Regardless of whatever merits and demerits, India is sure to oppose tooth and nail any deal which will ensure mainstreaming of Pakistan's nuclear programme as has happened with India, courtesy Bush (and Manmohan Singh).
Even otherwise, given the facts that the Obama administration is at the fag end of its tenure, any measure to limit its nuclear programme will be politically rather unsaleable in Pakistan and Republicans in the US Senate are sure to oppose any whatever initiative of the Obama administration, the prospects for such a deal look rather bleak. Sukla On 16/10/2015, john hallam <[email protected]> wrote: > Oct 15, 2015 @ 11:34 PM > > http://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2015/10/15/for-modis-indianext-weeks-pakistan-u-s-nuclear-weapons-talks-may-lower-the-chance-of-nuclear-war/ > > For Modi's India,Next Week's Pakistan-U.S. Nuclear Weapons Talks May > Lower The Chance Of Nuclear War > > Charles Tiefer , > > Contributor > > I cover government contracting, the Pentagon and Congress. > > Nawaz Sharif comes to Washington October 22. His visit may bring to > a head the secret U.S.- Pakistan talks, just now made publicly known, > dealing with Pakistan’s consideration of deploying tactical nuclear > weapons among its army facing India. > > This is life and death for India. Tactical nuclear weapons are > provided, in theory, to army units for use during regular military > campaigns, just like those army units might use conventional weapons. > But by using these during a conventional war with India, Pakistan’s > army would escalate an ordinary battle up to the nuclear level, > potentially leading to an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. The > lives of millions could be at risk, and, in the worst case – an > all-out nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan — incalculable > scores, if not hundreds, of millions of lives. > > India and Pakistan each have large arsenals of strategic nuclear > weapons. These are controlled directly from the top of the armed > forces. Hopefully, they have strong control systems, and exist only > to deter the use of such weapons by the other country. But, tactical > nuclear weapons are different. They are small, short-range nuclear > weapons, and their use may get delegated down the chain of command. > A relatively small army unit, during the heat of battle, might possess > such a weapon and have the discretion to use it. And, a Pakistani > army unit with such a weapon might have a jihadist element in it – > say, a commander who happens to have a fanatical hatred of India – > that could divert the tactical nuke for its own radical purpose, > unconcerned with the looming awful prospects in any use. > > ADVERTISING > > Some Indian observers consider a U.S.-Pakistan deal > unwelcome and, in any event, unlikely. They say it would be unwelcome > because Pakistan seeks to be on the road to a nuclear deal with the > United States like India’s own. This is unwelcome because they point > to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Pakistan as showing its > unreliability. And, they say it would be unlikely because Pakistan > has great national pride in its nuclear weapons program, considering > that program its real defense against invasion from India, and so > Pakistan would not accept limits. In other words, if Pakistan wants > to deploy tactical nukes, well, Obama is not going to talk them out of > it. > > Modi may have to take the stance, for domestic > consumption, that any such U.S.-Pakistan deal is unwelcome. But it > would be a valuable step forward if Obama could get Pakistan to agree > to formal limits of any kind on its nuclear weapons. Having the > subcontinent so heavily armed with nuclear weapons, yet far outside > the nonproliferation regime, makes it seen by some as the most > dangerous confrontation on the planet. > > Recommended by Forbes > > And tactical nuclear weapons are the place to make a start > on controls. One can imagine how the discussion about such weapons > has been taking place in Pakistan. Would it be primarily by the > civilian Sharif administration? Maybe. But it would also be a > discussion within the military. > > Pakistan has, or will very shortly have, a strategic triad > of nuclear weapons – on planes, missiles, and (Chinese-built) > submarines. But, the army may well be arguing that if India invades – > which has to be the center of Pakistani military planning – Pakistan > cannot use its strategic weapons because India would retaliate in > kind. That is what it means for India to have a strategic triad and > second-strike capability. But, the army argument may go, Pakistan > could halt an invasion by India by using tactical nuclear weapons, and > India would not respond because there had not been a strategic attack > on Indian soil. The explosion might be set off against Indian forces > on Pakistani soil, not killing a single Indian civilian. > > Before we call such reasoning a kind of unimaginable > madness, let me mention that the United States itself, during the Cold > War, had a very large tactical nuclear arsenal. It included the “Davy > Crockett recoilless rifles,” by which a unit of just two soldiers > could respond to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe by nuking the > Soviet army with a small nuclear weapon. The “Davy Crockett” was one > of many U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. So it is not impossible that > Pakistan might deploy these. > > The United States should never have had them. No one should. Let us > hope the talks between Sharif and Obama can prevent that now. > > > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/us-exploring-deal-to-limit-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal.html?_r=0 > > > U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal > > By DAVID E. SANGEROCT. 