http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/opinion/03ghosh.html?_r=1&emc=eta1


December 3, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
India’s 9/11? Not Exactly 
By AMITAV GHOSH
SINCE the terrorist assaults began in Mumbai last week, the metaphor of the 
World Trade Center attacks has been repeatedly invoked. From New Delhi to New 
York, pundits and TV commentators have insisted that “this is India’s 9/11” and 
should be treated as such. Nearly every newspaper in India has put “9/11” into 
its post-massacre headlines. The secretary general of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party, the leading Hindu nationalist political faction, has not only likened 
the Mumbai attack to those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but has 
insisted that “our response must be close to what the American response was.” 
There can be no doubt that there are certain clear analogies between the two 
attacks: in both cases the terrorists were clearly at great pains to single out 
urban landmarks, especially those that serve as symbolic points of reference in 
this increasingly interconnected world. There are similarities, too, in the 
unexpectedness of the attacks, the meticulousness of their planning, their 
shock value and the utter unpreparedness of the security services. But this is 
where the similarities end. Not only were the casualties far greater on Sept. 
11, 2001, but the shock of the attack was also greatly magnified by having no 
real precedent in America’s history. 
India’s experience of terrorist attacks, on the other hand, far predates 2001. 
Although this year has been one of the worst in recent history, 1984 was 
arguably worse still. That year an insurgency in the Punjab culminated in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards. This in 
turn led to riots that took the lives of some 2,000 Sikhs.
I was living in Delhi then and I recall vividly the sense of besetting crisis, 
of extreme fragility, of being pushed to the edge of an abyss: it was the only 
time I can recall when the very project of the Indian republic seemed to be 
seriously endangered. Yet for all its horror, the portents of 1984 were by no 
means fulfilled: in the following years, there was a slow turnaround; the 
Punjab insurgency gradually quieted down; and although the victims of the 
massacres may never receive justice in full measure, there has been some 
judicial retribution. 
This has been another terrible year: even before the invasion of Mumbai, 
several hundred people had been killed and injured in terrorist assaults. Yet 
the attacks on Jaipur, Ahmedabad, New Delhi, Guwahati and elsewhere did not set 
off chains of retaliatory violence of the sort that would almost certainly have 
resulted 10 or 15 years ago. Nor did the violence create a sense of existential 
crisis for the nation, as in 1984. Thus, despite all loss of life, this year 
could well be counted as a victory not for terrorism but for India’s citizenry. 
The question now is this: Will the November invasion of Mumbai change this? 
Although there is no way of knowing the answer, it is certain that if the 
precedent of 9/11 is taken seriously the outcome will be profoundly 
counterproductive. As a metaphor “9/11” is invested not just with the memory of 
what happened in Manhattan and at the Pentagon in 2001, but also with the 
penumbra of emotions that surround the events: the feeling that “the world will 
never be the same,” the notion that this was “the day the world woke up” and so 
on. In this sense 9/11 refers not just to the attacks but also to its 
aftermath, in particular to an utterly misconceived military and judicial 
response, one that has had disastrous consequences around the world. 
When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11 they are in effect pushing the 
Indian government to mount a comparable response. If India takes a hard line 
modeled on the actions of the Bush administration, the consequences are sure to 
be equally disastrous. The very power of the 9/11 metaphor blinds us to the 
possibility that there might be other, more productive analogies for the 
invasion of Mumbai: one is the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, which 
led to a comparable number of casualties and created a similar sense of shock 
and grief.
If 9/11 is a metaphor for one kind of reaction to terrorism, then 11-M (as it 
is known in Spanish) should serve as shorthand for a different kind of 
response: one that emphasizes vigilance, patience and careful police work in 
coordination with neighboring countries. This is exactly the kind of response 
India needs now, and fortunately this seems to be the course that the 
government, led by the Congress Party, has decided to follow. Government 
spokesmen have been at some pains to specify that India does not intend to 
respond with a troop buildup along the border with Pakistan, as the Bharatiya 
Janata-led government did after the attack by Muslim extremists on India’s 
Parliament in 2001. 
A buildup would indeed serve no point at all, since this is not the kind of war 
that can be fought along a border, by conventional armies. The Indian 
government would do better to focus on an international effort to eliminate the 
terrorists’ hide-outs and safe houses, some of them deep inside Pakistan. India 
will also need to cooperate with those in the Pakistani government who have 
come around to a belated recognition of the dangers of terrorism. 
The choice of targets in Mumbai clearly owes something to the September bombing 
of the Islamabad Marriott, another high-profile site sure to include foreign 
casualties. Here already there is common ground between the two countries — for 
if this has been a bad year for India in regard to terrorism, then for Pakistan 
it has been still worse. 
It is clear now that Pakistan’s establishment is so deeply divided that it no 
longer makes sense to treat it as a single entity. Sometimes a crisis is also 
an opportunity: this is a moment when India can forge strategic alliances with 
those sections of the Pakistani government, military and society who understand 
that they, too, are under fire. 
Much will depend, in the coming days, on Mumbai’s reaction to the invasion. 
That the city was not stricken by turmoil in the immediate aftermath of the 
attack is undoubtedly a positive sign. That the terrorists concentrated their 
assault on the most upscale parts of the city had the odd consequence of 
limiting the disruption in the everyday lives of most Mumbai residents. 
Chhatrapati Shivaji station, for instance, was open just a few hours after the 
terrorists there were cleared out. In the northern suburbs, the home of 
Bollywood’s studios, actors were summoned to rehearsal even while the battles 
were being fought. 
But with each succeeding day, tensions are rising and the natural anxieties of 
the inhabitants are being played upon. Still, this is not a moment for 
precipitate action: if India can react with dispassionate but determined 
resolve, then 2008 may yet be remembered as a moment when the tide turned in a 
long, long battle. For if there is any one lesson to be learned from the wave 
of terrorist attacks that has convulsed the globe over the last decade it is 
this: Defeat or victory is not determined by the success of the strike itself; 
it is determined by the response. 
 
Amitav Ghosh is the author, most recently, of the novel “Sea of Poppies.”


      
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