[One major difference between the two situations is that Vietnam was not divided on ethnic/religious lines - it was divided on political/ideological and (understandably) class lines; while Israel/Palestine is divided on ethnic/religious lines. And, they are geographically, by and large, segregated. That ensures that the Zionist rulers face rather minimal resistance from within on the question of tackling the Palestine issue. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that Palestinians in Gaza are represented by the Hamas. Things here are arguably far more comparable with the conflicts between the Sinhala (Buddhist) rulers of Sri Lanka and the Tamils represented by the LTTE. (Of course the LTTE did not swear by any particular religion despite the fact that its constituency was overwhelmingly Hindu.)]
http://www.epw.in/commentary/hanoi-1965-68-gaza-2014.html <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.epw.in%2Fcommentary%2Fhanoi-1965-68-gaza-2014.html&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNE8jgKIS0DVn0U5mOnGbgQAfH9oVQ> ------------------------------ Hanoi (1965-68), Gaza (2014) Vol - XLIX No. 36, September 06, 2014 | Sumanta Banerjee <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.epw.in%2Fauthors%2Fsumanta-banerjee&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEZgjCE2ah8Hygt2ZemooXcUbBqTQ> - Commentary <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.epw.in%2Fcommentary&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNGuJsdTfIdVKbp4aVDXdzsVcv4g-Q> <http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=Hanoi%20%281965-68%29,%20Gaza%20%282014%29&num=10&btnG=Search%20Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=Sumanta%20Banerjee&as_publication=> Continuity and Divergence over Half a Century *The parallels between Hanoi (1965-68) and Gaza (2014) are chilling. Yet, while the Vietnamese liberation fighters, through similar trials and tribulations, could emerge victorious after two decades of fighting (1950-70), why are the Palestinian liberation fi ghters, with an equally heroic record of struggles and sacrifi ces spanning more than four decades of armed struggle (from the 1960s till now), still limping towards their goal of a homeland, suffering disastrous defeats at every stage?* Sumanta Banerjee ([email protected]) is a long-time contributor to EPW and is best known for his book In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India (1980). Comparisons do not always imply parity, but also disparity - especially in historical contexts. The present tragedy in Gaza tempts us to compare it with what happened in Vietnam some half a century ago. The chilling similarities - encirclement of a civilian population and cutting them of essential commodities and services, shelling of their homes, killing of thousands of innocent women and children - recall the plight of the citizens of Hanoi, when in February 1965, the US President Lyndon B Johnson decided to launch Operation Flaming Dart to bomb North Vietnam. It was followed next month by the use of napalm to destroy fields and human beings. Over the next years, the US flew 3 million sorties and dropped nearly 8 million tonnes of bombs over Vietnam - four times the tonnage dropped during all of second world war. Apart from killing and maiming thousands, it resulted in the displacement of at least 3 million civilians due to the destruction of their villages. The replication of this military strategy in Gaza today by Israel's Operation Protective Edge, should alert us (who are living in the much celebrated "post-colonial" era) to the continuation of the old colonial policy of expanding territorial control through predatory violence (in the tradition of the Western colonists, and their later US successors), as evident from Israel's attempt to gobble up lands in Palestine today. But we must also recognise the differences between the politics of Vietnam and Palestine - which should also explain the divergences in the strategy and tactics of resistance, and the asymmetry in global public responses to the two situations. The US aggression in Vietnam to suppress a liberation war drew widespread protests from all sections of world opinion - ranging from the draft dodgers in the US itself to students and youth in Europe and elsewhere (including India), from Buddhist monks (who immolated themselves in Vietnam) to intellectual giants like Bertrand Russell (who came out in the streets) to express their revulsion against the atrocities committed by the US. Their sense of revulsion was all the more because here were a people, the Vietnamese, who were not only fighting for independence, but also trying to establish a regime based on egalitarian, democratic and secular values - values which were enshrined in the universal liberal humanist tradition. Their comrades had already established such a regime in North Vietnam with Hanoi as its capital, after liberating it by defeating the French colonial forces, under the leadership of a highly respected personality like Ho Chi Minh, whose strategy was marked by a combination of nationalism and socialism. Led by him, and his comrade, the brilliant military strategist Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese liberation fighters succeeded in achieving their objective of defeating the US invaders and ousting them from South Vietnam, through a multi-pronged strategy and multi-level tactics. Spanning a few decades, they combined mass mobilisation, guerrilla attacks (the famous "Tet Offensive" in South Vietnam, launched on 31 January 1968), frontal warfare, and creation of international public opinion in their favour to pressurise the US to sit with them in a series of negotiations. All these finally led to the surrender of the all-powerful Washington to the tiny capital of Hanoi in Vietnam, with the humiliating departure of the US forces from South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, and the reunification of the two parts of Vietnam. The celebration of a heroic triumph of a liberation movement in