I/II. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Strengthen-local-police-station-to-pack-a-punch-against-terror/articleshow/9252444.cms
Strengthen local police station to pack a punch against terrorPrakash Singh | Jul 17, 2011, 05.53am IST Terrorists have struck in Mumbai once again. This was the fifth major strike against India's biggest commercial hub, the earlier ones coming in 1993 (257 killed), 2003 (52 killed), 2006 (188 killed) and 2008 (166 killed). Securing Mumbai <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Securing-Mumbai>, with its demographic complexities, cannot be easy, but it should not be that difficult either. After all, New York<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/New-York> , Madrid <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Madrid> and London<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/London> were also attacked by terrorists, but those cities were able to secure themselves and the terrorists could not make any subsequent dent. It is true that in the wake of 26/11, the government took a number of steps to strengthen law enforcement and build its counter-terrorism edifice. National Security Guard (NSG) hubs were established at locations other than Delhi. The National Investigation Agency was set up. Counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism schools were established. The police strength was augmented and its equipment upgraded. A multi-agency centre was activated. Coastal security was beefed up. These measures went a long way, but were obviously not enough. The government needs to understand that an efficient police force with a high level of motivation is the strongest defence against any threat to law and order. The police, particularly at the thana (station) level, are the first responders to any challenge - be it a terrorist attack, a Maoist ambush or a communal conflagration. Preventive action also depends on the police's network of sources and contacts and whether they have their ears to the ground. This basic unit of the police - the ubiquitous thana - is one of the most neglected formations of the department. It is understaffed, under equipped and does not have the resources to cope with the complex challenges of present times. On September 22, 2006, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions for police reforms and ordered the setting up of a state security commission (to insulate the police from extraneous influences), a police establishment board (to give the force functional autonomy) and a police complaints authority (to ensure their accountability). The court also prescribed a transparent procedure for the selection of the Director General of Police and directed that this person, as also officers discharging operational responsibilities, have a minimum tenure of two years. The court further said that investigation work and law and order should be separately dealt with to improve the quality of investigations. These orders were to be implemented by March 31, 2007. It is a sad commentary on the working of our democracy that the state governments have been dragging their feet over the implementation of these directives. The Thomas Committee, which was appointed to monitor the progress of the implementation of the Supreme Court's directions in various states, found that "practically no state has fully complied with those directives so far, in letter and spirit", and expressed its "dismay over the total indifference to the issue of reforms in the functioning of police being exhibited by the states". The Union government's response has also been tardy. It is yet to pass the Delhi <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Delhi> Police Bill, which could have been a model for the other states. It is high time that the Supreme Court cracks the whip on the states that have refused to implement its directions or passed laws violating their letter and spirit. The Government of India<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/India> could also make grants under modernization conditional to the states implementing the reforms package. Police reforms are not for the glory of the police - they are to protect our democracy, our economy and to uphold the Rule of Law. Terrorism could be contained if the governments, both at the Centre and in the states, carry out essential reforms that would energize and invigorate the working of the police as a whole, particularly at the thana level. Seven yardsticks would be enough for the primary police unit: the police station must be adequately staffed, the staff must be well trained, they must be properly equipped, they must have decent housing, they should have adequate transport, they must have reliable communications and, above all, they should be free from extraneous pressures? If these goals are achieved, the response to any threat to law and order would pack a far greater punch. Governments have so far paid attention mostly to strengthening the super-structure. It is time they now think of the beat constable, the thana and the Station House Officer, around whom most of the police activities revolve. If the foundations are strong, the structure would stand firm. Taking a long term point of view, the existing constitutional arrangement which places 'police' in the State List also needs to be revisited. The states are very heavily dependent on the Centre for maintaining law and order even under normal conditions. What exists de facto may be recognized de jure. It would be appropriate if federal crimes, which could be defined, are brought under the concurrent list. The practice is already in vogue in the US. The stakes are very high; the political class needs to rise above narrow parochial considerations. (The writer is a retired police chief and security analyst) II. