On 02/20/2013 08:23 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > The current best attack on AES-256 maxes out at 11 rounds; the full > AES-256 has 14 rounds.
Doing a little more research, I found a theoretical attack on the full -256 and -192; I was wrong to say the current best attack only worked on a reduced-round variant. The new hotness is a related-key attack, wherein the attacker chooses two keys and a relationship between them and uses that to attack the full cipher. It's definitely an exotic: that sort of condition is unlikely to occur in the real world, especially in GnuPG where AES is used for randomly-generated session keys -- there's no relationship between them to be exploited. Still, I was incorrect to say the best attack is on a reduced-round variant. Mea culpa. :)
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