Vietnam 39 years ago, coincides with the mourning over the disaster of another liberation movement in Palestine today. However painful, this is a moment when both the international supporters of the Palestinian liberation struggle and the active participants in that struggle, should engage themselves in an honest effort at soul-searching, reassessment of their hitherto followed strategy and tactics, and their reconstruction to enable them to gain their objective of a Palestinian state embracing all parts of their homeland. The massacre of thousands of innocent citizens of Gaza in July-August 2014 recalls the slaughter of Vietnamese civilians at Mai Lai by US soldiers on 16 March 1968. The sounds of the bombardment of Hanoi and Haiphong by US B-52 bombers in 1972, reverberate through the Israeli shelling of Gaza today. Just as in the past when the US sought to cut off all supplies to North Vietnam by blocking the sea route, today Israel is imposing a land, air and sea blockade on Gaza cutting off its besieged inhabitants from the supply of essential commodities and humanitarian aid. Following the same US military strategy of reducing North Vietnam to rubble, the present Israeli government wants to destroy Gaza. The parallels are chilling. Yet, while the Vietnamese liberation fighters, through all these similar trials and tribulations, could emerge victorious after two decades of fighting (1950-70), why have the Palestinian liberation fighters, with an equally heroic record of struggles and sacrifices spanning more than four decades of armed struggle (from the 1960s till now), are still limping towards their goal of a homeland, suffering disastrous defeats at every stage? The difference between the two liberation movements may be traced to a number of factors - (i) the ideological and political orientation of the participants; (ii) the respective strategy and tactics adopted by the fighters; (iii) the territorial size and nature of the terrain where the battles are fought; and (iv) the balance of international forces, then and now. *Politics and Ideology* The liberation movement in Palestine had gone through various stages of political changes. In the early years of the movement (the late 1960s - corresponding to the period of the Vietnamese struggle), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) succeeded in drawing into its fold nationalists, Nasserites, Arab Baathists, socialists, religious groupings as well as Marxists. There were two broad trends in the movement in those days, one represented by the nationalist Al-Fatah and the other by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habbash, which was Marxist-oriented. Despite these differences, all these trends veered around the common objectives of (i) armed struggle to fight the main enemy which was the Zionist state of Israel; (ii) establishment of a democratic state of Palestine; and (iii) working towards Arab unity among all Arab governments. A significant feature of the Palestine movement during those years was the aim to bring together Jews and assure them of protection. As Yasser Arafat, on behalf of Al-Fatah said then: "The Palestinian revolution is against Zionism and not against Jews. Our Jewish brothers, the sons of Israeli sect...are Palestinians in Palestine." In a similar vein, the PFLP said: "The aim of the Palestinian liberation movement is the establishment of a national democratic state in Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews will live together as citizens equal both in rights and duties."1 This spirit of democratic accommodation was incorporated in the PLO national charter that was adopted in Cairo in July 1968, and which at the same time reinforced the will of the Palestinians to continue the armed struggle in the face of the defeat suffered by the Arab states in the 1967 war. During the decade from 1968 to 1978, the predominance of the Al-Fatah in the PLO, and the charismatic image of its leader Arafat, helped the Palestinians to gain international recognition from the Arab League and socialist and non-aligned nations. Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, explaining the cause of his people, and the PLO was able to open offices in some of the progressive African states like Tanzania. The diplomatic success of the PLO in the international forum, was bolstered by its military achievements in its war against Israeli aggression. Through a series of actions - both guerrilla struggles and straight fights - the Palestinian liberation forces could defeat the Israeli offensive and retain their bases in Jordan and Lebanon. A six-day war between US-armed Israeli aggressors and joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces in southern Lebanon in March 1978, ended with the retreat of the Israelis. This victory not only rallied the youth of Arab states behind the Palestinian cause (many among them swarming Palestinian offices to register as fighters), but also inspired an anti-war movement within Israel, spearheaded by none other than some top officers of Israeli combat units. They raised the slogan: "Peace rather than territories!", demanding that Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders.2 But this euphoria was short-lived, as within a few months, the US, panicked by the developments, rushed to sow divisions within the Arab camp. In September 1978, President Jimmy Carter brokered an Egyptian-Israeli accord at Camp David in the name of bringing peace in the region. But, the treaty signed by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel in March next year, further aggravated the situation. It went against the Arab League's cardinal principle that its members would engage in multilateral talks with Israel, and none should enter any bilateral agreement. The treaty evoked widespread protests among both radicals and moderates among the Palestinians, as well as other sections of the Arab population. It led to long-term repercussions in the politics of the region. As one on the most prescient observers of west Asian