After Sandhyas & Savads Posts on Hamas Victory, I am trying to raise
some questions on it. I belive hamas is is a terrorist structure as of
Israel and the United States
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sushovan Dhar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Jan 30, 2006 11:58 AM
The stunning victory by Hamas in the Palestinian election has
raised many questions. Jewish Voice for Peace offers some answers to
help us to make sense of these momentous developments.
Q: Who is Hamas?
A: Hamas is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement.
Created in 1987 during the first intifada, Hamas was an offshoot of
the Muslim Brotherhood, an international Islamic militant group. Hamas
is a purely Palestinian group and focuses exclusively on the
Palestinian issue.
Hamas' charter explicitly calls for Israel's destruction; it bars
recognition of Israel and compromise with her. The charter also
commits the group to armed struggle and, in describing its view of
Israeli and Zionist plans, cites the Protocols of the Elders of Zion
(a Russian forgery from the very early 20th century that is the
seminal piece of modern anti-Semitic literature) as its source. Hamas
has engaged in many criminal acts of attacking civilians.
But Hamas has another side as well. It has established an extensive
social services network, especially in the Gaza Strip. Many
Palestinians have gotten much more material aid through and from Hamas
than the PA over the years. This is a key source of support for Hamas
among those who do not share their political, religious or ideological
worldview.
Hamas, though certainly bound to a particular dogma, has always
shown a willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. In the past,
Hamas has refused to engage in Palestinian elections, seeing them,
correctly, as products of the Oslo Accords they opposed. But they have
obviously changed their views on this point. Even before that shift,
there were many indications that, while they may never accept the
legitimacy of Israel's existence, they were prepared to find ways for
Israel and Palestine to live together.
The book "The Palestinian Hamas" by Israeli scholars Shaul Mishal
and Avraham Sela is required reading for anyone who wishes to
understand Hamas. Though a bit outdated (the book was published in
2000), the clarity it sheds on Hamas is still valid. In fact, the way
the book battles the simplistic view of Hamas has only been
strengthened in recent years—if anything, Hamas has become more
adaptable to new circumstances and more open to new ways of doing
things than it had been five years ago.
---------------------------------
Q: So is Hamas a terrorist group?
A: Yes. But many terrorist groups have become governments or taken
leadership positions in governments in the past. That includes groups
like the Irgun Z'vai Leumi and the Lochamei Herut Israel (LEHI or
Stern Group), terrorist groups from the pre-state Yishuv, or Jewish
settlement in Palestine. >From the ranks of those groups came two
Israeli Prime Ministers, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. Fatah, the
party that had been in control of the Palestinian Authority, also had
a long history of attacks against Israeli and other civilian and
military targets. It is precisely the fact that Hamas has such a great
involvement in the violence of the second Palestinian intifada that
gives them much more ability than Fatah had to control that violence,
if they wish to do so.
---------------------------------
Q: Does this vote mean that Palestinians support Islamic fundamentalism?
A: Not likely. Although in recent years, religion has increased in
influence in the Palestinian territories, Palestinian society still
has a very strong secular element. While Hamas certainly has a sizable
core of supporters, their success in this election was not due to
religion, ideology or violence. Rather, it was attributable to the
failure and corruption of the ruling Fatah party and to the accurate
perception that Hamas was better organized and free of rampant
corruption.
More than anything, this was a vote for change, and Hamas was the
alternative. Beyond Fatah's corruption, there was also the fact that
Fatah's way of doing things had gained the Palestinians nothing in
their dealings with Israel. From the Palestinian point of view, the
politics of Fatah failed to produce results, so why not give Hamas a
chance?
---------------------------------
Q: Was this a vote in support of increased attacks against Israel?
A: Again, not likely. Recent polls indicate very strong Palestinian
support for continuing the cease-fire with Israel. Polls have
consistently indicated that Palestinians reserve their right to resist
occupation with force, but both oppose attacks on civilians (although
the settlers in the West Bank who are often armed and sometimes have
formed ad-hoc militias can blur the distinction between civilians and
combatants) and believe that violence is an unsound tactic at this
time (this has not always been the case during the second intifada,
but the polls on this point have been consistent for quite some time
now).
