On 01/14/2016 01:41 PM, NdK wrote:
Il 14/01/2016 21:06, Andrew Gallagher ha scritto:
>Tofu does not guarantee identity persistence. Just because your correspondence
hasn't been obviously tampered with (yet) does not mean that someone hasn't been
MITMing you all along and biding their time.
As usual, it depends on your attack scenario.
If I have 10-years-old mails from someone I've never met, and all use
the same key, I can assume that either 1) that identity belongs to the
same person or 2) that an attacker MITMed*all* my connections (from
every device I've had wherever I was and to every service I used).
Occam's razor and my "exposure profile" make me think it's 1):)
There are several more possible scenarios. The most plausible of which
would be 3) Your correspondent is being coerced, and 4) Your
correspondent has lost control of the key, and the new correspondent is
skilled at mimicking the "real" one. Of course neither of those
scenarios is defensible with either key verification strategy.
In other words,*time* can be considered an 'out of band' channel.
It really can't ... if anything time increases the likelihood that the
original key holder has lost control of the key.
Doug
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