[The following is an interesting differing voice, also from the Left,t worth attention. One may rather note his discomfiture in explaining away Putin's role in the context of current developments. If Russian nationalism had "forced" his hands as regards Crimea, how things can be all that different in relation to the current set of rebels? That brings us back to the issue: how effective is Western sanction? He is of course in no mood to acknowledge that it's working or even could work.
Sukla] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Renfrey Clarke [GreenLeft_discussion]" Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 11:11:20 +0000 Subject: [GreenLeft_discussion] Putin knifes Donetsk, makes up with Kiev and Washington Putin's new line on the insurgency in south-eastern Ukraine represents a striking turnaround, but one that was close to inevitable at some point. In my view it had little to do with the threatened sanctions - the Russian president had a number of strong economic cards still to play, especially the possibility of reducing gas supplies to the EU. The shift seems to me to reflect, in a fairly direct way, some of the more intractable contradictions of the Russian government's class allegiances and domestic political strategies. If that seems a bit mysterious, let me explain further. Putin is an authoritarian, right-wing populist who rules through fuelling Russian nationalism at the same time as his actual stances with relation to the West have mostly been quite accommodating. That's an obvious contradiction, and one that's essential for understanding his moves over the past few months. What Putin wants at the regional level is a stable and reasonably prosperous Ukraine that provides a market for Russian exports and that stays out of NATO. The coming to power in February of a far right-wing Ukrainian government presented the Russian president with both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge was implicit in the hankering of the new Kiev rulers for NATO membership; this threatened to extend the armed power of the Western alliance far to the east, into an area of extreme strategic sensitivity for the Russian state. The opportunity lay in the chance for Putin to play on the response in Russia to this heightened NATO threat, working it to his political advantage. Crisp, resolute power-plays by Putin in these circumstances had the potential to shore up his domestic position in circumstances where Russian economic growth had lost the dynamism of previous years. These power-plays, however, had very definite limits. Invading and taking over Ukraine, even in a limited way, has almost certainly never figured among Putin's plans. Apart from the cost in worsened international relations, Ukraine is an economic basket-case that would be ruinously expensive for Russia to ingest. Do I hear the objection that Putin used Russian troops to take over Crimea? We need to reflect that Crimea was a sharply different proposition compared to Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. It was historically Russian territory, transferred arbitrarily to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by Khrushchev in 1954. The Ukrainian claim to the region became exceedingly tenuous once it was clear that a large majority of the Crimean population wanted to return to Russian rule. Even so, annexing Crimea probably wasn't Putin's preferred option. His hand appears to have been forced by the decision of the local Crimean leadership to move swiftly to a referendum on independence from Ukraine. Contrary to assumptions in the West, this referendum almost certainly wasn't a Kremlin initiative. Rather, it was a manoeuvre by the Crimean leaders designed to lock the Russian government into a position where options apart from annexation - for example, maintaining Crimea as a de facto independent formation, aligned with Russia in much the same fashion as the trans-Dnestr region - were taken off the table. Once the process of secession was in train, for Putin to have refused to incorporate Crimea into Russia would have been impossible for reasons of domestic Russian politics. Encouraging jingoism in order to maintain his popular base, the Russian president remains to a marked extent its prisoner. The annexation had the benefit for the Kremlin of sending a crude message to the new Kiev regime and to Western capitals about the moves that Russia, as the local hegemon, might venture if provoked. But almost certainly, joining Crimea to the Russian Federation was as far as anyone in the Moscow leadership ever contemplated going. And there the Russian authorities undoubtedly wish events had rested, sparing them crises on their borders while allowing them to work out how to pay the bills of their new territory. The Kremlin, though, doesn't control the people of the Ukrainian Donbass, who have demands and aspirations of their own. Evidence that the Russian government instigated the uprising in the Ukrainian south-east is exceedingly weak, and material support for the insurgents from the Russian authorities has, from all appearances, been non-existent. There has of course been rhetorical support, extending even to veiled threats of invasion. But this seems to have been calculated to restrain the Kiev authorities from launching all-out assaults on insurgent-held towns. Now, the volume setting on the rhetorical support has been turned almost to zero, and the Russian president is calling for "an unconditional end to...the use of illegal armed radical groups." That won't restrict the Ukrainian government, which is incorporating the neo-fascist bands of the Right Sector into its (legal!) police shock troops and National Guard. But for the insurgents in the Ukrainian south-east, it amounts to a demand from Moscow that they lay down their weapons, while the threat of right-wing violence remains a daily reality. In addition, Putin has called on the rebels to suspend their referendum planned for May 11. This demand is another blow aimed against the insurgency, since the rebels hope to use the referendum to establish the popularity and legitimacy of their cause. Putin's characterisation of the May 25 presidential elections in Ukraine as "a step in the right direction" serves meanwhile to instruct Western listeners that his criticisms of the current regime should not be taken too seriously. Once sanctified at the ballot box, the new Ukrainian rulers - mostly, one