Hamas is cognizant of these popular feelings. That is why they have
abided by the cease-fire for the past year and why they have already
stated their willingness to continue it, despite the fact that the
conditions they set a year ago for maintaining the cease-fire have not
been met (this primarily refers to the release of Palestinian
prisoners).
---------------------------------
Q: Doesn't it make sense for Israel to refuse to negotiate with terrorists?
A: The entire issue is phony; Israel has not been negotiating with
Fatah in any real sense since the end of talks at Taba in early 2001,
in the last days of Ehud Barak's term as Prime Minister of Israel. So
their refusal to talk with Hamas does not represent a change from
before the election.
It is fair for Israel to push for Hamas to change their charter. But
one makes peace with enemies, not with friends or even "partners." It
was not the military leaders of Hamas that got elected, but those from
its political wing. The same controversy was raised a decade ago in
Northern Ireland, and everyone eventually realized that the only way
to move forward was to involve Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Army's
political wing. That same pragmatic view is needed now.
It is wrong and counter-productive for Hamas to refuse to negotiate
with Israel and it is wrong and counter-productive for Israel to
refuse to negotiate with the legitimately elected leadership of the
Palestinians.
---------------------------------
Q: Don't Israelis have a right to be scared by this result?
A: Yes, they do. The top Palestinian party is sworn to Israel's
destruction by its charter, and has, until recently, been responsible
for some of the most horrific suicide bombings in the intifada. That
they are now making some more conciliatory remarks is not very
reassuring to Israelis, especially since those remarks, at least for
the time being, include refusal to recognize Israel.
But while fear should never be ignored, it must also not be allowed
to overcome reason. Hamas is the legitimately elected party in power.
It is reasonable to expect them to act like a legitimate political
party, but it is not reasonable to simply say there will be no dealing
with them. There are good reasons to be afraid of Hamas. There are
even better ones, particularly if there is to be any hope for a better
future, to engage them.
---------------------------------
Q: Is Hamas prepared to engage in diplomacy with Israel?
A: Not at present, but there are indications that this could change.
Hamas' charter bars negotiating, recognizing or making any compromises
with Israel. For the time being, they are sticking to that line, but
even their own officials are saying that such a stance is incompatible
with being the leading Palestinian party. Hamas understands that they
are going to have to change. One Hamas official has already said that,
while Hamas is not prepared for direct negotiations, if Israel has
"something to offer, 1,000 ways can be found" to negotiate, which
likely means negotiating through third parties.
The Secretary-General of the Arab League flatly stated that Hamas
"must" negotiate with Israel and abide by the Beirut declarations of
2002. Based on a Saudi peace proposal, the Arab League in 2002 offered
full peace and fully normal relations between Israel and each of the
member states of the League in exchange for complete withdrawal from
the territories occupied since 1967, the establishment of a
Palestinian state on those lands in the West Bank and Gaza, with East
Jerusalem as its capital and "Achievement of a just solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN
General Assembly Resolution 194." Israel completely ignored this
offer. While there are points Israel would not accept whole cloth,
there is no discernable reason that this offer could not be the basis
for serious, short-term negotiations aimed at a permanent settlement
of the conflict.
In any event, this makes it clear that Hamas is going to face
intense pressure to recognize and negotiate with Israel from corners
that matter to them. Hamas has always been sensitive to Palestinian
public opinion, and that opinion still supports finding a way to end
the Israeli occupation and reach an agreement with Israel for a secure
and more hopeful future. All these factors combine to suggest that
Hamas will, if they form a government, take steps to comply with the
wishes of the Arab League and most of the Palestinian populace.
---------------------------------
Q: How did Israel and the United States contribute to this outcome?
