David Kastrup wrote: [...] > > Wallace brought forth the GPL. The GPL is his evidence. > > Yes. No facts compatible with his claim of predatory pricing.
And how do you know? Neither Judge Tinder nor Judge Young addressed his claim of predatory pricing. > IBM is > supposed to be guilty of heeding a license? And the judge is supposed > to admit that as a case? http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=495&invol=328 "Held: 1. Actionable "antitrust injury" is an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. Injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation, will not qualify unless it is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny, since it is inimical to the antitrust laws to award damages for losses stemming from continued competition. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 -110. P. 334 2. A vertical, maximum-price-fixing conspiracy in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act must result in predatory pricing to cause a competitor antitrust injury. Pp. 335-341." Now go read what Judge Tinder had to say about the GPL and Wallace's claims here: http://sco.tuxrocks.com/Docs/Wallace_v_FSF/Wallace_v_FSF-30.pdf Pay attention to "vertical maximum price fixing". The Judge ruled that Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint States a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted and that Plaintiffs Allegations Sufficiently Set Forth a Violation of the Rule of Reason, but Plaintiff Has Not Alleged Antitrust Injury. And then Wallace has added the claim of predatory pricing to his complaint. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=495&invol=328 "Although a vertical, maximum-price-fixing agreement is unlawful under 1 of the Sherman Act, it does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless it results in predatory pricing. 8 Antitrust injury does not arise for purposes of 4 of the Clayton Act, see n. 1, supra, until a private party is adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's conduct, see Brunswick, 429 U.S., at 487 ; in the context of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive effect. 9 See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related [495 U.S. 328, 340] Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 697-699 (1975); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 289, 292-294 (1980). Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition." > There is no case here. See above. regards, alexander. _______________________________________________ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
