David Kastrup wrote: [...] > How do you suppose the GPL leads to less competition
moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/maine-speech.html "We construct a protected commons, in which by a trick, an irony, the phenomena of commons are adduced through the phenomena of copyright, restricted ownership is employed to create non-restricted, self- protected commons. The GPL ..." "So, we now find ourselves, if you will permit me, projected approximately twenty-five to thirty years into the future. Software is a service, a public utility, being produced primarily by people we presently call ``students,'' doing something we presently call ``learning.'' The primary services being sold in the Capitalist economy with respect to software are project management, indemnification [aha ha ha], distributional customization, and tailoring, piece by piece, to the individual needs of consumers." "Now we have forty percent of the server market. We're going to have a hundred percent of the appliance market within five years. That's a trivial economic deduction ..." Or do you disagree with the your fellow GNUtian Number Two and coauthor of the GPL v3, dak? Well, we'll see how the Judge Young will deal with the GPL and Wallace's allegations. If Judge Young in the IBM case reads and considers Wallace's 2nd Answer Brief I am confident that the Motion to Dismiss will be denied. If the Judge refuses to even read the plaintiff's Answer Brief as Judge Tinder obviusly did then it's probably over. There is an interesting 2003 case in which Judge Young was appealed to the Seventh Circuit. In that case, the Seventh Circuit noted that a predatory pricing allegation constitutes an allegation of antitrust injury: "An underlying question regarding this tying claim is whether the plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust injurym as a result. Suits cannot be brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act unless a private party is adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendants conduct. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990) (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487) (emphasis in original). Neither plaintiff claims that the prices that ProLiance charged for the gas itself or its transportation were predatory, or that ProLiance somehow injured its customers by charging excessive prices for either gas transportation or gas. . . . That the plaintiffs losses stem from this behavior and not behavior that is anticompetitive, e.g., predatory pricing, means that they cannot make a tying claim against ProLiance that can withstand a motion to dismiss, since the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116; see also Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340-41; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14. "; Midwest Gas Services, Inc. v. Indiana Gas Co., 317 F.3d 703 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817 (2003)" If I were Wallace I'd add "GPL incompatible" boycott scheme to the mix right from the beginning... and file together with some victim (there are many). ---- Summit Health concerned the allegations by ophthalmologist/eye physician Pinhas that Summit Health, Midway Hospital Medical Center, its medical staff and others had entered into a conspiracy to drive Pinhas out of business so that other ophthalmologists and eye physicians, including four of the defendants, will have a greater share of the eye care and ophthalmic surgery in Los Angeles. The Supreme Court held that "[Plaintiff] Pinhas' allegations satisfy the Act's jurisdictional requirements. To be successful, Pinhas need not allege an actual effect on interstate commerce. Because the essence of any Section 1 violation is the illegal agreement itself, the proper analysis focuses upon the potential harm that would ensure if the conspiracy were successful, not upon actual consequences. And if the conspiracy alleged in the complaint is successful, as a matter of practical economics there will be a reduction in the provision of ophthalmological services in the Los Angeles market. Thus, petitioners [i.e., defendants] erroneously content that a boycott of a single surgeon, unlike a conspiracy to destroy a hospital department or a hospital, has no effect on interstate commerce because there remains an adequate supply of others to perform services for his patients. This case involves an alleged restraint on the practice of ophthalmological services accomplished by an alleged misuse of a congressionally regulated peer review process, which has been characterized as the gateway controlling access to the market for Pinhas' services. When the competitive significance of respondent's exclusion from the market is measured, not by a particularized evaluation of his practice, but by a general evaluation of the restraint's impact on other participants and potential participants in that market, the restraint is covered by the Act. Pp. 328-333." ---- regards, alexander. _______________________________________________ Gnu-misc-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
