Dear Udayji, Thank you for your response.
Kindly allow me to comment on each of the sentences you have written. You have asked, "Is UID acceptable if "fifth columnists" are denied entry into anything related to UID?" My submission:One, "fifth columnists" are not they who are duped into enrollment but the "fifth columnists" are they who promoting its indiscriminate usage like Mir Zafar, Jeevan Lal, You say: "Let us look at Planning commission's admission that all the anti-poverty schemes including flagships are ineffective." My submission: How can the Planning commission headed by a Prime Minister whose office is admittedly not leak proof inspire any faith. It is not anti-poverty schemes which are ineffective, it is Planning Commission which is ineffective and incompetent when it comes to schemes about poor. The same Prime Minister during his tenure effectively ensure tax waivers to the tune of Rs 30 lakh crore for companies like Reliance and others. Mukesh Ambani in return supports UID/aadhaar in writing! You say, "One thinks that direct cash transfers based on UID and consumer price index would yield intended results. Improvements can be effected over time.Otherwise status quo ante continues ad-infenitum." My submission:Coincidentally, such thoughts are an echo of the propositions of World Bank. Democratic mandate in recent elections is against the promoters of UID/aadhaar. Supreme Court has given order against linking of aadhaar with any services on September 24, 2013. Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance has repeatedly argue against UID/aadhaar in its reports to the Parliament. The last report was presented on October 18, 2013. Biometric data based UID/aadhaar number linked welfare schemes are being bulldozed with 2014 elections in mind with the ulterior motive of altering voting behavior of the citizens by creating a ‘universal identity infrastructure’ linked to ‘unified payment infrastructure’. But voters are not fools, they are voting against the such parties which support biometric UID/aadhaar number. Ahead of next parliamentary elections, with the launch of 21st crore UID-Aadhaar Number and Aadhaar Enabled Service Delivery (AESD) on October 20, 2012 contemptuously ignored Parliament, Parliamentary Committee, National Advisory Council and eminent citizens and the lessons from the belated report from Planning Commission’s Group of Experts on Privacy dated October 16, 2012. What is evident is that there is an open war declared on sensitive personal information like biometric data which includes finger prints, iris scans, voice prints, DNA samples etc. The fact is a centralized electronic database of citizens and privacy, both are conceptually contradictory. The launch exercise of October 20, 2012 was a an act of breach of trust because it is officially admitting that UID-Aadhaar is mandatory contrary to what was claimed at its launch in Maharashtra on September 29, 2010. The creeping of voluntariness into compulsion through threat of discontinuance of services has been roundly castigated by Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance. A revealing Policy Research Working Paper titled ‘Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior’ brought out by World Bank in October 2012 “provides empirical evidence to support the notion that political participation and political views are responsive to targeted transfers.” It notes that in Colombia, “During the 2010 presidential election voters covered by FA (large scale conditional cash transfer) not only voted more often, but also expressed a stronger preference (around 2 percentage points) for the official party that implemented and expanded the program… Another possible explanation is that FA (large scale conditional ash transfer) was strategically targeted and motivated by clientelism and vote buying.” Unique Identification (UID)/aadhaar number being created for Centralized Identity Repository (CIDR) is an identifier based on finger prints and iris scan, not an identity card A report “Biometrics: The Difference Engine: Dubious security” published by The Economist in its October 1, 2010 issue observed “Biometric identification can even invite violence. A motorist in Germany had a finger chopped off by thieves seeking to steal his exotic car, which used a fingerprint reader instead of a conventional door lock.” Database State, a report from the United Kingdom revealed how the old maxim, 'If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear' has been given a very public burial. The report states, 'In October 2007, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs lost two discs containing a copy of the entire child benefit database. Suddenly issues of privacy and data security were on the front page of most newspapers and leading the TV news bulletins. The millions of people affected by this data loss, who may have thought they had nothing to hide, were shown that they do have much to fear from the failures of the database state.' Likewise biometric databasing is a giant leap towards authoritarian control by data mining companies. It turns citizens into subjects and suspected criminals who can be kept under leash by control over sensitive data. Through convergence each data can be transformed into a sensitive data. May I submit that such touching faith in unproven experimental technology sounds like superstition. It is a case of indulgence in blind scientism. Trusting biometric identification is akin to displaying unscientific temper because immortality of finger, iris scan etc -biometric data- is scientifically proven to be untrustworthy and 'inherently fallible' warm regards Gopal Krishna Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) On 28/12/2013, uday chaturvedi <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Friends, > Is UID acceptable if "fifth columnists" are denied entry into anything > related to UID? Let us look at Planning commission's admission that all the > anti-poverty schemes including flagships are ineffective. One thinks that > direct cash transfers based on UID and consumer price index would yield > intended results. Improvements can be effected over time.Otherwise status > quo ante continues ad-infenitum. > >> To: [email protected] >> From: [email protected] >> Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2013 20:24:01 +0530 >> Subject: [ECwatch] Aadhaar: UIDAI and the ‘fifth column’ of Napoleon—Part >> XIX >> >> Aadhaar: UIDAI and the ‘fifth column’ of Napoleon—Part XIX >> >> Most of those who are in public life are in the ‘fifth column’ because >> of either their naivety or their seemingly apolitical tunnel vision >> for UIDAI’s Aadhaar project, which makes them act treacherously in a >> historical vacuum >> >> It is said that once on a military campaign Napoleon Bonaparte, a >> military and political leader of France, stood outside his tent in the >> battlefield facing the most fortified castle of an European city and >> said, “Once this city is taken, nothing will stop my campaign, and >> I'll soon be Emperor of France" with my five army columns. Everybody >> knew about his four columns of army but not the fifth. When asked >> about his 5th column, Napoleon replied, "My fifth column is within the >> city itself!” Soon the gate keepers of the castle were clubbed to >> death, the huge gates swung open, and Napoleon's soldiers marched >> through. The "fifth columnists" told him about the barracks full of >> soldiers kept to defend the city. Napoleon woke them and asked them to >> join him or die. The city fell in no time and Napoleon did indeed go >> on to become Emperor of France with the help of the fifth columnists. >> >> There is an unacknowledged relationship between the biometric Unique >> Identification (UID)/Aadhaar project and the US-based National Defense >> Industrial Association (NDIA). The latter was set up in 1919 to scale >> up the war effort during World War-I. Since then, it has been >> “promoting national security” of the US and 'institutionalising' >> Biometrics Enabled Identification based on Automatic Identification >> Technologies (AIT). The same National Defense Industrial >> Association-sponsored Unique Identification (UID) Industry Leadership >> Advisory Group (ILAG) that was organised “in March 2005 at the >> suggestion of the US Department of Defence (DoD) UID Program Manager >> to serve as a defense industry focal point for government-industry >> collaboration and coordination in developing UID implementation policy >> and procedures.” >> >> Notably, Defence Procurement and acquisition policy office in the US >> DoD has a “Unique Identification” (UID) section for “in tracking and >> reporting the value of items the Government owns”, “Item Unique >> Identification (IUID) Standards for Tangible Personal Property” and >> “Unique Identification (UID) Standards for a Net-Centric Department of >> Defense” that cites “Department of Defense Chief Information Officer >> (CIO) Memorandum, “DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy”” dated 9 May 2003. >> >> It is stated that IUID requirement does not apply to “software, >> manuals, etc.” and “commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items” but it >> applies to “not-for-profit contracts such as research contracts with >> universities”, “classified items”, “foreign military sales”, “small >> businesses”, “government-furnished property”, “Defense Logistics >> Agency (DLA) requests” “models, prototypes, or development items >> delivered to DoD”. >> >> US Department of Defence uses both Radio Frequency Identification >> (RFID) and Item Unique Identification (IUID). “Within IUID, the unique >> item identifier (UII) is a piece of data associated with an item that >> uniquely identifies it throughout its life. RFID is a vehicle for >> holding and sharing data. IUID of tangible items deals with physical >> markings applied directly (or indirectly via label, data plate, etc.) >> on items. IUID also requires data to be captured about the item and >> submitted electronically to a registry database. It is thought of as >> creating a birth certificate for the item. On a superficial level, >> IUID and RFID employ different technologies. IUID utilises an >> optically scannable 2-dimensional data matrix barcode to carry >> information whereas RFID utilises some form of integrated circuitry to >> encode information and produce radio waves which can be received and >> interpreted at a greater distance with a radio antenna and receiver. >> >> Notably, RFID has been recommended in India for installation vehicles >> and libraries. A briefing paper of Government of India observed that >> “Information or an opinion about an individual” is personal sensitive >> information. >> >> Functionally, IUID’s purpose within the (US) DoD is “to uniquely >> identify individual items”. The purpose of RFID within the (US) DoD is >> “to identify cases, pallets, or packages which contain items”. UID >> Policy Office of US DoD has a number of working groups to support the >> development and implementation of the UID policy. These include >> Working Groups on: Logistics IUID Task Force, Industry Leadership >> Advisory Group (ILAG), Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF)/UID/RFID Users >> Group, Property Management, Joint Aeronautical Commanders, Government >> Furnished Property Industry, Federal Acquisition Regulation, Business >> Rules, Standards, Implementation, Technical Interface and IUID Quality >> Assurance. >> >> Biometrics technology companies like Raytheon Company who were awarded >> by National Defense Industrial Association in 2009 participated in the >> ILAG. They have created an artificial need to sell their surveillance >> products in India unmindful of its dehumanising ramifications. It is >> these entities which are behind the biometric UID/Aadhaar project and >> the Bill to sell their products. >> >> The preamble of The National Identification Authority (NIDAI) Bill, >> 2010 which was rejected by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on >> Finance reveals that it is meant “for the purpose of issuing >> identification numbers to individuals residing in India and to certain >> other classes of individuals”. There are two parts to the phrase >> “individuals residing in India and to certain other classes of >> individuals”. >> >> The first part refers to “resident” as an individual usually residing >> in a village or rural area or town or ward or demarcated area >> (demarcated by the