By: Ali Ahmed Published in:* The Wire* Date: December 24, 2025 Source: https://thewire.in/religion/when-cohesion-becomes-coercion-the-indian-armys-case-against-conscience
Military officers – whether devout monotheists or avowed atheists – have had to deliver on a traditional leadership responsibility, that of leading their outfit in prayer. Apparently, Samuel Kamalesan chose differently and is now out of service without pension or gratuity, a punishment recently upheld by the Supreme Court of India. What the military lost in the bargain is an officer who appears to have had an independent mind and the courage of conviction. One assumes these are virtues that the military would look for in its members and support. In the event, the military chose to be guided by an anachronistic interpretation of the concept of cohesion. Cohesion is a necessity in any military body, enabling it to overcome friction in war and combat. It refers to the horizontal and vertical bonding, respectively, between members of military entities and its hierarchical levels. It is of particular interest at the primary group level, where the rubber meets the road. It is a leadership responsibility to foster and sustain cohesion to withstand the test of battle. A lack or absence of cohesion is a prelude to defeat. When confronted by an implacable enemy or severely challenging circumstances, non-cohesive forces tend to disintegrate. The Vietnam War is considered a classic instance where the defeat of the United States Army was placed on its lack of cohesiveness. An additional leadership function is also to articulate cohesion in a positive direction – of mandate achievement. Cognisant of its significance, the military has measures aplenty to instil it, such as the endless rounds of competitions and training cycles conducted in peacetime. One such is the periodic gathering at mandir (temple) parades. In operational areas, the upkeep of cohesion is easier, with the environment of risk and challenge spurring individuals as well as the military unit as a whole towards a coherent showing. In Kamalesan’s case, the claim is that his reluctance to participate in the leadership function to foster cohesion – through participation in collective prayer – led to his dismissal. However, by his account, Kamalesan was respectfully present at the collective prayer, just did not lead it. He was not willing to step up to the sanctum sanctorum to preside over the more intimate honours, a privilege reserved for the leader. His reservation was based on his monotheistic belief. Though counselled by religious preachers in uniform from his own faith – that the act did not detract from his faith – he stood by his own interpretation. If the military genuinely values officers who think independently and have moral courage, then it is strange – even self-contradictory – that it chose to protect a ritual meant to promote “cohesion” rather than protect the career of an officer who demonstrated exactly that moral courage. That Kamalesan landed in thick soup within a couple of months of commissioning tells its own tale. It is not necessarily only his reluctance but the commandant’s – armour parlance for commanding officer, the CO – dogmatism that needs scrutiny. It is not known whether the commandant received a career-ending report for having made a specimen out of a vulnerable lieutenant. That the chain of command persisted in bearing down on the junior officer, going the distance through the military-judicial route, reflects poorly on it as well. Usually, the sarv dharm sthal is maintained at unit level, with the religious teacher(s) authorised at its headquarters. In field areas where sub-units are deployed in penny packets, there are prayer sites set aside in posts and the junior leader either heads the outfit in prayer or a well-regarded soldier conducts a simple ceremony. It is not essential for the senior present to do so. It is certainly a task that can be delegated, and without prejudice to camaraderie in the sub-unit. Kamalesan was part of an armoured corps regiment located in a peace station. In such a setting, it is unusual for a junior officer to represent the unit in the sanctum sanctorum. A humour-laced WhatsApp forward circulating in military groups, authored by a Malayali Christian, recounts how, at the behest of the CO, he rote-learnt the majority denominational prayer overnight and led the obeisance the following day. However, that was in the context of a field exercise in a tented sarv dharm sthal, and not in a cantonment setting. Had the lieutenant, assigned to a squadron with Sikh troops, dithered at the squadron’s ad hoc gurudwara, it could plausibly have been argued that he fell short of his leadership obligation. Even in such a case, troops are far too large-hearted to take a young officer’s hesitance amiss, especially Sikh troops. Was it the commandant’s case that Sikh troops would take umbrage? Or has the commandant over-learnt the lessons from the Great Indian Mutiny, or from the 1984 mutinies? Does he think the Sikhs wear their religion on their sleeve? Sikh religious ritual does not place the junior leader in the quandary that faced Kamalesan (see note below). The incident in question, per court records, took place at the mandir or sarv dharm sthal at the unit level. If Kamalesan’s claim that the unit did not have a sarv dharm sthalis to be taken as true – that there was no conventionally defined sarv dharm sthal – it is a lapse that successive Colonels of the Regiment must account for. A standalone squadron-level gurudwara is an anomaly in the age of the sarv dharm sthal. Even so, the lieutenant’s action of being present without partaking in the core ritual