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/special-report/Business-of-terror/articleshow/9254539.cms Business of terrorJosy Joseph<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toireporter/author-Josy-Joseph.cms>, TNN | Jul 17, 2011, 06.10am IST Amidst several theories about who was behind the latest serial blasts in Mumbai, a deeply troubling new question is haunting investigators. Has money begun playing a bigger role than ideology? And are the motivations and anger of fringe groups being translated into action executed by criminals, sometimes so lowly that they are conveniently anonymous? Doubts about the outsourcing of terror are cropping up again among a growing number of officials in the security establishment because of the inability of investigators to make sense of the jigsaw of terror in the past few years. "Even in cases where we have been able to achieve a breakthrough, there are significant gaps," says a senior official. The spectacular nature of terror strikes then may not be backed by a similarly effective terror organization. There are indications that the whole business is being outsourced to local criminal gangs or individuals who would, for instance, carry out the recce, identify the spot and plant the bomb. All for adequate compensation. This assumption, signs of which are now available in several recent cases, is prompting many within the establishment to suspect that at least some of the terrorist attacks may not be the handiwork of a singular organization; they could be acts executed through multiple layers, with the final operation handed over to people who actually may have nothing to do with the ideology behind it. "For a few thousand rupees you can get criminals to place a bomb. They don't need any other particular capability," an officer says. "Unlike in the '90s, when we were able to track a crime of such nature from particulars of the man who planted the bomb, and trace it up to the very top, we are unable to connect the dots clearly today. The gaps in our investigations, between the attacker and the ideological top, are increasing." Such gaps are visible in many of the serials blasts in Indian cities like Jaipur and Delhi, and even in the 2006 train blasts of Mumbai, the IC-814 hijack <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/IC-814-hijack> of 1999, and the Parliament attack<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Parliament-attack>. In fact, it was only in the 2008 Mumbai<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Mumbai> attacks that agencies had direct, credible evidence of the attackers' Pakistani links, thanks to the interception of communications between terrorists in Mumbai and their handlers in Pakistan<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Pakistan> . The outsourcing of terror to criminals and others not really connected to the ideology is visible in most of the attacks of recent times, be it by Hindu fringe groups or Islamic fundamentalists. One officer points out that the way the Karachi <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Karachi> Project (the ISI plan to recruit Indians to carry out terror strikes so that blame does not go back to Pakistan) is being executed, it is a definite example of how terrorism is finally being carried out by criminals. Riyaz Bhatkal, the co-founder of Indian Mujahideen (believed to be an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba for executing the Karachi Project), had been part of a criminal syndicate in Mumbai before he turned to terrorism. Investigators also suspect that some other members of IM, who are involved in executing the blasts, are criminal elements. "Ideology is not the sole motive. Money and protection plays a key part," an intelligence officer says. The creation of Indian Mujahideen may be a part of the Pakistani establishment's continuing strategy to bleed India<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/India> from a thousand cuts, but its existence and survival are dependent on men like Bhatkal, he adds. A similar pattern is visible among the Hindu fundamentalist group that was behind blasts in places like Mecca Masjid, Ajmer and in the Samjhauta Express. Sunil Joshi, one of the co-conspirators in the attacks, had earlier been charged with the murder of tribal leader Pyar Singh Nenama. Harshad Solanki, who is an accused in Gujarat's Best Bakery case, is another key player in the so-called right-wing terror module. "What is emerging clearly is the fact that at the execution level there are these criminal elements who would do anything for a price," one officer says. And he believes that this concept of outsourcing may now have become the norm in terrorism and insurgency-related incidents across the country. Many say that in Kashmir and the Northeast, most of the violence in the name of insurgency is merely local criminal operations. What makes outsourcing an added attraction today is the ease with which a bomb can be assembled and planted, meaning those doing it don't have to put themselves to much trouble. An Army explosives expert points out that putting together a bomb with RDX would require "fairly sophisticated levels of understanding" while assembling a bomb using TNT<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/TNT> (trinitrotoluene) or ammonium nitrate is a far easier process that can be done by an amateur. All one needs is a timer, a detonator, the required explosives and shrapnel. "For a few thousand rupees, one can get a pretty potent bomb," he says. Attesting this theory, an officer reminds how investigators in the German Bakery case in Pune had failed to link the suspect found in CCTV recordings to known sympathizers. "Ultimately, you are only looking at a limited number of suspects who have cropped up in previous investigations. What if the bomb planter is a new person?" an intelligence officer asks. A similar reason could be behind the inability to crack the attack in the Jama Masjid area of Delhi <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Delhi> just before the Commonwealth Games <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Commonwealth-Games>, when two motorcycle-borne youths shot at a bus full of tourists. But not all are convinced. Rana Banerjee, a retired senior Research and Analysis Wing officer (R&AW), says that a majority of the attacks are still carried out in the name of ideology. "If the outsourcing is happening, it is definitely to proven and tested outfits that may not have the same driving principles," he says. A senior officer spoken to for this article argues that Mumbai being repeatedly targeted should make those probing the attacks "think in very unorthodox manners", including the possibility of the bomb planters being completely unconnected to the brains behind it. "How really is Mumbai different from, say, Delhi? The impact of an attack would be the same and so would the mix of the population," he says. "One big difference is the presence of organised criminal gangs and the underworld in Mumbai. It is an area we need to probe better." -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth?hl=en-GB.
