This article is from Ubiquity: Volume 8, Issue 10 (March 13, 2007 -
March 19, 2007)


On Oct 9, 12:17 pm, Anil Tharayath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>    In the 20th century, with the advancement of technology as a world-
> historical force, philosophers have spoken of "the end of
> History" (Arnold Gehlen) and "the end of Philosophy" (Martin
> Heidegger). Technological progress replaces philosophy and reflection,
> and thereby accompanies the end of cosmologically oriented
> Metaphysics. Although it focused itself on ecological crisis for a
> short time at the end of 20th century, the 20th century was a revival
> of a natural philosophy style of thinking. Also, the cultural unity of
> a technological kind was threatened and is still threatened in the
> current period. But the current trends are moving in an opposite
> direction, and offering new meaningful thinking about culturally
> embedded technology - which in turn refers to the cultural
> understanding of technological development.
>    Since the Industrial Revolution, the idea of alternative
> technological futures becomes increasingly central to plans for
> technical decisions. Thus arises the more general question of the
> concept for the future of technology, which we want to conceptualize
> in our vision, and for that purpose a technical utopia, perhaps a
> technological world-view, is necessary. Technological development in
> its ambivalent form and the future of technological development
> replaces the paradigm of technological progress. Also the generic
> future of human beings, to which technological progress has been
> directed since the Enlightenment, is an insufficiently broad concept.
> It needs to be changed and integrated into a concept of Sustainable
> Development. The concrete formation of human beings in its Bodily
> Existence should be placed at the center of the evaluation of
> technological progress. Since the Industrial Revolution, the
> coincidental technological evolution with its acceleration effects is
> taken over by an organizational model of projected technologies.
>    Most organizational theories want to limit the borders of
> technologies, but not by transforming technological development. The
> formulation of moral limits, which propagates the return to a new
> simplicity, is the usual approach. However, one must acknowledge the
> limits of moral and political fixing of boundaries. The western theory
> means that alternative forms of the technologization (in other
> cultures and societies) are not possible. With a cultural theory in
> the background, the idea of an alternative technological future can be
> developed. The economic costs of regularization have to be considered
> and the conditions of the dominant economic culture have to be
> questioned. Technology is always actually adapted to changing
> conditions, and so alternative technologies are possible.
>    The compensation theory of the Geisteswissenschaften (human
> sciences) by Odo Marquard goes back to the philosophical studies of
> Hermann Luebbe. In addition, Joachim Ritter perceives further
> scientific and technological development by the Geisteswissenschaften.
> In particular, the theory maintains a compensation of history by
> technology studies and natural sciences. However, preceding the
> hypothesis of compensation, some inherent thinking about the
> assumptions is needed; the substantiality of previous life forms could
> gain back the liability with the assistance of Geisteswissenschaften.
>    The hypothesis of compensation keeps the myth of the two cultures
> intact. During this process, the compensation of adversity of
> modernization is publicized and the complementary function of the
> historical culture sciences is ignored. The hypothesis of compensation
> refers only to that part of the natural sciences which produces
> technical-industrially used knowledge. Joachim Ritter, in his study,
> gives a functionalistic analysis for the authorization of existence of
> the Geisteswissenschaften by modeling the hypothesis of compensation.
>    Natural sciences and technology are embedded into a network of
> tradition. Innovation, correspondingly, is subsequently bounded with
> transformation of tradition. Technological development can be
> understood as a cultural-historical process. Needs and value
> conceptions resist technological development, whereas cultural
> perspectives are more important than general subordinates. This kind
> of resistance - however preferentially made by philosophers - is not
> analytical, although it would not be uninteresting for ethical
> evaluations. Also, an ethics of the technological development is not
> to be understood as a compensation. The thesis of dealing with
> technological knowledge and action implies also another concept of
> ethics. At this juncture, ethics is not added from the outside for
> technological development; rather, from the very beginning ethical
> evaluation/assessment is a part of technological action. This also
> changes the concepts of modernization. Technological development does
> not only happen exclusively for its own sake, even if this has
> sometimes appeared that way. Therefore, a new concept of modernization
> is urgently needed on the national and global scale.
>    Cultural models are criticizing the particular technological
> alternatives as inhuman or ecologically harmful and focus on adapted
> or intelligent solutions. Ideas of naturalness or humanity have always
> been included into a path-dependent orientation of particular
> technological development. The substantial paths of individual
> technology advancement results from an interaction of various selected
> and limited conditions. With the dynamic of variation and
> construction, particular fields of technological development, routines
> of construction and paradigmatic solutions have been worked out. The
> routines of construction are established in the "State of Technology."
> In this respect a path dependency of technological developments
> results from the practice of technology advancement. There is no
> central authority which would structure the entire development.
> Therefore, one has to take various contexts of structuring into
> consideration, if researchers want to structure a particular frame of
> conditions.
>    Technological action is defined as dealing with technological
> practice which goes along with traditions, paths of development,
> selective models. Models can be worked out in view of development
> trends. Here one can speak of trends, but not of preformed
> technological ideas. Though construction patterns of a technological
> kind seem to be more than mere social constructions of technological
> developments, technology is not arising from one single consistent
> project, so it cannot be planned in advance, but is being developed
> out of a gradual constitutive process. Yet neither Technology
> Assessment (Technikfolgenabschätzung) nor Technology Structuring can
> be done only by one single project in advance but also has to be taken
> as a gradual process of constitution and reflection. Nevertheless the
> openness of technological development has nothing to do with
> irrationality; one can realize it and in the light of this openness
> one can also act rationally.