politics, Dilip Hiro, was to comment later: Sadat's betrayal of the Arab cause and negation of the popular will marked the germination of Islamist militancy and terrorism which resulted in his assassination and much greater violence and bloodshed...3 *Terrorism and Islamisation* It was not only the Camp David accord, but several other developments in both the international arena and within Palestine also, that shaped the later course of the Palestinian movement in the direction of Islamisation and adoption of terrorist tactics. First, by the 1980s, secular Arab elements in the Palestinian organisations were losing their influence and credibility, as the degeneration of their political counterparts (the ruling Nasserite and Baathist states in the Arab region) into corrupt and authoritarian regimes, rubbed off on them. The popular disgust with widespread nepotism, disenchantment with economic policies that widened the gap between the rich and the poor, and resentment against suppression of dissent in these Arab states continued to simmer, driving a desperate people to seek avenues for protest through Islamic fundamentalist groups (e g, Muslim Brotherhood, and other secret militant organisations). Invariably, these groups also found their way into the Palestinian movement. It is significant that Hamas (acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, meaning Islamic Resistance Movement), the Islamic militant group that controls Gaza today, was formed in 1987, at the start of the first Intifada (the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that lasted from 1987 till 1993 - and ended with the Oslo peace accord in 1993). In 1988, Hamas adopted a charter which declared its aim of establishing an Islamic state in Israel, West Bank and Gaza, as well as the rest of the region, as under Article 6 of the charter: "Only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all regions co-exist in safety and security for their lives, properties and rights." Article 17, defining the role of women, said that they should "manufacture men and play a great role in guiding and educating them..." Article 8 sums up its ideological and tactical objectives by stating that "Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Quran its constitution, Jihad its path, and death for the cause of Allah its most sublime belief."4 Unlike the PLO charter which recognised the legitimacy of the state of Israel, Hamas aimed at its destruction. Second, the transformation in the balance of international powers in the 1980s, with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the face of the triumph of the US-backed Taliban, further emboldened the Islamic fundamentalist groups to rally the Muslim masses in west Asia and other parts of the world in support of their call for a sharia-based Islamic world order that was claimed to be superior to the socialist states, or the Arab nationalist and secular regimes - both by then, having been thoroughly discredited in the popular mind. The youth in the Arab states, who had grown up in the era of disillusionment following the Camp David accord, and disenchantment with the domestic policies of their ruling parties, gradually began to drift to these Islamic groups which offered them an alternative ideology of liberation - that involved them in actions which demonstrated immediate impact on Israel (e g, suicide bombing as a perverted form of martyrdom, which killed both the freedom fighter and Israeli soldiers, as well as non-combatant civilians). Third, within Palestine, by the late 1990s, the charismatic image of Yasser Arafat had suffered a dent. Following the 1993 Oslo peace accord, he assumed the leadership of the Palestinian government in 1994. But popular optimism soon gave way to dismay, when over the next few years, skeletons kept pouring out of Arafat's Fatah-led government, revealing massive corruption that involved not only its ministers and officials, but also Arafat himself. Allegations were made (by one of his closest confidants) about his amassing wealth and transferring it to Swiss banks.5 The Palestinian government turned out to be yet another replica of the corrupt Baathist and other secular Arab regimes. This alienated the youth from the Fatah, and drove them into the arms of the Hamas. *Hamas to the Fore* With the expanding influence of Hamas and other Islamic jihadist groups on the Palestinian movement, the tactics also changed. The first Intifada of the 1980-90 period, for instance, was marked by a combination of both civil disobedience, like economic boycott, and armed actions. Before that, the armed struggle had gone through various phases, from sabotage and ambushes of Israeli government and military forces to guerrilla warfare, from mobile warfare to war of fixed positions. The targets were mainly the Israeli soldiers. The second Intifada (2000-05) was however marked by a shift of emphasis from collective armed actions to individual acts like suicide bombing, abduction and taking of hostages, and attacks on the civilian population in Israel. The Hamas, and the other terrorist group known as Islamic Jihad (which has also found a place in the current negotiations being held in Cairo), played a major role in this change of tactics. The Hamas set the pattern in 1989 by abducting and killing two Israelis. Following it, the second Intifada came to be dominated by tactics of assassination of individuals, revenge killings, suicide bombings, sniper attacks on the Israeli civil population, as well as gunfire exchanges with Israeli soldiers. This led to more civilian casualties among Israelis (although their number was far less compared to the massacre of Palestinians by the Israeli military all through the two Intifadas). The first Intifada led to the killing of 94 civilians and 91 soldiers among the Israelis, as against the second Intifada, which saw a ratio of 731 civilians to 332 security forces, among those killed in Israel. These Israeli victims of the terrorist tactics of the Palestinian liberation forces were mainly common people