Registrar of Citizen Registration) within a ward in >> a town or urban area in India.” This motivated definition of the term >> resident in the Section 2 (q) of the NIDAI Bill accords wide scope to >> the Bill. It leaves the definition vague about the Indians who are >> residing abroad temporarily, non-resident Indians (NRIs), persons of >> Indian origin (PIOs) and refugees. By now, Indians know that there are >> NRIs and PIOs of all ilk and shades whose role merits rigorous >> attention. The second part of the phrase is “certain other classes of >> individuals”. The first part is defined but the second part has not >> been defined. >> >> The National Identification Authority (NIDAI) Bill, 2013 which was >> re-approved by the Union Cabinet on 8 October 2013 was listed for >> introduction in the winter session of the Parliament but it >> could not be introduced. In the new version, “certain other classes of >> individuals” have been substituted with “certain other categories of >> individuals to enable establishing the identity.” >> >> In the NIDAI Bill 2010, Section 4(3) reads, “An Aadhaar number shall, >> subject to authentication, be accepted as proof of identity of the >> Aadhaar number holder.” >> >> In the NIDAI Bill, 2013, Section 4 (3) reads, “An Aadhaar number in >> physical or electronic form, subject to authentication and other >> conditions as may be specified by regulations, shall be accepted as >> proof of identity and proof of address.” Along with it is added an >> “Explanation—For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression >> “electronic form” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in >> clause (r) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information >> Technology Act, 2000.” >> >> Section 9 of the Bill reads: “The Authority shall not require any >> individual to give information pertaining to his race, religion, >> caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health.” The issue here >> is once someone has been biometrically profiled and identified >> ‘Prohibition on requiring certain information’ becomes irrelevant. But >> the question is how biometric information is less sensitive than >> information regarding race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, >> language, income or health collection of which is prohibited? >> >> Section 10 of the Bill reads: The Authority shall take special >> measures to issue Aadhaar number to women, children, senior citizens, >> persons with disability, migrant unskilled and un-organised workers, >> nomadic tribes or to such other persons who do not have any permanent >> dwelling house and such other categories of individuals as may be >> specified by regulations.” It does not reveal or define the “special >> measures” being deployed to trap these categories of people in the >> database. >> >> The Bill makes a specific distinction between the “identity >> information” in respect of an individual means biometric information, >> demographic information and Aadhaar number of such individuals” and >> “demographic information” that includes information relating to the >> name, age, gender and address of an individual (other than race, >> religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health), and >> such other information as may be specified in the regulations for the >> purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number. It refers to “biometric >> information” as “a set of such biological attributes of an individual >> as may be specified by regulations.” It is important to note that >> although Planning Commission or Ministry of Home Affairs does not have >> the legal mandate to collect biometric data instead of seeking that >> mandate under the NIDAI Bill, there is once again an effort being made >> to do it through sub-ordinate legislation. >> >> The Bill defines “Central Identities Data Repository” (CIDR) as “a >> centralised database in one or more locations containing all Aadhaar >> numbers issued to Aadhaar number holders along with the corresponding >> demographic information and biometric information of such individuals >> and other information related thereto.” It is not made clear as to why >> CIDR will be at “one or more locations.” >> >> Now, if one looks at the definition of “authentication” in the Bill >> which is defined as “the process wherein, Aadhaar number along with >> other attributes (including biometrics) are submitted to the Central >> Identities Data Repository for its verification and such Repository >> verifies the correctness thereof on the basis of information or data >> or documents available with it,” it implies that authentication using >> CIDR of an “Aadhaar number holder”, an individual who has been issued >> an Aadhaar number, will be done at “one or more locations.” >> >> It is quite apparent that these locations can be private companies. In >> effect, a private company of Indian or/and foreign origin will >> authenticate whether a resident of India is definitely the same person >> as he/she claims to be. As an implication identity of an Indian >> citizen is going to be decided by a company, which can be a National >> Information Utility (NIU), a private company with a public purpose >> with a profit making as the motive but not maximising profit. >> >> Most of those who are in public life are in the fifth column because >> of either their naivety or their seemingly apolitical tunnel vision >> which makes them act treacherously in a historical vacuum. It is >> evident that in India, knowingly or unknowingly many institutions and >> individuals are acting like this column, a party that is acting with >> the foreign and corporate entities to subvert the very idea of India >> and Indian civilisation under the influence of their supervisors. >> >> Do Indians need to ponder over—who all are in the fifth column, which >> institutions are acting like this column and isn’t there a need to >> know the identity of those in the column in question? >> >> http://moneylife.in/article/aadhaar-uidai-and-the-fifth-column-of-napoleonmdashpart-xix/35760.html >> >> >> ------------------------------------ >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. 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