expects, the same people as the interim government - will be accepted as legitimate by Moscow whatever their actions. So why, specifically, was the reversal carried out? Drawing on sources in official Washington, US journalist Robert Parry reports discreet personal discussions between Putin and Barack Obama aimed at finding a formula that would allow a winding-down of the tensions surrounding Ukraine. The concessions have come exclusively from Putin, and the political cost for him, among a consternated Russian public, will be considerable. But the argument that Putin's switch was intended to relieve political pressures from the West is unpersuasive. Western leverage in this setting is not great, and Putin benefits politically from a certain, controlled level of tension. Any supposed benefits in this regard simply do not match the scale of his retreat. Nor, as indicated earlier, does the prospect of sanctions provide an explanation. I think the crucial reason behind Putin's turnaround was that the popular struggle in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces had reached such a pitch that it served none of his purposes, and was on the way to becoming an actual threat. Particularly ominous for him were various signs that the struggle for the rights of the Russian-speaking population was about to spill over into militant class struggle aimed against the IMF-Kiev austerity program and against the power of Kiev-aligned oligarchs. Putin is the neoliberal leader of a state machine that answers to a capitalist oligarchy. Independent popular struggle, even when the moods of those involved are friendly to Russia, is something he regards at best with distaste. Where the focus of revolt is on the rights of national minorities, his wariness is all the greater: Russia itself has minority populations, especially the Tatars, that number many millions. When the struggle begins taking on an anti-capitalist cast, the Russian president is guaranteed to switch to active hostility. The most conscious of the militants in south-eastern Ukraine have at least some understanding of the stakes for the Russian rulers. Canadian writer Roger Annis quotes this passage: "In Slavyansk, a member of the Slavyansk self-defense militia, Rustem, told the Guardian, 'Instead of helping Russian people here, he [Putin] is betraying us. He will pay for this with a revolution in Red Square. Russian people will not stand by and watch this happen.'" Understandably, the insurgents in south-eastern Ukraine are refusing to disarm, and their referendum is going ahead. Western leaders and their court journalists who insisted on portraying the struggle in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces as a Russian import have been shown up as liars and fools. Meanwhile in Russia, millions of citizens who earlier supported Putin as a defender of Russian greatness will be voicing their disgust, at least at night under the blankets. The hopes of Russian aid held out by the insurgents in south-eastern Ukraine were always an illusion. Despite this, the fact that Putin has now knifed their struggle will be a demoralising blow. How can the struggle survive and go forward? As Russian socialist writer Boris Kagarlitsky has argued, the only future for the revolt lies in finding ways to link up with the broad masses of Ukrainian citizens, including Ukrainian speakers, who are already suffering from the Kiev government's austerity. This means moving beyond a focus on regional and linguistic rights to an open embrace of class-based demands. The immediate thrust of the campaigning will not necessarily be revolutionary, as Western leftists tend to understand the term. The most potent demands may well seem quite restrained - such as that price increases for natural gas be rolled back, or that the government expropriate the assets of oligarchs who have funded fascist groups. The point, though, is that such demands are impossible for the government to meet unless it attacks some of its most vital sources of domestic political support, while at the same time refusing the dictates of Western financiers. There is no prospect that the Ukrainian regime will meet such demands without an almighty political battle. As economic catastrophe unfolds around them, and resistance mounts, Ukrainian working people will grow quickly into more radical perspectives. To: [email protected] From: [email protected] Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 23:52:02 +0530 Subject: [GreenLeft_discussion] Vladimir Putin on Ukraine Crisis and roles of Russia and the West in a Press Release Issued after Meeting with Swiss President [What is striking here is that there is no talk whatever of Russia's right to unilateral military intervention beyond its border to protect Russian interests.That's a pretty big departure. The other two are: appeal to the the pro-Russian activists/militants to defer referendum and accepting the scheduled general election in Ukraine. He sticks to his earlier position in respect of calling the new regime in Ukraine as coup leaders. There is no change. But in the context of other changes - the acceptance of the planned poll in Ukraine on May 25, in particular, it loses any practical relevance altogether. Evidently, the (economic and diplomatic) sanctions had its effect. The issue is how the West is going to respond?Would it, further fired up, go for a kill; or it'd use this opportunity, or at least seriously attempt, to resolve the ongoing turmoil? That's the million dollar question. And, one'd guess, public opinion may play a significant role here.] From: Bob Rigg <[email protected]> on 8 May 2014 Embassy of the Russian Federation to New Zealand 57 Messines Road, Karori,Wellington New Zealand tel.: (04) 476 6113: fax: (04) 473 3843 [email protected],www.newzealand.mid.ru Press Release President of Russia Vladimir Putin met at the Kremlin with President of Switzerland and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Didier Burkhalter. Press statement and replies to journalists' questions after the meeting Moscow, 7 May 2014 PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to start by welcoming once more our guest, the President of Switzerland and current head of the OSCE, and I want to thank him for the attention he is giving to settling this acute crisis in Ukraine. None of us are indifferent to what is happening there. The situation has us all very concerned. Let me