On Dienstag, 22. Juni 2021 20:47:45 CEST Brandon Anderson via Gnupg-users wrote: > I agree that for most people having a paper backup stolen is unlikely, > but then again, most people are not using GPG, to begin with, let alone > GPG with smartcards or security tokens. There are several security > concerns which having retirement keyslots can address. They can also > improve the user experience as you won't have to air-gap a machine to > view old records with revoked keys. All in all, it's about providing the > option of having only security token access, not requiring it. I would > expect any smartcard stored in a safe and only used infrequently during > key changes and the occasional old record decryptions to last well over > a decade.
I really fail to see your point. I can accept that you do not want to have a not-hardware-token-secured copy of your encryption keys. But what is the problem with having one OpenPGP smartcard for each retired key? Why do you want to cram all retired keys on a single OpenPGP card? Is your motivation the environment (less retired still functional hardware tokens -> less wasted resources)? I'd applaud that, but I also question it. Deleting all those old and probably mostly useless encrypted emails might be better for the environment than keeping them in an archive (with several backups), which needs to be refreshed/copied to new archive storage every few years. Or is it money? Something else? If this single OpenPGP smartcard which holds all of your keys of the last decade breaks, what then? Then you have lost access to all encrypted documents of the last decade. If you'd use separate OpenPGP smartcards instead, then you'd lose access to only one key rotation interval worth of old encrypted documents. Regards, Ingo
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