attending open-air markets, or using public buses. About 40% of these killings were attributed to Hamas.6 Even today, while the number of victims of Israeli air strikes in Gaza runs to thousands, mostly civilians, Hamas through its missile attacks on Israeli territory has succeeded in killing a few Israeli soldiers only, the rest of its targets being a handful of non-combatant Israeli citizens. It is also necessary in this connection to remember that there had always been an opportunistic terroristic streak in the Palestinian liberation movement - a streak marked by utter indifference to humanitarian concerns and ideological principles. As early as 1972 - when the PLO was led by the Al-Fatah - a Palestinian terrorist group launched an attack on the Munich Olympics Game site, killing 11 members of the Israeli team, who were innocent sportspersons. While the act - known as Black September - did indeed draw world attention to the demands of the Palestinian cause, it also caused revulsion among the general public which dissuaded them from coming out on the streets to condemn the horrific repression that was unleashed by Israeli authorities on the Palestinians soon after the Munich tragedy. Today, after more than 40 years, it has been revealed (from German intelligence agency files) that the Palestinian terrorist group that launched that assault was helped by a local German neo-Nazi group - a collaboration indicating the unscrupulous length to which sections of the Palestinian movement could go.*7* *A Third and Final Intifada?* It is evident that the Hamas-led offensive from Gaza - attuned as it is to its strategy of setting up a theocratic Islamic state by destroying Israel through the tactics of suicide-bombing and missile attacks that indiscriminately kill innocent Israelis - is actually leading to the suicide of the Palestinian liberation movement itself, and the destruction of the principles of a secular and democratic society on which the movement was based at one time. Unlike the Vietnamese struggle for liberation which was a politically integrated and militarily well-trained movement under the leadership of a universally respected personality, the Palestinian movement remains divided (between Fatah and Hamas, as well as other various factions) without any effective leadership. Unlike the Vietnamese struggle again, which received support from its socialist allies - the Soviet Union and China - the Palestinian liberation fighters are today not fully buttressed by all the Arab states, some among which are embroiled in civil wars within their territories (like Syria and Iraq), and some others (like Jordan and Saudi Arabia) are aligned with the US, and thus reluctant to get into any confrontation with Israel. The Palestinians are thus fighting a lonely battle from an extremely isolated bunker - isolated not only territorially (with a tiny space of some 6,000 sq km covering the West Bank and Gaza, in contrast with Vietnam's wider terrain), but also politically (in terms of international support). We must, by all means, lend our shoulders to the demonstrations being organised by peace activists in different parts of the world to put an end to Israeli depredations in Gaza. But at the same time, we will fail in our responsibilities if we do not remind our comrades in Palestine that finally the ball lies in their court. It is they who have to decide whether they want to continue with the present tactics of battle which invite massacre of their own people, or choose some other methods - both armed and peaceful - to achieve their goal. It is a welcome sign that self-interrogating voices from within the Arab community are emerging, which are questioning the present leadership of the Palestinian movement, and are expressing hopes for a new Intifada that would transform the mentality of both the Arabs and the Israelis. To quote one of them: The Palestinians need to demand an end to useless leadership, and resurface with new leadership complete with a contemporary vision and platform; one that truly and adequately represents the interests and rights of the Palestinians. He then asserts the need for "the third and final Intifada - the Intifada of Transformation...An uprising that includes Israeli citizens themselves against the ideological regime that has been governing them since 1948".8 *Notes* 1 Quoted in Karrim Essack, *The Armed Struggle*, Vol II, Thakers, Dar es Salaam, 1979, p 123. 2 Ibid, pp 154-57. 3 Dilip Hiro, *War Without End: The Rise of Islamis**t Terrorism and Global Response* (London: Routledge), 1989, p 406. *4 *www.the <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.the%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEAkPH6vCnoMpNPbyAcgQbAxnwzSw> jerusalemfund.org <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fjerusalemfund.org&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFRW3Siw2hxWNYLmwjzwYUJhEq-4g> 5 Issam Abu Issa, former chairman of the Palestine International Bank, in an article entitled "Arafat's Swiss Account", in the US journal *The Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2004, Vol XI, No 4, pp 15-23. 6 (i) Wikipedia; (ii) lens of history.com/2014/08/06/history-hamas <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fhistory.com%2F2014%2F08%2F06%2Fhistory-hamas&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFO1nzfbAX-CY_TxJ1chtBMthMb5w> . 7 Gunther Latsch and Klaus Wiegrefe, in the German newspaper *Der Spiegel*, 18 June 2012. 8 Ahmad Moussa, visiting professor at the University of Duhok in Kurdistan, Iraq, in an article entitled "Time For a Third and Final Intifada", *Middle East Eye,* 14 July 2014. ------------------------------ *Source URL:* http://www.epw.in/commentary/hanoi-1965-68-gaza-2014.html <http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.epw.in%2Fcommentary%2Fhanoi-1965-68-gaza-2014.html&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNE8jgKIS0DVn0U5mOnGbgQAfH9oVQ> -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. 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