15, 2015 > > WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is exploring a deal with > Pakistan that would limit the scope of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the > fastest-growing on Earth. The talks are the first in the decade since > one of the founders of its nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was > caught selling the country’s nuclear technology around the world. > > The talks are being held in advance of the arrival of Pakistan’s prime > minister, Nawaz Sharif, in Washington next week. They focus on > American concern that Pakistan might be on the verge of deploying a > small tactical nuclear weapon — explicitly modeled on weapons the > United States put in Europe during the Cold War to deter a Soviet > invasion — that would be far harder to secure than the country’s > arsenal of larger weapons. > > Iran Meets Atomic Agency Deadline for Material on Past ActivitiesOCT. 15, > 2015 > > Iran Is Set to Put Nuclear Deal, Now Ratified, in MotionOCT. 14, 2015 > > But outside experts familiar with the discussions, which have echoes > of the Obama administration’s first approaches to Iran on its nuclear > program three years ago, expressed deep skepticism that Pakistan is > ready to put limits on a program that is the pride of the nation, and > that it regards as its only real defense against India. > > Photo > Pakistan's leaders watched in March as a Pakistani-developed Shaheen > II missile, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads, rolled by > during a Republic Day parade in Islamabad. Credit T Mughal/European > Pressphoto Agency > > The discussions are being led by Peter R. Lavoy, a longtime > intelligence expert on the Pakistani program who is now on the staff > of the National Security Council. At the White House on Thursday, Josh > Earnest, the press secretary, was asked about the talks and broke from > the administration’s previous position of refusing to comment. > > “A deal like the one that’s been discussed publicly is not something > that’s likely to come to fruition next week,” he said. “But the United > States and Pakistan are regularly engaged in a dialogue about the > importance of nuclear security. And I would anticipate that that > dialogue would include conversations between the leaders of our two > countries.” > > The central element of the proposal, according to other officials and > outside experts, would be a relaxation of strict controls put on > Pakistan by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a loose affiliation of > nations that tries to control the proliferation of weapons. > > “If Pakistan would take the actions requested by the United States, it > would essentially amount to recognition of rehabilitation and would > essentially amount to parole,” said George Perkovich, vice president > for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has > maintained contacts with the Pakistani nuclear establishment. > > “I think it’s worth a try,” Mr. Perkovich said. “But I have my doubts > that the Pakistanis are capable of doing this.” > > David Ignatius, a columnist for The Washington Post, first disclosed > the exploratory talks in a column a week ago. Since then, several > other officials and outside experts have talked in more detail about > the effort, although the White House has refused to comment. > > The activity of Mr. Khan, who lives in retirement in a comfortable > neighborhood in Islamabad after many years of house arrest, prompted > more than a decade of American-led punishment of Pakistan’s nuclear > enterprises. He ran what amounted to the world’s most sophisticated > black market in the equipment needed to make nuclear fuel, and he did > business with Iran, North Korea and Libya. > > When Libya turned over the equipment it bought, in late 2003, it > included a nearly complete design for one of China’s first nuclear > weapons. > > Pakistani officials denied that any of the country’s leaders knew of > Mr. Khan’s black market activities, a story American officials did not > believe because some of the equipment was shipped on Pakistani Air > Force cargo planes. While Mr. Khan is not under formal restrictions > today, he has not left Pakistan in years and has been prohibited from > talking to most outsiders. > > Even before entering office, President Obama was interested in > addressing the Pakistani nuclear problem, considered by most > proliferation experts to be the most dangerous in the world. But until > now, most efforts to manage the problem have been covert. > > During the Bush administration, the United States spent as much as > $100 million on a highly classified program to help secure the > country’s nuclear arsenal, helping with physical security and the > training of Pakistani security personnel. Those efforts continued in > the Obama years, with State Department, Energy Department and > intelligence officials meeting secretly, in locales around the world, > with senior Pakistani officials from the Strategic Plans Division, > which controls the arsenal. > > They used those sessions to argue to the Pakistanis that fielding the > small, short-range nuclear weapons, which Pakistan designed to use > against an invading Indian ground force, would be highly risky. > > American officials have told Congress they are increasingly convinced > that most of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under good safeguards, with > warheads separated from delivery vehicles and a series of measures in > place to guard against unauthorized use. But they fear the smaller > weapons are easier to steal, or would be easier to use should they > fall into the hands of a rogue commander. > > “All it takes is one commander with secret radical sympathies, and you > have a big problem,” said one former official who dealt with the > issue. > > The message appears to have resonated; an unknown number of the > tactical weapons were built, but not deployed. It is that problem that > Mr. Lavoy and others are trying to forestall, along with preventing > Pakistan from deploying some long-range missiles that could reach well > beyond India. > > But American leverage has been hard to find. Unlike Iran, Pakistan > never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the international > agreement that prohibits nations, except for existing declared nuclear > states like the United