Could he be seen as a serious journalist at all? On Apr 13, 5:54 pm, Sukla Sen <[email protected]> wrote: > [Quote > The former Punjab Director-General of Police, K.P.S. Gill's signal > contribution was demonstrating that alternatives to population-centric > counter-insurgency could succeed. Instead of engaging in protracted, > large-force operations, Mr. Gill focussed on offensive operations targeting > the leadership and cadre of Khalistan terrorists. In effect, unconventional > war-fighting methods were used to defeat unconventional > war-fighting methods. Evidence that such tactics work has piled up. In Jammu > and Kashmir, the Special Operations Group succeeded in decimating the > leadership of the Hizb ul-Mujahideen. Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds destroyed > a once-powerful Maoist insurgency. Tripura defeated an intractable tribal > insurgency. > Unquote > > Praveen Swami is calling for targeted killing of the insurgent leaders (and > cadres)! > Understandably, away from the battlefields. Dragged out of homes or on the > city streets? A la Mossad!? > And deriding Chidambaram for not doing that. For being "conservative"! > > He proclaims that "Indian forces are losing" - to justify his call for > adoption of "unconventional" methods. > Evidently the execution of this fiendish call would call for drumming up of > insane paranoia. > > If the "democratic" state starts emulating the Maoists, then the state loses > its legitimacy. Life, in general, radically degrades. Maoist, and such > other, armed and systematic violence becomes the only feasible option for > protest against state policies and actions. > Violence escalates. Gory turns gorier. > That's too nauseous.] > > http://www.hinduonnet.com/2010/04/13/stories/2010041362531000. > > *For a review of counter-insurgency doctrine* > > Praveen Swami > > *Key to India's failure in combating Maoist insurgency is an ahistorical, > one-size-fits-all security doctrine.* > > Eric Hobsbawm wrote: “There is nothing in the purely military pages of Mao, > > Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara or other manuals of guerrilla warfare which a > traditional guerrillero or band leader would regard as other than simple > common sense.” > > Last week, after the massacre of 76 police personnel in Dantewada, Union > Home Minister P. Chidambaram urged Indians to “remain calm, keep your nerve, > and do not stray from the carefully chosen course that we have adopted since > November 2009.” > > The last of those recommendations may prove profoundly misguided. Few of the > strategists charged with executing the Minister's ambitious counter-Maoist > offensive appear to have grasped its doctrinal and tactical demands. > Premised on the belief that counter-insurgency campaigns must be > population-centric — in other words, dominate territories and thus deny > insurgents contact with the population — the strategic foundation of India's > war against Maoist insurgents is flawed. The bottom line is this: Indian > forces are losing. Last year, 312 security personnel were killed to 294 > Maoists. This year, too, the figures are grim. > > For centuries, insurgents have known that a superior force can be defeated. > Napoleon Bonaparte believed that his 1808 occupation of Spain would be a > “military promenade.” Instead, France found itself bogged down by a > protracted guerrilla struggle that lasted six years and compelled to commit > three-fifths of its imperial army. Irish insurgents who fought the British > in 1848 were taught to “decompose the science and system of war.” “The force > of England,” advised the radical James Lalor, “is entrenched and fortified. > You must draw it out of position; break up its mass; break its trained line > of march and manoeuvre; its equal step and serried array.” > > Much of this would have been familiar to peasant rebels and bandits in > India. Back in 1813, Kallua Gujjar led a successful series of raids > targeting moneylenders, travellers and police posts in the Saharanpur-Dehra > Dun belt. His 1,000-strong irregular force was, on one occasion, able to > loot a group of some 200 police personnel. Bhil insurgents staged a series > of revolt between 1820 and 1860 — driven, among other things, by the > large-scale expropriation of Adivasi land by the state and growing > exploitation by moneylenders. Despite the use of irregular formations like > James Outram's Bhil Corps and a policy of pacification that involved pushing > the Adivasis to become settled farmers, the Bhil raids continued for > decades. > > Major-General Akbar Khan, who commanded the Pakistani irregular offensive > directed at Srinagar in 1947, described the tactical mindset of such > irregular warriors in his memoirs: “One Mahsud tribesman aptly described to > me their tactics as being like that of the hawk. The hawk flies high in the > sky, out of danger; he flies round and round until he sees his prey and then > he swoops down on it for one mighty strike and when he has got his prey, he > does not wait around, he flies off at once to some far off quiet place where > he can enjoy what he has got.” > > Ossified doctrine > > Key to India's failure in combating Maoist insurgency is an ahistorical, > one-size-fits-all security doctrine. In essence, state responses have > consisted of pumping in forces for conventional, ground-holding operations > in the hope of displacing guerrilla forces; maintaining high force levels > over sustained periods of time; and, using this military presence to push > forward with developmental and political initiatives to deprive insurgents > of their political legitimacy. > > Indian counter-insurgency tactics and strategy, Vijendra Singh Jafa notes, > “have remained fundamentally conservative and traditional, influenced > substantially by accounts of British experiences.” Drawing on the British > campaign against the Malayan Communist Party, Indian strategists believe > that successful counter-insurgency campaigns must focus on winning popular > support. New work, like that of historian Karl Hack, has shown that the back > of the Malayan insurgency