On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 8:54 AM, NdK <[email protected]> wrote: > Il 03/05/2014 01:10, Daniel Kahn Gillmor ha scritto: > >> Having such an assertion cryptographically bound to the OpenPGP >> certificate in parseable form implies in some sense that you think a >> mechanical process (e.g. WoT calculated validity) should be able to make >> use of it. But how would that work? > Making WoT calculator avoid looking for keys signed by that user if > reached throught my certification. > >> It sounds like you'd want to ask >> an OpenPGP to introduce an additional concept on top of the notions of >> validity and ownertrust (which are already confusing): > They work: I'm *really* confused. :) > >> some sort of meta-ownertrust: instead of ownertrust's question of: >> "how much am i willing to rely on NdK's identity assertions", > Well, if ownertrust answers that, it's what I need: a way to say "I am > sure this key belongs to X, but I don't want it to be used to introduce > more keys in the WoT".
But it doesn't work like that anyway. Unless you are using Trust signatures (and few people do) then a signature on a key does not encourage a 3rd party to trust signatures made by that key. Even if a key is recognised as authenticated/validated/certified for association with a particular email address, the signatures made by that key will not be trusted by anyone who has not made an active decision to make a particular key a trusted introducer. In fact, this is a reason (though one of many) why the web of trust has never quite lived up to its promise. No UI that I am aware of sets even marginal trust by default on newly imported keys. Most users (I suspect) will only ever end up trusting keys that they themselves have signed. That is the default position. It is interesting to speculate whether the WoT would have been more effective if there had been a culture of marginally trusting new keys by default, allowing users to make an active choice either to not trust someone or to fully trust someone. As it is, the inertia of the system works against the idea of a web of trust.[*] In any case - there is no need for what you are suggesting. 3rd parties are not (by default) going to infer from your signature that they should then trust the key you sign as an introducer. N. [*] I'm aware there are problems with "marginal trust" related the fact that the requirement of three marginally trusted signatures to confer validity may in fact be fairly weak. The three signatures may not, in fact, be made independently of each other (consider three keys owned by the same person which all introduce a third key, for example, or multiple signatures made a single key-signing party). _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
