Gmail is annoying... anyway, reposting: Alright, thanks for elaborating it. Does this mean that the notation (the "sig-notation [email protected]=%g" line) is final, and is not going to change in the future?
I noticed that GnuPG also offers a "cert-notation" option - should this be set too or can I safely omit it? dkg: I have no idea what the answers should be. But guessing I'd just put the second answer as "cert-notation [email protected]=%g" though I'm unsure whether the presence of cert-notation it is necessary. On 6/6/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]> wrote: > On 06/06/2014 04:19 AM, Cpp wrote me privately (but later OKed > publication): >> On 6/5/14, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]> wrote: >>> there is a link to an explanation about it. you can read the rationale >>> for it here: >>> >>> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.mail.notmuch.general/3721/focus=7234 >> >> Yes, that is where I got it from. >> >> I am aware of the discussion thread at gmane. In fact I've read the >> entire chain before posting here, but I still didn't fully understand >> it. It seems to be some advanced way to distinguish keys via full >> fingerprints, but it doesn't seem to be a standard yet. By the looks >> of it, it's more like a temporary feature or a placeholder for >> something else. The big question is whether I should add it to my key. >> The article above seems to think so though I'm not sure how useful the >> feature really is considering the fact that it's not that widespread. > > including this notation allows a remote peer who receives a signed > message from you to reliably distinguish between two cases: > > 0) this signature is bad > > 1) this signature status is unknown and i just don't have the right key > > Without the extension, a signature verification process has no way to > determine which of these scenarios is the correct one when the signature > doesn't appear to validate. > > Without the extension, an attacker willing to do a fair amount of work > (2^64 operations -- not out of reach of an organization willing to > devote some time and resources) can create a key with a colliding long > keyID. If the party verifying a signature is verifying against the > new/colliding key instead of the proper key, then all the signatures > will appear in this broken state. > > few OpenPGP signature-verifying tools make this check currently; but > your messages may be verified by systems that you don't know about > (including systems in the future). If you want to provide those tools > with an way to reliably distinguish between the two cases, you should > use the notation. > > Regards, > > --dkg > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
