> For whatever it's worth, many people within the OpenPGP community would > really like to see a lot of algorithms go away. (E.g., if it were up to > me, only DSA, ElG, AES, 3DES, SHA1 and SHA256 would be supported.) Some > people reduce their advertised capabilities in order to encourage moving > to a smaller algorithm set. >
Based on the lack of vulnerabilities of those limited set of algorithms (excluding SHA1 -- another topic entirely), it would seem to be prudent to "refine" the number of acceptable algorithms. When the SHA family is eventually supplanted and Camellia cipher officially recognized, I only see this list expanding, not shrinking! -- Kevin Hilton _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users