http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/modern-cosmology-versus-gods-creation/
[image: Opinionator - A Gathering of Opinion From Around the Web]
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/?module=BlogMain&action=Click&region=Header&pgtype=Blogs&version=Blog%20Post&contentCollection=Opinion>
 The Stone
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/?module=BlogCategory&version=Blog%20Post&action=Click&contentCollection=Opinion&pgtype=Blogs&region=Header>
Modern
Cosmology Versus God’s Creation
 By GARY GUTTING
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/gary-gutting/> June
15, 2014 8:00 pm

*This is the seventh in a series of interviews about religion that I am
conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is Tim
Maudlin, a professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of
“Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time.”*

*Gary Gutting*: Could you begin by noting aspects of recent scientific
cosmology that are particularly relevant to theological questions?

No one looking at the completely random location of homo sapiens in the
universe could seriously maintain that the whole thing was intentionally
created for us.

 *Tim Maudlin*: That depends on the given theological account. The biblical
account of the origin of the cosmos in Genesis, for example, posits that a
god created the physical universe particularly with human beings in mind,
and so unsurprisingly placed the Earth at the center of creation.

Modern cosmological knowledge has refuted such an account. We are living in
the golden age of cosmology: More has been discovered about the large-scale
structure and history of the visible cosmos in the last 20 years than in
the whole of prior human history. We now have precise knowledge of the
distribution of galaxies and know that ours is nowhere near the center of
the universe, just as we know that our planetary system has no privileged
place among the billions of such systems in our galaxy and that Earth is
not even at the center of our planetary system. We also know that the Big
Bang, the beginning of our universe, occurred about 13.7 billion years ago,
whereas Earth didn’t even exist until about 10 billion years later.

No one looking at the vast extent of the universe and the completely random
location of *homo sapiens* within it (in both space and time) could
seriously maintain that the whole thing was intentionally created for us.
This realization began with Galileo, and has only intensified ever since.

*G.G.*: I don’t see why the extent of the universe and our nonprivileged
spatio-temporal position within it says anything about whether we have some
special role in the universe. The major monotheistic religions maintain
that there is a special *spiritual* relationship between us and the
creator. But that doesn’t imply that this is the only purpose of the
universe or that we’re the only creatures with a special relationship to
the creator.

*T.M.*: Yes, of course, there are, in theory, other possible hypotheses
about the origin of the universe and our role in it. Someone might hold
that the universe was created with humans playing some important role, but
a role equally played by other living beings (not living on Earth); or that
the universe was created with some living beings playing an important role,
but that humans are not among them; or even that the universe was created
with no particular regard for any living beings.

If cosmology is to bear on any such hypothesis, then the hypothesis must
lead to some expectations for the sort of universe a deity so motivated
would create. The expectations following from the accounts, like Genesis,
that make us the main purpose of the universe have, as I’ve pointed out,
the great weight of evidence against them. (The other sorts of hypotheses
have not been much advocated to my knowledge, and hence not developed to
the point where one would know what sort of a physical universe to expect
if any of them were true. My guess is that most religious people would not
be especially interested in these hypotheses.)

*G.G.*: I think we need to distinguish different sorts of theism. There are
versions of theism that, like a literal reading of Genesis, are
inconsistent with what we know about cosmology. But there are also versions
that don’t require any specific story about the extent of the physical
universe or our location in it. For example, there’s a basic theism that
merely asserts that there’s an intelligent being that created the entire
universe. It says nothing about what the purpose of God’s creation was,
beyond simply making a universe. So I don’t see why every version of theism
is refuted by scientific cosmology.

*T.M.*: Theism, as religious people typically hold it, does not merely
state that some entity created the universe, but that the universe was
created specifically with humans in mind as the most important part of
creation. If we have any understanding at all of how an intelligent agent
capable of creating the material universe would act if it had such an
intention, we would say it would not create the huge structure we see, most
of it completely irrelevant for life on Earth, with the Earth in such a
seemingly random location, and with humans appearing only after a long and
rather random course of evolution.