was, in fact, broken long before Britain set about > winning hearts and minds. Little of this revisionist literature, though, has > been studied seriously in Indian military academies. > > Despite plenty of evidence that population-centric strategies do not work > —witness the durability of insurgencies in the northeast and Jammu and > Kashmir — the doctrine has never been reappraised. > > The former Punjab Director-General of Police, K.P.S. Gill's signal > contribution was demonstrating that alternatives to population-centric > counter-insurgency could succeed. Instead of engaging in protracted, > large-force operations, Mr. Gill focussed on offensive operations targeting > the leadership and cadre of Khalistan terrorists. In effect, unconventional > war-fighting methods were used to defeat unconventional war-fighting > methods. Evidence that such tactics work has piled up. In Jammu and Kashmir, > the Special Operations Group succeeded in decimating the leadership of the > Hizb ul-Mujahideen. Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds destroyed a once-powerful > Maoist insurgency. Tripura defeated an intractable tribal insurgency. > > In a thoughtful 1988 paper for the United States Air Force Airpower Research > Institute, Dennis Drew noted that counter-insurgency operations called for > an upturning of military thinking. Military professionals, he wrote, believe > “that the basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that lead > to the destruction of the enemy's centre of gravity.” India's policy of > pumping company-sized formations into the Maoist heartland, and attempting > to dominate the territory around them, is one manifestation of this > thinking. The problem is successful insurgents have no fixed centre of > gravity — no bases that conventional forces may overwhelm. > > Population-centred counter-insurgency has received renewed legitimacy from > the apparent success of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq, which was marketed as > having subdued a growing insurgency. But, as scholar and soldier Gian > Gentile has pointed out, the notion that the reduction of insurgent violence > in Iraq was “primarily the result of American military action is hubris run > amok.” In fact, Gentile argued, a “combination of brutal attacks by Shia > militia in conjunction with the actions of the Iraqi Shia government and the > continuing persecution by the al-Qaeda against the Sunni community convinced > the insurgents that they could no longer counter all these forces and it was > to their advantage to cut a deal with the Americans.” > > Capacity crisis > > For many in the Indian intelligentsia, the defeat of insurgents is an > inevitability: part, as it were, of the manifest destiny of the state. Last > week, Shekhar Gupta, editor of Indian Express, offered a ringing endorsement > of this received wisdom, arguing that insurgencies “follow a pattern pretty > much like a bell curve,” “The graph of violence,” he argued, “rises in the > initial period, producing more and more casualties on both sides. But at > some stage the rebels come to the realisation that the state and its people > are too strong and resolute to be ever defeated, no matter what the score, > in a particular day's battle in a long war. That is the point of inflexion > when rebels see reason. There is no reason why the Maoist insurgency will > not follow that same pattern.” > > But will it? Back in 1954, when India first committed troops to battling > Naga insurgents, just one State was hit by insurgency. Now, 265 of 625 > districts are affected by one form or the other of chronic conflict — a > figure that excludes areas with unacceptably high levels of organised crime, > as well as cities periodically targeted by jihadist violence. It is far from > clear if the resources exist to address the problem. Italy has 559 police > officers for every 1,00,000 citizens; Bihar has 60, Orissa 97, Chhattisgarh > 128 and Jharkhand 136. Even the Army, despite its apparently enormous size, > will be stretched if it is committed to internal security duties. The United > States has one soldier for every 186 citizens; India has one for 866. > > Worse, it is far from clear if the Indian state has the capacity needed for > rapid, transformative projects. The U.S., figures compiled by the Institute > for Conflict Management's Ajai Sahni show, has 889 federal employees, and > 6,314 state and local employees for every 1,00,000 citizens. India's Union > government has 295 — and if one excludes railway employees, 171. > Chhattisgarh has 1,067 government employees per 1,00,000 population; Bihar, > a pathetic 472. > > Even if forces are found to saturate the ground, experience shows, > development will not necessarily follow. In both Jammu and Kashmir and the > northeast, state spending has yielded only limited results. Funds have often > been siphoned off by local contractors and politicians — and, worse, preyed > on by insurgents. In effect, the injection of cash into troubled regions has > subsidised insurgency. > > Learning from its own success stories, India needs to fight insurgencies in > smarter, leaner ways. Like Andhra Pradesh, States must invest in training > facilities that meet their particular needs; expand intelligence > capabilities; and use technology effectively. Instead of focussing on simply > expanding the size of Central forces, the Union government must understand > the need for them to be properly trained and equipped. Soldiers without > skills have only one fate: defeat. > > In time, it is true, Indian forces may succeed in wearing down the Maoist > insurgency, albeit at a horrible cost of lives — but there are reasons to > worry that they may not. India's strategic strengths are manifest. But as > the work of military scholar Ivan Arreguin-Toft teaches us, the weak do > sometimes win. Instead of despatching ever-greater numbers of men to support > those already flailing in the face of insurgent fire, a dispassionate review > of both doctrine and tactics is needed. > > -- > Peace Is Doable
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