On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 03:10:37 -0700 (PDT)
Riccardo Raccuia <riracc...@gmail.com> wrote:

> My intent is not to start a debate on any cipher/mode/signature algs' 
> weaknesses but merely to understand some the limitations that are enforced 
> when using the "crypto/tls/fipsonly" package of the famous boringcrypto 
> fork of golang.

In short: FIPS is all about about bureaucracy, "US National Security"
and $$$ that follows. Real soundness and code security is important
but is of second thought to above.

https://blog.ipswitch.com/fips-validated-vs-fips-compliant

Validated is exact version of boringcrypto: 24e.....d6f5
It will not lose its validation even if it has a bug.
If it will fix this bug its validation is lost.

> Really, I understand and agree that we're much better off without CBC and 
> SHA1, although sometimes one might not have a choice.

If you need something that NIST allows you are free to make NIST
application for your own changes / configuration of an open source software.
It was done eg. for Crypto++ in the past.

> Does anyone know the reasons behind the much stricter limitations compared 
> to FIPS 140-2 when in fipsonly mode?

Adam Langley is a well recognized expert in the field. I trust in his decisions.
 
> Thanks !!

Hope this helps.

-- 
Wojciech S. Czarnecki
 << ^oo^ >> OHIR-RIPE

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