On 06/30/2019 08:33 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: >> "Look, this one guy who just got mugged? [...] > > I had to read it twice to distill what I think Mirimir meant, but I > think they meant that if you blacklist/blackhole all affected > certificates, you remove the incentive for the attackers to poison more > certificates since the poison can't spread to the people fetching keys. > Thus stopping the attackers.
Thanks. That's almost right. But I'm not focusing on incentives. I'm focusing only on impacts. Because as I understand it, you can't stop people from poisoning certificates on the SKS keyservers. > I concluded that Mirimir perhaps forgot about that this creates a second > attack model, where you can block keys from being on the keyserver. This > seems like a new problem that means this stopgap measure is probably not > the one we want, since it still provides the incentive for attackers to > poison keys. > > Peter. I didn't forget about that. I just don't think that it matters. Unless I've misunderstood the situation, the SKS keyservers are dead meat. And have been dead meat for a decade. So the focus has gotta be on a secure and capable replacement. And meanwhile, on mitigating damage done through the SKS keyservers. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users