> Good point, and I agree to that for a very basic assessment. However, > the assumption that only politicians and government employees holding > a security clearance are targeted by Mossad & co is a thing of the > past.
It never was true -- for decades the French DGSE surveilled on Airbus's competitors, for instance. But the point still stands. The attacks you're talking about are not automated. They require significant per-target involvement from highly-skilled technical talent, and once you posit you're being targeted by people who have both technical talent and a budget you're far outside the realm where a smartcard can save you. There are definitely domains where smartcards make sense. I use a smartcard not just because of high-value secrets, but because I use several different computers. A smartcard means I have one copy of my private key that I can safely share between rigs, without the risks that come from each machine having a copy, putting my private key on an NFS share, storing it on a USB drive, or any of the other ways to tackle it. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
