On 9/10/26 02:59, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote:
[...]
The passphrases in the cache are actually stored encrypted in the RAM
but obviously the symmetric key for tha is still hold in the clear in
the RAM .-)
Suggestion/feature request: store /N/ shadows that must be XORed
together to recover the symmetric key. Periodically "shuffle" the
shadows by XORing the same random value into all of them. (/N/ must be
even; 2 is the simplest case.) Initially generate the key by simply
randomly generating the shadows.
This addresses the tail risk of memory cells "taking a set" which I
understand can happen if the same data is stored for a very long time.
The effect is that the state of those cells upon powerup is biased
towards (or away---I forget which...) from the pattern that was stored
in them.
As far as I know, the attack is theoretical, but it could be addressed
for extra paranoia points. :-)
-- Jacob
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