Quote
Under U.S. influence, international conventions dealing with nuclear
liability have thus embodied three concepts of dubious merit from the
efficiency perspective. First, legal channelling of liability for accidents
to foreign operators, second, giving operators an extremely limited right of
recourse against suppliers in the event of an accident and, third, setting
aside ordinary tort law and disallowing fault-based claims by victims
against operator or supplier.
Unquote

As far as legal channelling of liability for accidents to operators
(regardless of foreign  or indigenous) goes, it is actually highly welcome
in itself from the viewpoint of the victims.

It'd in fact be well nigh impossible for the victims otherwise to pinpoint
the responsibility.
It'd be otherwise an interminable and highly asymmetric  legal battle, a
true Kafkaesque scenario for the victim(s).

But that must not deprive the operator of its own right to recourse
vis-a-vis the  turn-key contractor, suppliers, consultant etc., as the case
may be.
The operator would very much be in a position to fight long legal battles if
necessary. And, it would be a more or less equal fight.

As regards the limit or cap on operator's liability, while ideally there
should be no cap, the real problem is that very much unlike in other
industries here no substantive insurance cover is available. Given the very
nature of nuclear industry and its catastrophic potentials.
That's the elephant in the room.
Siddharth is just mum on that.

Quote
In the wake of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, therefore, getting India to
accede to the CSC has been Washington's priority. That would effectively bar
Indian victims from approaching an American court in the event of an
accident involving a U.S.-supplied reactor.
Unquote

Here also, one is just barking up the wrong tree.
As and when the CSC comes into force, the US as a signatory, and in fact
initiator, would ipso facto be (broadly) governed by the provisions of the
CSC.
So would India be as and when it subscribes to the CSC. As much as all other
member nations.

It is of course not to deny the general merits of the article.

Sukla

http://www.hinduonnet.com/2010/06/16/stories/2010061654181000.htm

<http://www.hinduonnet.com/2010/06/16/stories/2010061654181000.htm>

*Turn the nuclear bill from liability to asset*

Siddharth Varadarajan

*The legislative challenge is to ensure that Indian victims get the same
degree of protection from Indian courts as U.S. victims would from their
courts.*

As one of only two countries to run a nuclear power programme without any
statute dealing with the possibility of an accident — the other is Pakistan
— India has done well to finally recognise the importance of enacting a
liability law. With ambitious plans for 20,000 MWe of nuclear power
generation capacity on the anvil, liability legislation, especially if it
helps internalise the risks associated with this expansion, can lower the
probability of accidents. A good law would also ensure speedy and adequate
compensation to victims.

The shabby manner in which the Indian system has dealt with the Bhopal
disaster is a reminder of the need to place the victim at the centre of
legislative action. Unfortunately, the international framework for nuclear
liability is designed to favour nuclear suppliers. Despite this constraint,
the Manmohan Singh government has managed to frame a law with some positive
features. It includes two provisions that are not to the liking of the U.S.,
which wants to grab a share of the huge Indian market without accepting
liability for any accident its products may cause. At the same time, the
bill has some definite weaknesses.

The international regime on civil nuclear liability suffers from a serious
flaw. By excluding the supplier, channelling liability for a nuclear
accident to the operator and capping this liability, it leads to
underinvestment in safety. This is because potential tort-feasors optimise
their behaviour on the basis of artificially low damages they would have to
pay in case things go wrong.

As Michael Faure and Karine Fiore have argued, any legal regime governing
civil liability must aim to push the industry towards the prevention of
accidents. “A basic notion is that the injurer should be fully exposed to
damage costs in order to provide him with the necessary incentives for
prevention” (“An economic analysis of the nuclear liability subsidy,” Pace
Environmental Law Review, 2009). As a corollary, all those who can
contribute to accident risk should be forced to internalise the costs of the
damage they might cause. If all treaties on nuclear liability — including
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation to which India is planning to
accede — stand the economics of torts on their head, this is because of the
nuclear suppliers' lobby. Right from the 1950s, when nuclear power was in
its infancy, down to today, U.S. contractors have contended they cannot do
business abroad if there is a danger of being exposed to law suits.

Under U.S. influence, international conventions dealing with nuclear
liability have thus embodied three concepts of dubious merit from the
efficiency perspective. First, legal channelling of liability for accidents
to foreign operators, second, giving operators an extremely limited right of
recourse against suppliers in the event of an accident and, third, setting
aside ordinary tort law and disallowing fault-based claims by victims
against operator or supplier.

All of this was done in the name of speedy compensation for victims since
the quid pro quo of channelling was the rule of ‘strict liability' under
which the operator is liable even if he is not at fault. Victims benefit
from this rule since there is no ambiguity about who must pay. But as Tom
Vanden Borre has argued, channelling was “not introduced to protect the
victims of nuclear accidents, nor to reduce the insurance costs, but to
protect the American nuclear industry.” The irony is that even as it has
pushed the regime of legal channelling on the rest of the world, the U.S.
system of economic channelling of liability allows tort claims as well as an
unrestricted right of recourse for the operator. That is how, for example,
Metropolitan Edison, the operator of the Three Mile Island reactor, sued its
supplier, Babcock & Wilcox, after the 1979 accident.