repeat once more that in Russia's view, the blame for the crisis that emerged in Ukraine and is now taking the worst direction in its developments lies with those who organised the coup d'etat in Kiev on February 22-23, and have not yet taken the trouble to disarm right-wing radical and nationalist groups. But no matter what the case, we must look for ways out of the situation as it is today. We all have an interest in ending this crisis, Ukraine and its people above all. Thus I say that we all want the crisis to end as soon as possible and in such a way that takes into account the interests of all people in Ukraine no matter where they live. The discussion with Mr President showed that our approaches to possible solutions to the crisis have much in common. Russia urgently appeals to the authorities in Kiev to cease immediately all military and punitive operations in southeast Ukraine. This is not an effective means of resolving internal political conflicts and, on the contrary, will only deepen the divisions. We welcome the release of Mr [Pavel] Gubarev, but we hope to see all the other political prisoners released too. We think the most important thing now is to launch direct dialogue, genuine, full-fledged dialogue between the Kiev authorities and representatives of southeast Ukraine. This dialogue could give people from southeast Ukraine the chance to see that their lawful rights in Ukraine really will be guaranteed. In this context, we appeal too, to representatives of southeast Ukraine and supporters of federalisation to hold off the referendum scheduled for May 11, in order to give this dialogue the conditions it needs to have a chance. Let me stress that the presidential election the Kiev authorities plan to hold is a step in the right direction, but it will not solve anything unless all of Ukraine's people first understand how their rights will be guaranteed once the election has taken place. In this respect, I hold the same position as Mr President, because we both believe that direct dialogue between the Kiev authorities and representatives of southeast Ukraine is the key to settling this crisis. But one of the essential conditions for getting dialogue underway is an unconditional end to the use of force, whether with the help of the armed forces, which is completely unacceptable in the modern world, or through the use of illegal armed radical groups. Russia is ready to contribute as it can to resolving the Ukrainian crisis and playing an active and positive part in the Geneva process. QUESTION: President Putin, The Ukrainian government has made recent statements to the effect that they are ready to begin broad decentralisation in the country. First of all, does this decentralisation suit you? Second, we hear that the violence must end and we must settle the conflict. We already heard similar words in Geneva. My question therefore is what concrete steps can you take, because the experts all say that Moscow holds the key to resolving the conflict. How can you influence people in eastern Ukraine, the so-called separatists? What concrete steps are needed to de-escalate the conflict? VLADIMIR PUTIN: First, the idea that Russia holds the key to resolving the problem is a trick thought up by our Western partners and does not have any grounds in reality. No sooner do our colleagues in Europe or the US drive the situation into a dead end, they always say that Moscow holds the keys to a solution and put all the responsibility on us. The responsibility for what is happening in Ukraine now lies with the people who carried out an anti-constitutional seizure of power, a coup d'etat, and with those who supported these actions and gave them financial, political, information and other kinds of support and pushed the situation to the tragic events that took place in Odessa. It's quite simply blood-chilling to watch the footage of those events. Russia will take every necessary step of course and do everything within its power to settle the situation. I can understand the people in southeast Ukraine, who say that if others can do what they like in Kiev, carry out a coup d'etat, take up arms and seize government buildings, police stations and military garrisons, then why shouldn't they be allowed to defend their interests and lawful rights? As for whether proposed measures suit Russia or not, we are not a party to this conflict; the parties to the conflict are in Ukraine itself. We were told repeatedly that our forces by the Ukrainian border were a source of concern. We have withdrawn our forces and they are now not on the Ukrainian border but are carrying out their regular exercises at the test grounds. This can be easily verified using modern intelligence techniques, including from space, where everything can be seen. We helped to secure the OSCE military observers' release and I think also made a contribution to defusing the situation. You asked what we can do now. As I said, what is needed is direct, full-fledged and equal dialogue between the Kiev authorities and the representatives of people in southeast Ukraine. I spoke recently with German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, who proposed organising this dialogue in the form of a round table. We support this. I think it is a good idea and we will do everything we can to help make it happen. We must do everything possible to ensure that people in southeast Ukraine understand, feel and believe that after the Ukrainian presidential election on May 24 or 25 their lawful rights will be reliably guaranteed. This is the real issue, not the presidential election, but ensuring that people in the southeast know that they won't be abandoned and deceived. This is the crux of the matter, and it is for this that we need the dialogue we have been talking about today. QUESTION: How realistic is a second round of talks in Geneva, Geneva-2? And how realistic is it to launch internal talks between the different groups in Ukraine in a situation when the parties have diametrically opposed positions to a degree never seen before in Ukraine's history? VLADIMIR PUTIN: I don't know how realistic a Geneva-2 round of talks or even internal political talks in Ukraine itself would be. I simply believe that if we want to find a long-term solution to the crisis in Ukraine, open, honest and equal dialogue is the only possible option. Thank you. -- Peace Is Doable -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