*G.G.*: Maybe, but that conclusion doesn’t follow from scientific
cosmology; it’s based on further assumptions about what a creator would
want ― and how the creator would go about achieving it. Moreover, theistic
religions can allow for many other intelligent creatures with a special
relation to God; and it’s even plausible to think that God might have made
a huge and complex universe as an object of knowledge for intelligent
creatures. From that standpoint, the development of scientific cosmology
would be part of God’s plan.

In any case, I’d like to hear your thoughts on a recent effort to find
scientific support for religious views. Some theists have appealed to
scientific cosmology to argue that there’s a “fine-tuning” of physical
constants that shows that the universe is designed to support living beings
and, in particular, humans. It’s said, for example, that if the ratio of
the mass of the neutron to the mass of the proton were just slightly
different, there couldn’t be sufficient structure to allow for the
existence of organisms like us.

If there were some deity who desired that we know of its existence, there
would be simple, clear ways to convey that information.

 *T.M.*: At this point, our physical theories contain quite a large number
of “constants of nature,” of which we have no deeper account. There seem to
be more of them than most physicists are comfortable with, and we don’t
know for sure whether these “constants” are really constant rather than
variable. This gives rise to questions about “fine-tuning” of these
constants. One thing to keep in mind is that the true number and status of
the “constants of nature” is not part of any well-established physical
theory: It is part of what we don’t yet know rather than what we do know.

*G.G.*: So are you saying that we don’t know enough about the relevant
constants to get a theistic argument started?

*T.M.*: Yes, since we don’t even know if the “constants” are constant, we
certainly don’t know enough to draw any conclusions about the best account
of why they have the particular values they have right now and around here.
Since we don’t know how the various “constants” might be related to each
other by deeper physics, the game of trying to figure out the effect of
changing just one and leaving the rest alone also is not well founded.

One thing is for sure: If there were some deity who desired that we know of
its existence, there would be simple, clear ways to convey that
information. I would say that any theistic argument that starts with the
constants of nature cannot end with a deity who is interested in us knowing
of its existence.

*G.G.*: Once again, that’s assuming we are good judges of how the deity
would behave. But suppose that a surprisingly narrow range of the relevant
constants turns out to be necessary for humans to exist. Some critics would
say that even so, cosmological inflation would provide a satisfactory
explanation with no reference to a creator. What’s your view on that?

*T.M.*: Not everything about cosmology is known. We do not know how to
reconcile quantum theory and relativity yet, and such a reconciliation
would be needed to investigate the nature of the Big Bang. In particular,
we don’t understand the basic physics well enough to tell if anything
preceded the Big Bang. Even the existence of an inflationary period is
still controversial.

One very speculative idea in cosmology is that the entire universe contains
infinitely many “pocket universes” or “bubble universes,” in each of which
the quantities we call “constants of nature” take different, randomly
chosen, values. If so, then every possible combination of such values
occurs somewhere, and living beings will obviously only evolve in regions
where the combination of values supports life. Such an account predicts
that intelligent creatures would arise in essentially random locations in a
huge cosmological structure, just as we see. But this idea is highly
speculative, and there is no direct evidence in its favor.

*G.G.*: So is your view that we don’t currently know enough to decide
whether or not fine-tuning for human life supports theism?

*T.M.*: First, note how “humans” got put into that question! If there were
any argument like this to be made, it would go through equally well for
cockroaches. They, too, can only exist in certain physical conditions. The
attempt to put *homo sapiens* at the center of this discussion is a
reflection of our egocentrism, and has no basis at all in the actual
structure of the universe.

Consider a different hypothesis. Suppose that there is a deity who created
the universe with particular attention to the fate of some creatures in a
distant galaxy. The very existence of the Earth and the evolution of life
on Earth was just an unintended byproduct of setting up the “constants of
nature” for the sake of those creatures, not us. That would be a
fascinating thing to find out, but not what most people with interests in
theism were after. The actual values of the “constants of nature” certainly
cannot provide *more* evidence for their (Genesis-like) hypothesis than for
this hypothesis.

