The same-domain/cross-domain policy is there to face this situation: We have host A and B behind a firewall. B is an application server, A is a client. Network administrator wants A to be able to access B services, but only trough trusted applications.
Trusted applications are marked as domain from which the application has been loaded. So, for instance, if A plays a movie downloaded from B it gets access to B services, while if A plays a movie downloaded from C (an external host) it does not. This configuration is put in a crossdomain.xml file on the host from which the load is attempted. So, for instance, if B webmaster is willing to provide the services to movies downloaded from D (another external host) can do so by writing D domain in the crossdomain.xml file. To summarize up, loads from a domain/uri are only allowed if the publisher of that domain/uri *explicitly* allow so by using a crossdoomain.xml file *or* if the accessing movie has been loaded from the same domain. Now, this has, in my opinion, the following problems: (1) Fascist default Implicit configuration (ie: no crossdomain.xml file is found) is NOT allowing loads by any movies expect the ones downloaded by this host. This means that anyone willing to provide their resources publically (say FSF RSS) needs to add a crossdomain.xml file, or they'd be practically forbidding access by foreign flash movies. I'd rather *only* use crossdomain.xml file if actually found on the host, like it is for the robots.txt file (ie: be kind if someone asks you). (2) Security enforced by trusted player This whole model only works if you trust the player. A saner implementation would use authenticated access to services instead. Comments welcome. --strk; _______________________________________________ Gnash-dev mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnash-dev
