Enron and
WorldCom (and lots of lesser debacles at other companies) grew out of a
rabid desire to keep shareholders happy.

More recently, several of our leading financial institutions imploded from
what executives were convinced was the pursuit of higher returns for
shareholders. It has gotten so bad that a couple of months ago even Jack
Welch, whose tenure at General Electric
(GE<http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=GE&source=story_quote_link>,
Fortune 
500<http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/snapshots/170.html?source=story_f500_link>)
epitomized the pursuit of shareholder value, declared it to be the "dumbest
idea in the world."

Is Jack right? Is it a dumb idea? Depends what you think it means. In the
1981 Harvard Business Review article that introduced the term to the world,
accounting professor Alfred Rappaport attempted to sketch a "theoretically
sound, practical approach" to running a business that would maximize
"economic value for shareholders."

The goal was to get corporate executives to pay less attention to accounting
earnings and focus instead on economic earnings - which Rappaport, who
taught at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, defined as
anticipated cash flow discounted by the cost of capital. It was an argument
for paying attention to what created value over time instead of stressing
out about quarterly earnings. Which doesn't sound dumb.

"I don't know how many times I kept saying long term, long term, long term,"
explains Rappaport, who is now 77 and living in semiretirement in Southern
California, but still pens the occasional Harvard Business Review article
and has a new book in the works. "To me, shareholder value was not about an
immediate boost to stock price."

Yet that is exactly what it came to be about in the 1990s. CEOs professing
to be disciples of shareholder value fell over themselves trying to please
the stock market. They obsessed over meeting quarterly earnings targets. And
in doing so they made their companies less valuable.

Why did this happen? It was partly greed, as the result of economic
incentives inherent in executive pay packages - pay packages that because of
a quirk in the accounting rules were heavy on stock options. It was partly
the workings of the immutable law that every good idea on Wall Street
eventually becomes a bad one. But it also flowed from a powerful but flawed
theory born on another Chicago university campus: the efficient-market
hypothesis.

The efficient-market theory that emerged from the University of Chicago's
business school in the 1960s and prevailed through the 1990s (it has since
been watered down by its remaining adherents) was an argument that the
prices prevailing on the stock market were right. If stock prices were
right, maximizing shareholder value was the simplest thing in the world.
"Focusing on current earnings might be myopic," argued the late, great
Chicago finance scholar Merton Miller in 1993, "but not so for stock prices,
which reflect not just today's earnings, but the earnings the market expects
in all future years as well."

Stock prices do reflect expectations about the future. But decades of
research have now shown them also to reflect lots of other things too -
emotion, error, and the often perverse incentives of the money-management
business. The stock market "is terribly noisy in the short run," says
Rappaport. As a result, it's largely useless as a guidepost for those who
would pursue shareholder value over the long run.

So is shareholder value a dumb idea? No, just a very difficult one. Because
to really get it right, you need to ignore your shareholders.

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
""GLOBAL SPECULATORS"" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
[email protected]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/globalspeculators?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to