On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 10:15 PM, Adrien Béraud
> I make use of GnuTLS certificate revocation list methods, including
> gnutls_x509_crl_verify, but it looks like there some issue:
> which calls
> which calls
> However it seems that the raw_dn field is not set for a new generated
> certificate, only for a certificate loaded using gnutls_x509_crt_import
> Also it seems the raw_issuer_dn field is not set for a new generated CRL,
> only for a CRL loaded using gnutls_x509_crl_import functions.
> So that gnutls_x509_crl_verify fails when used with new generated
> certificate or CRL.
Right, newly generated CRLs and certificates are not fully usable. I
think I should make that apparent in the _sign() functions of them.
They need to go through the import phase to be used for verification.
> Also this means that if multiple new certificates and a new CRL are provided
> to gnutls_x509_crl_verify, any of the provided certificate will match since
> the raw DN is allays empty so allays equal.
> Fortunately in this case the signature check would fail later in
> gnutls_x509_crl_verify so this might not be a security issue.
DN matching does not offer an security guarrantee. The DN is what the
certificate claims to be, rather than an ID assertion. The matching is
used to discover a possible signer, but does not replace the signature
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