*G.G.*: Finally, let me ask about what I’ve called causal theism, which
merely argues that a creator is needed to explain the very existence of the
universe, regardless of its purpose. Some cosmologists, like Lawrence
Krauss, have suggested that current physical theory shows how the universe
could have emerged from nothing ― for example, by a quantum fluctuation.
What do you think of this suggestion?
More From The Stone
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/>

Read previous contributions to this series.

*T.M.*: The more general claim that a creator is needed to explain the very
existence of the universe is a much, much weaker claim, and is consistent
with humanity having had no particular significance at all to the creator.
That’s why I say that just getting some creator or other is not what most
people are after.

In any case, does there need to be a nonmaterial cause as an explanation
for the entire material universe? Causal explanation either goes on forever
backward in time or it comes to a stop somewhere. Even people who want to
postulate a nonmaterial cause of the material universe often see no need to
invoke yet another cause for that nonmaterial cause, and so are content to
let the sequence of causal explanations come to an end. But the initial
state of the universe (if there is one) could just as well be the uncaused
cause. Or if there is no initial state, and the universe goes back
infinitely in time, then it can’t have a cause that precedes it in time.

Krauss does not suggest that the universe came to exist “from nothing” in
the sense of “did not come from anything at all,” but rather that it came
from a quantum vacuum state. He seems to think that such a vacuum state
would be a satisfying place to end the causal regress as the state with no
causal antecedent. The vacuum state has many important symmetries, so if
one could tell a physical story of everything coming out of a vacuum state
it would have a certain appealing plausibility. But one could still ask,
“Why start with the vacuum state rather than something else?” I think we
don’t know enough to make any plausible guess about even whether there was
an initial state, much less what it might have been. This goes beyond what
we have good evidence or theory for.

*G.G.*: You obviously don’t see scientific cosmology as supporting any case
for theism. You also think that it refutes theistic religions’ claiming
that the primary purpose of God’s creation is the existence of human
beings. What, finally, is your view about the minimal theistic view that
the universe was created by an intelligent being (regardless of its
purpose). Does scientific cosmology support the atheistic position that
there is no such creator or does it leave us with the agnostic judgment
that there isn’t sufficient evidence to say?

*T.M.*: Atheism is the default position in any scientific inquiry, just as
a-quarkism or a-neutrinoism was. That is, any entity has to earn its
admission into a scientific account either via direct evidence for its
existence or because it plays some fundamental explanatory role. Before the
theoretical need for neutrinos was appreciated (to preserve the
conservation of energy) and then later experimental detection was made,
they were not part of the accepted physical account of the world. To say
physicists in 1900 were “agnostic” about neutrinos sounds wrong: they just
did not believe there were such things.

As yet, there is no direct experimental evidence of a deity, and in order
for the postulation of a deity to play an explanatory role there would have
to be a lot of detail about how it would act. If, as you have suggested, we
are not “good judges of how the deity would behave,” then such an unknown
and unpredictable deity cannot provide good explanatory grounds for any
phenomenon. The problem with the “minimal view” is that in trying to be as
vague as possible about the nature and motivation of the deity, the
hypothesis loses any explanatory force, and so cannot be admitted on
scientific grounds. Of course, as the example of quarks and neutrinos
shows, scientific accounts change in response to new data and new theory.
The default position can be overcome.

*This interview was conducted by email and edited. Previous interviews in
this series were with **Alvin Plantinga*
<http://http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational/>*,
**Louise Antony*
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/arguments-against-god/>*,
**John
D. Caputo*
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/deconstructing-god/>*,
**Howard
Wettstein*
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/is-belief-a-jewish-notion/>*,
**Jay L. Garfield*
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/what-does-buddhism-require/>*
and **Philip Kitcher*
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/the-case-for-soft-atheism/>
*.*

*Gary Gutting is a professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame,
and an editor of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/about/>. He is the author of, most recently, “Thinking
the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960″ and writes regularly for The
Stone.*_._,___



-- 
Peace Is Doable

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Green Youth Movement" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send an email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to