Jacob Bachmeyer via Gnupg-devel wrote in <e2835c3e-f736-49e9-844b-ff78ad36a...@gmail.com>: |On 7/11/25 04:34, Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-devel wrote: |>> But many side channels, such as those arising from speculative |>> execution, are observable by an unpriviliged third party user of a VM |>> host (and not just cloud, on-prem is no different in principle). |> |> Sorry to jump in here, but for 25 years I've told people "only run GnuPG |> on hardware you control." That also applies if your underlying hardware |> is a virtualized environment. |> |> I side with Jacob here. Once Mallory has access to your hardware, it's |> game over. | |Thank you. ... |The catch is that the "juicy" stuff is typically *in* the user's account |on a single-user box... and therefore accessible without elevation if |Mallory is hitting the client. ...
I have no idea of further gnupg internals, but OpenSSH since some time "shield"s data in memory; ie the stuff gets encrypted -- only short time decrypted -- when actually needed. Iirc this was implemented as a countermeasure against side-channel exposures. (Ie random key->checksum->used as key to encrypt key data; random key and encrypted key ptrs stored side-by-side in memory.) --steffen | |Der Kragenbaer, The moon bear, |der holt sich munter he cheerfully and one by one |einen nach dem anderen runter wa.ks himself off |(By Robert Gernhardt) | |During summer's humble, here's David Leonard's grumble | |The black bear, The black bear, |blithely holds his own holds himself at leisure |beating it, up and down tossing over his ups and downs with pleasure | |Farewell, dear collar bear _______________________________________________ Gnupg-devel mailing list Gnupg-devel@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel
