And with the Home Ministry under its command, is it too difficult to orchestrate a Reichstag fire and trigger a subsequent tectonic shift in the national polity?
Sukla On 10 December 2013 16:14, Mohammad Imran <[email protected]> wrote: > Kareem: What I mean is a coalition in which BJP will be joined with other > regional parties to run the central government. It has the focus and > desire to communalize departments which will be under its influence. > > On Dec 10, 2013, at 11:49 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > > Imran bhai N.Ram in his editorial gives more detailing on the subject > wherein he mentions BJP is absent in 250 seats in the country and the > final say will be with the regional parties . Delhi has clearly proved that > where there is a alternative to BJp and Congress people vote for the third > alternative. BJP got lesser percentage of votes in Delhi than what it got > last time despite the so called Modi factor . Even in Rajastan and Madhya > Pradesh the vote difference is 10% and 3% but whereas the no of seats won > is way higher despite the absence of a strong third front . The case for > proportionate representation becomes stronger in such a grossly > dissproptionate democratic representation of elected representatives, and > ultimately makes a mockery of the whole process . > > Kareem > > Sent from BSNL with my BlackBerry® smartphone > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Mohammad Imran <[email protected]> > > Sender: [email protected] > > Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 20:44:47 > > To: <[email protected]> > > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [progressive interactions29214] The not-quite ‘semi-final’ > and what it portends - The Hindu: Mobile Edition > > > > BJP whether giving a stellar performance or not in the incoming > elections will still be a very difficult proposition in the central > government as a major partner. When they were in the center coalition > twelve years ago they managed to Talibanize education books, gave Modi help > so he could remain chief minister after the pogrom and provided all help > they could to the Hindutva forces. They have more experience and more clout > now. The chance of India going fascist under NDA rule are much greater now > than they were before. BJP does not have to form a majority government to > tilt India to fascism. > > > > > > > > On Dec 9, 2013, at 8:07 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > > >> > >> > http://m.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-notquite-semifinal-and-what-it-portends/article5437122.ece/?secid=3010 > >> > >> For all those who may be disappointed with the BJp's stellar > performance here is a realistic analysis of what lies ahead and the truth > about Modi . > >> > >> Kareem > >> > >> > >> The not-quite ‘semi-final’ and what it portends > >> Dec 9, 2013 01:13 AM , By N. Ram > >> Everything now points to the BJP emerging as the single largest party, > by some distance, in the sixteenth Lok Sabha. But the Modi-led alliance > will not go into the mid-2014 ‘finals’ as the favourite, in any event not > the overwhelming favourite. > >> The results of the four State Assembly elections conducted in > November-December 2013 in northern India confirm one thing: the political > marketplace has downgraded Congress stock to junk status. The clear message > from tens of millions of voters to the party ruling at the Centre is ‘get > prepared to be in the Opposition for quite a stretch’. The Bharatiya Janata > Party’s sweep of the two largest States, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, is > significant but its cup of joy is not quite full. While a sterling > performance by a fresh-faced debutant, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), has > denied it outright victory in Delhi, the knife-edge contest in Chhattisgarh > has raised some awkward questions. These questions revolve round how the > people of the State, which witnessed the shocking liquidation by extremists > of the Congress’s top State leadership in May 2013, feel about governance, > security, and the Raman Singh government’s accountability for a grave > security failure. > >> > >> AAP’s performance > >> > >> The humbling of the Congress and the BJP’s surge in this round have > been along expected lines, more or less, but the AAP’s performance has been > way beyond general expectations. In fact, as far as political perceptions > and portents go, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that Arvind > Kejriwal’s team of dedicated campaigners and contestants in Delhi have > stolen the limelight from the architects of the BJP’s sweep of Rajasthan > and Madhya Pradesh. This time the opinion, exit, and post polls can claim > to have been on the right side of the popular mood and the electoral > trends. However, the vote share estimates and seat forecasts (which have > varied significantly and, in the case of Delhi, wildly) have been off in > varying degrees, with virtually all the polls grossly underestimating the > AAP. > >> > >> Hindutva spokespersons have depicted the latest Assembly contests as a > ‘semi-final’ in which the winner’s form portends an overpowering victory in > the ‘finals’ that will be played in April-May 2014. The problem with the > analogy is that the guaranteed winner of the other semi-final, which will > be played in virtual space, is a constellation of regional and some other > non-BJP, non-Congress players, and the finals will be played by three > contestants under differential rules — with the two semi-final winners each > able to play on only part of the pitch and only the guaranteed loser in a > position to play on the whole pitch, more or less. > >> > >> So how is the contest shaping up for the big prize? > >> > >> Before we can answer this challenging question, we need to figure out > some kind of basic explanatory insight into what has happened in the nine > States where Assembly elections have been held in 2013 and what the > outcomes add up to, quantitatively and qualitatively. The short answer to > the first sub-question, based on what we can learn from the information > provided by the opinion, exit, and post polls and also from journalistic > reportage, is this. The price rise, the relentless pressures on livelihood > and living standards, and corruption have figured high among voter > concerns, and on these sensitive issues the big loser is the Congress and > the United Progressive Alliance government, which has been thoroughly > discredited and has clearly overstayed its welcome. > >> > >> As for what the 2013 Assembly election outcomes add up to, it is > interesting that five of these States, four in the north and Karnataka in > the south, aggregate a hundred Lok Sabha seats, while the other four, all > in the north-east, make up a combined total of six seats. So this is not > quite political India: in fact, the State Assembly contests won and lost in > 2013 translate to less than a fifth of the composition of the Lok Sabha. > Secondly, if a trend favouring the BJP can be detected in the northern > States that have gone to the polls this year, it is countered by what has > happened in the south, signifying the reality that the party that speaks > and functions in the name of ‘Hindu nationalism’, or majoritarianism, is > not quite a national party in the sense it does not have a serious > electoral presence in a large part of India. It is surely significant that > these no-go regions cumulatively elect about 250 members to the Lok Sabha, > which means the victor of this ‘semi-final’ will go to the ‘finals’ knowing > it can play on just one-half of the pitch. And one does not need political > punditry to realise that electoral victory and defeat is made by several > factors, local, regional, and national, and any analysis that reduces the > diversity and complexity of India’s electoral game to one or two factors > will be wrong-headed and deluded. > >> > >> This leads us to the question whether any ‘wave’ — a decisive and > overpowering swing in the voter mood — can be detected across the country > in favour of any one party or leader. The question is not irrelevant > because historically there have been such electoral waves in India, notably > in 1971, 1977, and 1984, under very different sets of circumstances. Modi > partisans would of course say ‘yes’. But the evidence-based answer seems to > be that while his prime ministerial candidacy has gained traction and > momentum and has significantly strengthened the electoral stock of his > party, there is no ‘Modi wave’ that the BJP and its National Democratic > Alliance partners can ride straight to power at the Centre. > >> > >> Need for allies > >> > >> Everything points to the BJP emerging as the single largest party, by > some distance, in the sixteenth Lok Sabha. The Congress, some pollsters > speculate, could be reduced to half its present strength of 206. The > regional, Left, and other non-Congress, non-BJP parties and independents > are likely to make up a sizeable proportion of the next Lok Sabha, well > above the UPA’s total strength. So what is the threshold from which a > Modi-led BJP could bid aggressively to form a government? Given the overall > political picture, it needs to be well over 200 Lok Sabha seats for the NDA > — which after all is a shadow of the alliance it was when Atal Bihari > Vajpayee, a much more acceptable political leader than Mr. Modi, > spearheaded it to power in 1998 and 1999. > >> > >> The essential political truth is that notwithstanding his present > avatar as ‘Vikas Purush’, the Man of Development, Mr. Modi does not attract > allies; he repels erstwhile allies and also potential allies. It is well > established that he is a highly polarising and divisive figure, with a > special notoriety rooted in his and his government’s role in the 2002 > Gujarat pogrom. > >> > >> Interestingly, India’s newspapers and news television channels have, by > and large, maintained the necessary professional distance in reporting the > Modi campaign. But what they have also done is to keep the focus on the > deeply troubling path he has taken to the national stage — and on what this > portends for secular and democratic governance. > >> > >> That this essential political truth has had an impact even at the top > leadership levels of the BJP was evidenced by Lal Krishna Advani’s revolt > against the installation of Mr. Modi, first as the BJP’s election campaign > chief, and then as its prime ministerial candidate. Instant media analysis > might have concluded that the BJP’s pre-eminent ideologue and strategist > was deeply offended because he was overlooked for the top job but that > reading is both shallow and simple-minded. The more likely explanation is > that Mr. Advani, with his long institutional memory, is disturbed by what > lies in store for both the party and the Parivar — given Mr. Modi’s > political notoriety, which, among other things, repels potential BJP allies. > >> > >> All this suggests that the BJP, although assured of its single largest > party status, will not go into the mid-2014 ‘finals’ as the favourite, in > any event not the overwhelming favourite. Interesting political moves are > on, for example, the Congress’s reported attempt to strike a deal with the > Bahujan Samaj Party, the alliance manoeuvres in Bihar, not to mention the > Telangana drama that lies ahead, that could make a difference on the > ground. It is quite conceivable, even likely, that a post-poll combination > of triumphant regional parties will, with external support from the > Congress and the Left, be able to form the next government. > >> Sent from BSNL with my BlackBerry® smartphone > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Progressive interactions" group. > >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to [email protected]. > >> To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > >> Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/progressive-interactions. > >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Progressive interactions" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/progressive-interactions. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Progressive interactions" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/progressive-interactions. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Progressive interactions" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/progressive-interactions. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. 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