http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/6411
Top of Form [image: Description: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/images/CommentaryNews/bmd.png]*Regardless of New START, Obama Should Limit U.S. Missile Defense* Andrew Futter | 15 Sep 2010 Critics of the New START treaty charge that, if ratified, it would constrain U.S. missile defense plans. Whether or not the treaty's non-binding preamble supports their argument, the broader question regarding the future of missile defense<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5951/u-s-must-prioritize-bmd-cooperation-with-russia> is an important one. Missile defenses bolster deterrence and strengthen the security of U.S. allies, giving them a significant role to play in a fluid and dynamic contemporary security environment. But regardless of the New START treaty, the Obama administration will have to limit U.S. missile defense plans if it wishes to remain credibly committed to future arms reduction agreements with Russia, as well as to widespread nuclear reductions and the possibility of global zero. This is in part because any expansion of missile defense in Europe is almost certain to be a spoiler in further nuclear arms reduction negotiations with Russia, themselves a precursor to wider cuts. Meanwhile, if the expansion of U.S. missile defenses in East Asia is perceived as a threat by China, it could undermine the region's entire nonproliferation structure. Finally, current U.S. missile defense plans are also likely to be naturally limited by both technological and budgetary constraints. Although much of the zero-sum Cold War thinking about missile defense has become anachronistic, U.S. BMD plans were still a significant stumbling block<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1904/sochi-summit-fails-to-solve-u-s-russian-missile-defense-dispute> in the New START negotiation process. For a variety of political, ideological and tactical reasons, Russia remains staunchly opposed to U.S. missile defense plans, particularly in Europe, and any further deployments seem likely to become an even bigger obstacle to future nuclear arms reduction agreements between the two countries. The fact that numerous efforts toward establishing cooperation on missile defense with Russia have so far been fruitless, and that the administration's Phased Adaptive Approach includes the possible deployment of hundreds of interceptor to Europe, suggests that the problem is likely to persist. Stalled progress in arms reductions with Russia will in turn make persuading other nuclear powers to disarm and thus multilateralise the push for nuclear arms reductions an even more daunting task. If the Obama team remains serious about further nuclear arms control agreements with Russia -- a formidable task on its own -- not to mention wider nuclear cuts, then limits on U.S. missile defense plans will almost certainly have to be included in such a deal. Equally important is the planned and current expansion of U.S. missile defenses in East Asia in response to the growing threat from North Korea. While China has been far less vocal about U.S. BMD plans than Russia, its smaller nuclear deterrent force and the potentially destabilizing impact of U.S. deployments in the region make them a far more complicated problem. A Phased Adaptive Approach in East Asia, as called for by the February Ballistic Missile Defense Review, is certainly an integral component in enhancing deterrence against Pyongyang, but the benefits of this must be balanced against how the deployments might be perceived by Beijing. China might decide to respond to these deployments by building more nuclear weapons, citing the need to preserve its deterrent capacity or even its freedom of action on regional issues such as Taiwan. Such a scenario would create strong pressures for nations like Japan, South Korea, India, Pakistan and others to seek or enhance their own nuclear capability. Such a result would be hugely detrimental to a whole range of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives. The scale and scope of short-term U.S. missile defense plans are also likely to be naturally limited by both technological barriers and simple economics. Due partly to the cost, it is very unlikely that the long-range, ground-based interceptor missile installations in Alaska and California will be expanded, barring a considerable increase in the threat posed by Iran and North Korea. Moreover, although the Aegis sea-based SM3 system forms the backbone of the Obama administration's missile defense plans, it remains limited in its capacity, and later versions of the SM-3 missile have not yet been tested. Plans will also be limited by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' goal to streamline the U.S. defense budget, which seems likely to provide both a natural limit on annual BMD procurement and also a strong disincentive to further expansion. Moreover, while the SM-3 interceptor missile is comparatively cheap at $10 million to $12 million each, the Aegis ships needed to support them are not. Whether or not the New START Treaty limits U.S. missile defense plans, the Obama administration will need to make a choice in the near future between the expansion of missile defenses and the credibility of its nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This does not mean that missile defenses should be abandoned or that they are intrinsically undesirable. They shouldn't be, and they are not. But it does mean that the Obama administration and those that come after it must find a way to reconcile the benefits offered by missile defense with other, potentially conflicting requirements of U.S. national security policy.* Andrew Futter is a doctoral candidate at the University of Birmingham, U.K.* * Photo: The first ground-based interceptor is lowered into its silo at the missile defense complex at Fort Greely, Alaska, July 2004 (Department of Defense photo).* -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. 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