A: In a global sense, major Western powers, as well as Israel, have
worked to counter secular Arab nationalism for decades. For a very
long time that was seen as the primary threat to first British and
French and later American interests. One of the ways they pursued
their opposition to Arab nationalism was by strengthening, or at the
very least ignoring the growth of, religious opposition groups. This
led to the rise of many groups, often equipped with US money and/or
training.
In Hamas' case, they certainly benefited from a general rise in
religious militarism. But Israel also helped them by allowing the
Islamic groups that preceded Hamas to flourish with relatively little
harassment in the 70s and most of the 80s. Israel saw the religious
groups opposing the secular nationalists, like the PLO, that Israel
was more concerned with. They believed that allowing, and even
encouraging Hamas to flower would create a thorn in the side of
secular Palestinian nationalism, leading to infighting and blunting
the Palestinians' ability to mount resistance. And for a time, that
was what happened. But the rise of groups like Hamas was the
inevitable result.
In more recent years, Israeli actions have consistently undermined
support for Fatah, Yasir Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. In April, 2002,
after a horrific attack in Netanya on Passover (carried out, it should
be noted, by Hamas), Israel launched "Operation Defensive Shield". By
the end of that offensive, the Palestinian infrastructure had been
destroyed. There has only recently been an opportunity for the
Palestinian Authority to start to rebuild that infrastructure. Yet
Israel continued to insist that the PA clamp down on militants,
despite their not having the military means or the political capital
to do so. When the PA could not comply, Israel and the US would
ridicule their leadership, refuse to negotiate and act unilaterally.
Then, by building the wall, in defiance of international law, through
the West Bank rather than along the Green Line and by unilaterally
withdrawing from Gaza, Israel demonstrated the irrelevance, in their
eyes, of Mahmoud Abbas, the PA and Fatah.
From the Palestinian point of view, things were just getting worse
under Fatah's leadership and what warmth the US was showing Fatah only
made the party look like quislings. Indeed, the leaking of news that
the US was covertly funneling funds to Fatah to bolster their campaign
just before the election was probably very damaging.
---------------------------------
Q: What does this election say about Palestinian democracy?
A: Considering that this election took place under military
occupation and was run by a Palestinian Authority that does not have
anything like the resources of an independent government, the
election, in and of itself, was a triumph for the Palestinians.
Virtually free of any scandals, and with nearly 78% of eligible voters
participating, the election was a huge success. In terms of
participation, transparency and verified honesty of the ballot, one
would have to dig deep and far before one found an Israeli or American
national election that could match it.
That Hamas comes out the winner is the result of their being the
clearest alternative to Fatah, and of their superior organizational
ability. It is not inevitable that harder-line groups would triumph in
a Palestinian democracy. But other, more secular and mainstream
groups, must now demonstrate to the Palestinian people that they are
free of corruption, organized and connected to the people if they wish
to challenge Hamas.
---------------------------------
Q: Is there any positive side to this?
A: Yes, there are opportunities in this surprising turn of events.
One of the biggest difficulties over the years of dealing with Fatah,
particularly under Yasir Arafat's was a disconnect between the
negotiations with Israel and the US and the attitudes among the
Palestinian population. Particularly on the issue of refugees, the
terms of negotiations were always very different from what the
populace was prepared to accept. Hamas is likely to force the issue
into greater clarity. The refugee issue is the hardest one to deal
with, because it is absolutely fundamental to Palestinian nationalism
and is also the one area where Israelis are almost universally united
in being unwilling to see anything more than a token return of
refugees. This issue can't be resolved unless both sides are really
negotiating based on the feelings of their people, and in the past
Palestinian negotiators have not done this.
The Fatah leadership that has been leading negotiations is very much
removed from the Palestinian street. Hamas is very much in touch with
it. This would allow for much greater clarity, and, if compromises can
be found (which will certainly be more difficult with Hamas, but still
not impossible) they will be much more likely to be accepted by the
Palestinian masses than the sort of deals Fatah tended to discuss. In
fact, the legitimacy which Hamas has now means both greater difficulty
but also greater clarity and confidence in all negotiations. If Hamas
can be persuaded to strike a deal, it will be one that will pass the
muster of the Palestinian street, something Fatah could never
guarantee.
