Currently, it looks like pinentry-gtk-2 (I'm using 0.8.0) doesn't allow pasting from the clipboard. This is annoying, because a truly long, randomized password is not practical to type into a hidden dialog box. It really seems like pinentry forces one to use short, insecure passwords. One supposes there is a trade-off in security here, but I'm more concerned about brute-force attacks on the passphrase than I am about someone sniffing the clipboard--it seems that if they have access to my clipboard, they can probably log my keystrokes, anyway, right? So offline attacks against the key's passphrase seem more likely.
So, I really have two questions. First, is it possible to force pinentry dialogs to allow pasting from the clipboard? Secondly, is it possible to force the CLI to use an alternate pinentry (say, pinentry-curses) or some other method to populate an existing gpg-agent with a cached passphrase?
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