--- Begin Message ---
TO: The Board of Governors, International Atomic
Energy Agency
We write as members of the US-India Deal Working Group
of ABOLITION 2000, a global network of over 2000
organizations in more than 90 countries working for a
global treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons1. We wish
to convey our concerns about the proposed negotiation
of a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA
pertaining to the eight nuclear facilities that India
has declared as civilian as part of its agreement
with the United States (the US-India nuclear deal).
Our concerns are outlined below.
1. The US-India Nuclear Deal
This safeguards agreement would facilitate a nuclear
supply initiative that is deeply flawed, not least
because it contradicts the full-scope safeguards
standard that has been established in the context of
the NPT, NSG, Treaty of Rarotonga, and Treaty of
Pelindaba. IAEA member states must not allow
themselves to be used to lend legitimacy to an
arrangement that would compromise the full-scope
safeguards regime they have worked so long to
construct.
2. India-specific Safeguards
The proposed US-India agreement for nuclear
cooperation (the 123 Agreement, 3 August 2007)
refers to an India-specific Safeguards Agreement
(Article 10). The IAEA should not approve a safeguards
agreement which affords India any special privileges.
There is concern that India might seek India specific
safeguards that make the safeguards contingent upon
the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign
suppliers. There is no precedent for dropping
safeguards if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted.
The Board of Governors should require that safeguards
on Indian nuclear facilities be permanent and
consistent with IAEA standards and practices.
The most likely reason why fuel supplies to India
would be interrupted under the proposed arrangement is
if India conducts a nuclear weapon test explosion. Any
such test would amount to an Indian rejection of the
UN Security Council Resolution 1172 demand that India
not conduct further nuclear tests and that it should
join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. IAEA
General Conference Resolution GC(42)/RES/19 (25
September 1998) called on India (and Pakistan) to
become Parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty, without delay and without conditions.
Furthermore, this resolution obliges all IAEA member
states to support the implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1172. (The UN Security Council and
IAEA General Conference Resolutions are attached.)
3. Partial Safeguards In Context
It has been argued by some that bringing additional
Indian electricity-producing reactors under safeguards
is a major step forward for nonproliferation. It is
not.
So long as India maintains fissile material production
and nuclear weapons-related facilities outside of
safeguards, safeguards on additional electricity
producing reactors are hardly worth their estimated
annual cost of $10 million (USD). It is clear that if
Nuclear Supplier Group states (or others) agree to
supply India with uranium for its safeguarded
reactors, this will free-up Indias limited indigenous
supplies for the purpose of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium production and allow it to increase
production of these fissile materials2. If supplier
states agree to transfer sensitive nuclear
technologies to Indian safeguarded facilities, the
comprehensive safeguards system is ill-equipped to
prevent the possible replication and use of such
technologies in Indias unsafeguarded military sector.
India has made clear also that it will only agree to
Additional Protocol safeguards on the facilities that
would be on its civilian list. The Board of
Governors should obtain a detailed clarification from
India and the Director General on the nature and form
of the Additional Protocol agreement that India will
pursue before it considers any other safeguards
agreement for India. IAEA member states should require
that the Additional Protocol be applied and
implemented so as to prevent the misuse of any nuclear
equipment or material that India imports.
Conclusion
In view of the above concerns, we urge you to ensure
that there is no rush to judgment in the negotiation
of a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA.
The goal of the Board of Governors during the
negotiations should be to ensure that the US-India
deal comply fully with current international nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation agreements,
principles, and norms.
Philip White, US-India Deal Working Group Coordinator
Steven Staples, Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000
10 September 2007
Notes and References
1. The US-India Deal Working Group was established at
ABOLITION 2000's Annual General Meeting, May 2007,
Vienna. The website for the group is as follows:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html
2. Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications
of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, by Zia Mian, A.H.
Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, International
Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report #1,
September 2006, http://www.ipfmlibrary/rr01.pdf
Endorsed by Members of Abolition 2000 US-India Deal
Working Group
Lisa Clark (Italy), Beati i costruttori di pace
(Blessed Are the Peacemakers) and
Italian Disarmament Network
Beatrice Fihn (Sweden), Womens International League
for Peace and Freedom
Shelagh Foreman (USA), Massachusetts Peace Action
Jim Green (Australia), Friends of the Earth Australia
Regina Hagen (Germany), International Network of
Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
Xanthe Hall (Germany), International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War
John Hallam (Australia), People for Nuclear
Disarmament NSW - Nuclear Flashpoints
David Heller (Belgium), Friends of the Earth Flanders
& Brussels
Hidemichi Kano (Japan), Japan Congress Against A- and
H-Bombs
Akira Kawasaki (Japan), Peace Boat
Ak Malten (The Netherlands), Global Anti-Nuclear
Alliance
Nouri Abdul Razzak Hussain (Egypt), Secretary-General,
Afro-Asian Peoples'
Solidarity Organization
Sukla Sen (India), National Coordination Committee
Member, Coalition for Nuclear
Disarmament and Peace
Hari P. Sharma (Canada), Professor Emeritus of
Sociology, Simon Fraser University and President,
SANSAD (South Asian Network for Secularism and
Democracy)
Steven Staples (Canada), Director, Rideau Institute on
International Affairs, Global Secretariat to
Abolition 2000
Heinz Stockinger (Austria), PLAGE - Independent
Platform Against Nuclear Dangers
Aaron Tovish (USA), International Manager, Mayors for
Peace 2020 Vision Campaign
David Webb (UK), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Gunnar Westberg (Sweden), International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War
Philip White (Japan), Citizens Nuclear Information
Center
Working Group Contact Address:
c/- Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5, Sumiyoshi-cho,
Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800 Fax: 03-3357-3801
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html
___________________________________________________________
Yahoo! Answers - Got a question? Someone out there knows the answer. Try it
now.
http://uk.answers.yahoo.com/
_______________________________________________
Foil-l mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://insaf.net/mailman/listinfo/foil-l_insaf.net
--- End Message ---