Hamas also now has the incentive to continue to refrain from attacks
on Israeli civilians. More than that, they have incentive to bring all
the militias under the PA's control. And they have the political and
military cache to do it, in a way Fatah did not any longer.
---------------------------------
Q: What can we expect in the coming days?
A: It is almost impossible to predict where things will go from
here. Fatah finds itself outside of whatever power exists among the
Palestinians for the first time in more than forty years. There is a
lot of anger in Fatah, against Hamas, against Israel and against its
own outgoing leadership. There have been a few violent incidents and
Fatah has already declared its intention to be a very vocal
opposition.
It is not clear what kind of deals Hamas will make to form a
coalition government or even if it will do so. Hamas has enough seats
to control the government without a coalition, so if
coalition-building proves untenable, they have the option not to
pursue it. They are currently putting a great deal of effort into
bringing Fatah into a coalition government, but thus far Fatah has
remained adamant in its refusal.
One thing that is likely is that Hamas will try to focus inward
first and leave the nagging question of the Israel, the US and the
occupation until later. This is sensible, as it will give them the
opportunity to root out corruption in the PA, thereby increasing its
effectiveness. Then they will need to make the hard choices about
whether to change their stances or how to accommodate the
Palestinians' and the rest of the world's desire to see negotiations
commence again.
Israel and the US would do well to put the onus on Hamas to
negotiate by accepting the Beirut Declaration of 2002 as a basis for
resuming negotiations (which does not mean accepting their terms whole
cloth, something Israel would obviously not do). This would force the
issue of recognition and negotiation and would really turn the heat up
on Hamas to sit down and negotiate a deal. It could prove a turning
point, but it is not going to happen. As sensible as such a move would
be for everyone, even the Israeli Labor Party has immediately turned
to a call for more "unilateral moves" in the wake of the election, and
the Bush Administration is certainly not going to compromise its
"anti-terror" rhetoric in this regard.
There is the real possibility that Hamas will try to meet the
conditions the USOslo framework. Hamas could try to make some
declaration about this (one of their leaders has already said that
Hamas would respect agreements made by previous Palestinian
governments, whether they agreed with them or not) and see if that was
enough. It is highly unlikely they will change their charter any time
in the foreseeable future. has set forth for being a "legitimate
partner" on some level. They have already announced their intention
integrate their militia with PA forces, though this may prove more
difficult than it sounds. Many observers, including some inside Hamas,
feel that by running in the elections, Hamas has de facto accepted the
For the time being, Hamas is probably going to focus on rooting out
corruption in the PA and will maintain the "quiet" with Israel, as
long as Israel does the same. It seems likely that Israel will do so,
although with their own elections coming up, acting Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert will be very deliberate about how he approaches the
Hamas-led PA. He could decide that increasing actions in the West Bank
or even extra-judicial killings would bolster his position. But this
doesn't seem immediately likely. The other militant groups like
Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade may decide that it is
now time for them to ramp up their operations. The al-Aqsa Martyrs in
particular, being a breakaway faction of Fatah, may wish to
immediately de-stabilize the Hamas government. It is a certainty that
Hamas will now be blamed for every attack, whether they had anything
to with it or not, much as Fatah was in the past, only amplified. It
is in their interests to try to bring the other
armed groups under control. Whether they can or even wish to do so
remains to be seen.
---
Anivar Aravind
GAIA
--
The great moral question of the twenty-first century is: If all
knowledge, all culture, all art, all useful information, can be
costlessly given to everyone at the same price that it is given to
anyone
-- if everyone can have everything, everywhere, all the time, why is
it ever moral to exclude anyone from anything?
- Eben Moglen
--
The great moral question of the twenty-first century is: If all
knowledge, all culture, all art, all useful information, can be
costlessly given to everyone at the same price that it is given to
anyone
-- if everyone can have everything, everywhere, all the time, why is
it ever moral to exclude anyone from anything?
- Eben Moglen