>    In accordance with the cultural turn, technological development is
> taken as a model for cultural development. The fitness of certain
> means for certain purposes can always be estimated by success and
> failure, i.e. by reaching or missing a certain purpose (goal). The
> success of technological action does not have to depend on the actual
> agreement of various groups, but at all times it must demonstrate
> transculturally and prove its practical worth. Technical know-how has
> not only the characteristics of continuation and irreversibility, but
> it is also not revisable, which shows clearly a cumulative character.
>    In this sense, in principle the technology goes through a progress
> of direction. Technological progress, as a progress of cognition and
> realization, can be methodically restored as a hierarchically
> structured and diversifying acting competence sufficiently developed
> such that it is available for action. Philosophy reconstructs those
> social practices, which imply poietic instrumental action (poesis
> action) or the result of a poietic action: such as practices of
> technological development and technological production, practical use
> of technology and the practices in which technology must be removed
> from the context of usage (including disposal, etc.). Therefore, the
> main feature of these artifacts is their relict character.
>    A large number of decisions need to be made so that a technical
> organization can run smoothly, efficiently, inconspicuously, but only
> a relatively few organizations permit questions the technical
> organization perceive as suggesting it is a precarious conflict-laden
> business. The large and unhomogenous group of the Technics Designer is
> to be structured in such a way that itself works in principle, for
> which relevant differences bring ethical questions in discussion.
> Technology-organizing individuals usually receive no formal training
> in ethics. Different approaches to business ethics find easy access
> into operational practice and are also increasingly being introduced
> in industrialized countries. But compared to this, the application of
> ethical reflection for entrepreneurial technological organization is
> still in a very beginning phase.
>    Technology-organizing practical men with their needs to receive
> guidance in concrete individual cases also continuously seek ethical
> assistance outside of the university system. Most people who
> participate in technological organizations do not have information
> about those different situations in which possible ethical
> consultation is already obstructed, but took part nonetheless. In each
> case, the contact with rather highly deterring expenditure is
> connected. Ethical criteria are an integral component of the new
> modernization discussion.
>    Technological progress lies first within the instrumental range and
> requires a pragmatic and utilitarian justification. In addition,
> progress in technological action has an ethical dimension. To that
> extent, pragmatic and ethical legitimacy of examination can be
> differentiated methodically, but not completely be separated. The
> legitimacy regarding a practice must take the limitations of tradition
> and "teachability" into account. Legitimacy can only be done regarding
> the uncertainty of the technology consequences and future development.
> Overall, a deficit of complexity theory and the unsatisfactory
> causality of prognosis make the estimation more difficult for future
> developments, which however are not completely impossible.
>    A part of the acceptance crisis of modern technology could have to
> be attributed to missing visions of technological development. People
> would rather talk about the frightful visions than about positive
> utopias, as they are significant for technological development. During
> earlier times of technological development optimistic progress was
> allowed. We are in the age of rapid technological change, of which
> however individual innovations, trends and megatrends are the
> characteristics. On the way toward the High Technology Civilization,
> there are a whole number of emerging successes, such as automobiles of
> the future, power supply innovations, high-tech medicine, and new
> building materials. What is missing is a model for cross-linking and
> embedding these new technologies - a vision for a coherent cultural
> paradigm, which ultimately helps to prepare the acceptance. This
> spells a new category of modernization, which has a new meaning.
>    A vision of technology is not to be confused with prognosis. It has
> no prognostic features. It does not aim to predict what is likely to
> occur in the future. Instead, what it does is attempt a structuring of
> individual fields of technology, a security of technology and its
> cross-linking, not least in the indication of a successful technical
> progress (i.e. technological practice). However, it must be a practice
> based on the knowledge of its basic conditions and its background
> justifications. Prosperity and use were long-time legitimizing
> horizons for technological practice. Today, if only at a rudimentary
> level, at least successful life and a human practice is now morally,
> pragmatically, strategically - or instrumentally and technologically -
> judged by other criteria. This is a starting point for a better human
> practice. At the same time, it represents a challenge to technicians
> who are responsible for progress in the technological development and
> who believe that technological working order and fulfillment is
> already sufficient. I would not like to deny that the success and
> failure of human practice belong as the central indicators for the
> evaluation of technological practice.
>    Technical criteria alone are not sufficient, but cultural-
> civilization models with a moral component such as sustainability or
> long-term responsibility will become part of a technology reflection
> culture. That culture, in order to be energized, must raise the
> question of acceptance between the involved technicians. On the one
> hand, engineering and economic transactions must be to be reflected,
> and on the other hand specialists for the acceptability of
> technologies will be needed. Communication, mobility and knowledge
> regarding information must be brought together in harmony with
> ecological, civilization and communicative embedding paradigms, in
> order to be able to finally clarify the questions of acceptability of
> technological practice. These issues must be examined in a
> transdisciplinary research practice.
>
> About the author:
> Prof. Dr. Dr. Bernhard Irrgang
> Dr. Bernhard Irrgang (professor for philosophy of technology at TU
> Dresden) teaches courses in philosophy of technology and ethical
> hermeneutics in the Institute for Philosophy at Dresden University of
> Technology Germany. He has expertise in different fields of philosophy
> of technology and research on the philosophical issues and questions
> of techniques and technology especially in gene technologies, cultural
> theory of techniques, information technology, artificial intelligence
> and expert systems, technological assessments, hermeneutical ethics
> and medicine ethics. Main emphases are on: Philosophical questions and
> topics concerning technique and technology; Technology and Cultural
> transfer; Technical development and early technical cultures;
> Technoscience research; STS research (Science, Technology and Society
> studies), esp. Gene Technology, Culture theory of technique,
> Information Technology/Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems;
> Technological Assessment and Organisation of technology; Study of
> limitations between philosophy and biology; Applied and Hermeneutics
> Ethics; Technological ethics; Ecological ethics, medical ethics,
> Intercultural environmental ethics. History of philosophy in 17th,
> 18th, 20th century.


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