Supplementing these layers of protection for nuclear suppliers is a fourth:
legal jurisdiction belongs to the courts of the country where the accident
takes place. Bhopal, where Indian victims approached a U.S. court, is the
ghost that looms large. “While ultimately the court declined to take
jurisdiction”, Ben McCrae, legal counsel for the U.S. Department of Energy,
notes, “this was not because it doubted its capacity to do so: it basically
waited to ensure that there was an adequate remedy available in India.”

In the wake of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, therefore, getting India to
accede to the CSC has been Washington's priority. That would effectively bar
Indian victims from approaching an American court in the event of an
accident involving a U.S.-supplied reactor. Of course, this in itself cannot
be an argument against India adopting a liability law. Rather, the challenge
is to embed nuclear liability in a set of legal and administrative measures
that can ensure the payment of speedy and adequate compensation to victims
as well as force everyone in the nuclear business — suppliers and operators
— to internalise the costs of an accident. Indeed, the legislative challenge
is to ensure that Indian victims get the same degree of protection from
Indian courts as U.S. victims would from their courts.

In a recent article, Evelyne Ameye has confronted the flawed logic of
channelling, making a safety-cum-engineering argument in favour of suppliers
remaining liable for accidents their products may cause. (“Channelling of
nuclear third party liability towards the operator,” European Energy and
Environmental Law Review, 2010). This can be done in two ways. Liability for
an accident can still be channelled on to the operator but his right of
recourse in the event of supplier negligence is left unrestricted. The
Russian Federal Act on Atomic Energy, for example, does not impose a limit
upon the operator's right of recourse. (Alexander Matveev, “The Russian
approach to nuclear liability,” International Journal of Nuclear Law, 2006).
South Korea's liability legislation also allows operators to recover damages
from suppliers in the event of negligence. A second way would be to allow
victims to sue suppliers for fault-liability under tort law so as to win
damages over and above what the operator pays through strict liability. Thus
Germany, a party to the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability, entered a
reservation stressing its right, under national law, to hold persons other
than the operator liable for nuclear damage. Besides, several conventions on
environmental damage — such as the 2003 Kiev Protocol on industrial
accidents in transboundary waters — now explicitly provide for strict as
well as fault-liability to run side by side.

Ameye argues that channelling can no longer be justified on the grounds of
nuclear power being an infant industry. Nor is it healthy to exclude
suppliers from the liability chain when nuclear technology is rapidly
evolving. “Given the increasingly complex designs of the new generations of
nuclear power plants, it is… both legally and realistically incorrect to
maintain the heavy burden of legal channelling upon the nuclear plant's
operator … To the extent that design knowledge becomes more hermetic, it
will be hard to sustain the operator's liability for risks he is not aware
of or, even worse, for risks he cannot perceive”. This is especially so when
all major nuclear accidents in the past — Windscale, Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl — have occurred, in part, because of design flaws.

Turning to the Indian bill, the inclusion of strict liability is a positive
feature. The bill also legally channels this liability to the operator, thus
eliminating any ambiguity about who must pay. On the positive side, too, is
the additional 300 million SDRs (approximately Rs. 2050 crore) Indian
victims would be entitled to from pooled contributions by state parties to
the CSC, as and when it enters into force.

On the negative side is the cap placed on the operator's no-fault liability.
The bill sets this at Rs. 500 crore, a figure that is low by international
standards and by the requirement of safety incentivisation. In case the
operator is private — a key qualification since the bill is not limited to
public operators — this cap amounts to a subsidy as the government will
assume liability for damages up to a maximum of 300 million SDRs. Private
operators must not get such a benefit. Even if the operator is a public
entity, the liability cap will distort the true cost of running a reactor
and lead to a higher than optimal share of nuclear power in India's energy
mix.

Where the original Indian bill is innovative is in allowing operators a
right of recourse against suppliers in the event of gross negligence
(Section 17(b)). Also, the bill would appear to allow victims to sue for
fault-liability, though the ambiguous wording of Section 46 leaves unclear
whether tort claims can be pressed against only the operator or any other
person whose negligence leads to an accident.

Since both provisions undermine the principle of channelling, U.S. suppliers
want them deleted. Not only must that pressure be resisted but steps should
be taken to clarify their provisions.

Also, in the light of Bhopal, it is cold comfort to be told that victims can
use existing laws to pursue compensation. As the Merlin case in England
showed, courts can treat tort claims for nuclear damage with scepticism. In
India, where the law of the torts is not well developed, it is essential
that the nuclear liability bill provide mechanisms to allow victims to
effectively press their case.
-- 
Peace Is Doable



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Peace Is Doable

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