is not unique. At mandir parades, many prostrate in front of the deity; some quietly bow with folded hands and join the congregation. There is latitude in the manner of according respect, though never lassitude. Kamalesan’s actions would have been unremarkable in that setting. While he had no defined role at that level, there are instances when the holy lamp is passed from hand to hand, with each leader present performing the ritual in turn. This would have required Samuel to step up. Had he demurred on such an occasion, he would rightly have incurred the wrath of his commandant. If the Army is right, that he did not even attend such parades, then he is blameworthy. That said, dismissal is something of an over-reaction to absence from parade. However, if his word is taken – that he was present but unwilling to lead the ritual – dismissal exacts a rather steep price. The commandant has much to answer for. Why did he make an issue of a lieutenant’s position? Did he really think it would impact cohesion in the unit? Did he think the lieutenant’s example would have infected the unit? Was there ill intent on the lieutenant’s part that could be corroborated by his actions in other fields? If he thinks it insulting to Hindus, does he not expose an under-confidence in the well-known acceptance of diversity by adherents of that great faith? Cohesion – the excuse to put down the youngster – was hardly at risk. Cohesion is not forged only in the barracks but is honed in battle too. How can it be inferred from the lieutenant’s reticence at the mandir that his outfit would crack at the first sound of shot and sight of smoke? Cohesion does not require self-effacement. It can live with angularities, only making these irrelevant. An officer who has the guts to stand up for his beliefs would likely die for them too – and such beliefs include patriotism, camaraderie and dharma. He can be expected to serve as a pole for a positive articulation of cohesion. That Kamalesan was selected for a commission shows he had traits that would have served cohesion well, were he given a chance. Patently, cohesion did stand endangered, but not from a young officer’s grandstanding. It was endangered by the arbitrary exercise of power that could not but have turned the internal environment of the unit toxic, for which the onus rests on the commandant, not the youngster. To be fair, the military did not ‘go after’ the young officer citing cohesion, but for disobedience of lawful orders. In essence, the military’s case appears to be that when asked to perform religious rituals, the officer dissented, thus contravening a lawful order. How such an order is lawful is not easily comprehensible in light of cohesion not being at stake by the non-implementation of the order. For such a signal moment to transpire, it takes more than a trivial clash of egos between a commandant and a recruit. Higher and wider matters, otherwise resonant in wider society, could well be at play. In light of the rightward turn society has taken, it is only to be expected that the eddies would reach shores military. From how the military leadership is flaunting religious colours, it is now a tsunami. Words of wisdom from veterans are likely to be ignored. The military needs reminding that the Wahhabi turn in the Islamisation of the Pakistan Army in the Zia years was hardly in the interest of its professionalism. Such a situation could replicate in the Indian military if it is not conscious of the dynamism attending the field of religion and identity in India. The lieutenant has served as the fall guy. There was no replay in the military’s courtrooms of the scene from Hacksaw Ridge, in which the values of the pacifist protagonist are factored in and he is assigned a task that did not require him to kill. He ended up saving lives as a paramedic, earning a Medal of Honour in the process. Normally, where the military falters, the ministry it answers to ought to step up. It would be too much to expect the regime’s defence ministry to emulate Robert Gates’s approach, elaborated in his tome Duty. He writes of an instance in which the military backed a Medal of Honour citation which, on investigation, turned out to be hyping of facts, showing that the courage depicted was not quite demonstrated. Though initially forwarded to the White House, Gates recalled the citation. That kind of due diligence or accountability does not obtain here. As for the courts, their interventions are capricious. While they rightly pushed the military on gender, they have much less to say on human rights. In this case, the higher court egregiously twisted the knife with its remarks. Samuel is the regime’s Dreyfus. Albert Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French Army in the late nineteenth century, was court-martialled for spying for Germany. It was not the facts of the case so much as the prevailing antisemitism that led to his incarceration. Later, the accusation having been proven false, he was reinstated, going on to serve in the First World War. The only thing certain, if Kanalesan is similarly rehabilitated, is that it will be only after a very, very long time. (Note: This essay has been pieced together from open sources. Crazy as it may sound, the grapevine has an interesting take: apportioning a role to the Colonel of the Regiment, who apparently was Sikh, and locating the contretemps in the squadron gurudwara. Incidentally, the institution of the colonel is itself under threat of extinction by the thrust to decolonise. This incident does nothing to help preserve it.) The original version of this essay first appeared on the author’s Substack. It has been edited and republished with permission.
