On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 03:10:37 -0700 (PDT) Riccardo Raccuia <riracc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> My intent is not to start a debate on any cipher/mode/signature algs' > weaknesses but merely to understand some the limitations that are enforced > when using the "crypto/tls/fipsonly" package of the famous boringcrypto > fork of golang. In short: FIPS is all about about bureaucracy, "US National Security" and $$$ that follows. Real soundness and code security is important but is of second thought to above. https://blog.ipswitch.com/fips-validated-vs-fips-compliant Validated is exact version of boringcrypto: 24e.....d6f5 It will not lose its validation even if it has a bug. If it will fix this bug its validation is lost. > Really, I understand and agree that we're much better off without CBC and > SHA1, although sometimes one might not have a choice. If you need something that NIST allows you are free to make NIST application for your own changes / configuration of an open source software. It was done eg. for Crypto++ in the past. > Does anyone know the reasons behind the much stricter limitations compared > to FIPS 140-2 when in fipsonly mode? Adam Langley is a well recognized expert in the field. I trust in his decisions. > Thanks !! Hope this helps. -- Wojciech S. Czarnecki << ^oo^ >> OHIR-RIPE -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "golang-nuts" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to golang-nuts+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