States, from possessing a nuclear arsenal. > Pakistan is not alone in that distinction: India and Israel also have > not signed. > > (North Korea has twice declared that it has withdrawn from the treaty, > in 1993 and 2003.) > > Ordinarily, any country’s refusal to sign the treaty would preclude > American nuclear cooperation. So Pakistani officials remain angry with > the American decision to enter an agreement with India in 2005 > allowing India to buy civil nuclear technology, even though it remains > outside the treaty and put no limits on its nuclear program. > > Under that agreement, India’s nuclear infrastructure was split with a > civilian program that is under international inspection, and a > military program that is not. > > Pakistani officials have demanded the same arrangement. > > That does not appear to be on the table. Instead, the United States is > exploring ways to relax restrictions on nuclear-related technology to > Pakistan, perhaps with a long-term goal of allowing the country to > join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which regulates the sale of the > technology. That would be largely symbolic: Pakistan manages to import > or make what it needs for its nuclear arsenal, and China has already > broken ground on a $9.6 billion nuclear power complex in Karachi. Mr. > Sharif presided over the ceremony. > > William J. Broad contributed reporting from New York, and Julie > Hirschfeld Davis from Washington. > > Follow the New York Times’s politics and Washington coverage on > Facebook and Twitter, and sign up for the First Draft politics > newsletter. > > > > > > > http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/15/us-nuclear-pakistan-usa-idUSKCN0S92WX20151015 > > World | Thu Oct 15, 2015 6:39pm EDT > Related: World > > Obama to discuss nuclear security concerns with Pakistan > > WASHINGTON | By David Brunnstrom > > U.S. President Barack Obama listens to Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz > Sharif (R) during the opening session of the Nuclear Security Summit > in The Hague March 24, 2014. > Reuters/Yves Herman > > The United States will discuss concerns about the security of > Pakistan's nuclear arsenal during a visit to Washington next week by > Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the White House said on > Thursday. > > The News York Times reported on Thursday that the Obama administration > was concerned that Pakistan might be on the verge of deploying a small > tactical nuclear weapon that would be harder to protect from falling > into hands of militants. > > The paper said the administration was also seeking to prevent Pakistan > deploying missiles that could reach beyond its main foe India, and was > thus exploring a possible deal to limit the Pakistani arsenal that > could involve relaxing restrictions on access to nuclear technology. > > White House spokesman Josh Earnest played down the prospect of an > agreement when asked if there was a serious effort to reach a deal > with Pakistan on nuclear technology in the run-up to Sharif visit, > which is expected to start on Tuesday. > > "I would not be overly excited about the prospects of reaching the > kind of agreement that is being speculated about publicly," he told a > regular news briefing, adding that it was "not likely to come to > fruition next week. > > "But the United States and Pakistan are regularly engaged in a > dialogue about the importance of nuclear security. And I would > anticipate that dialogue would include conversations between the > leaders of our two countries." > > Earnest added that the administration was confident the Pakistani > government was "well aware of the range of potential threats to its > nuclear arsenal" and that "Pakistan has a professional and dedicated > security force that understands the importance and the high priority > that the world places on nuclear security." > > Nuclear-armed Pakistan is troubled by violent Islamist militancy, and > the prospect of a nuclear device falling into the hands of radicals > has long been a worst-case fear of Western security officials. > > The New York Times said the United States had spent as much as $100 > million during the Bush administration on a program to help secure > Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, an effort that had continued under Obama. > > The paper said U.S. officials were concerned that smaller, short-range > nuclear weapons Pakistan designed to use against any Indian invasion > were easier to steal and to use if they should fall into the hands of > a rogue commander. > > Pakistan maintains there is no chance of Islamist militants getting > their hands on atomic weapons. > > Pakistan has had the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, and a > report by two U.S. think tanks this year said its expansion "goes well > beyond the assurances of credible minimal deterrence provided by > Pakistani officials." > > The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center > said Pakistan had the capacity to add 20 warheads annually and could > have as many as 350 weapons in 10 years time. > > (Reporting by David Brunnstrom and Idrees Ali; Editing by Cynthia Osterman) > > > > > > > > http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-by-happymon-jacob-on-uspakistan-nuclear-deal-mainstreaming-a-nuclear-pakistan/article7766518.ece > > Updated: October 16, 2015 03:10 IST > > Mainstreaming a nuclear Pakistan > > Australian Recession 2015 - Why Its Coming, What To Do. And How You > Can Profit www.dailyreckoning.com.au > Ads by Google > > Happymon Jacob > > Reuters > U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (left) poses with Pakistan's Prime > Minister Nawaz Sharif during their meeting in New York on September > 27, 2015. > > ndia should offer conditional support to a civilian nuclear deal > between the U.S. and Pakistan while insisting that Islamabad signs the > ‘No-first-use treaty’ and clamps down on home-grown terror. It is in > India’s interest to ensure that Pakistan’s nukes are under > international supervision. > > What should New Delhi’s response be to a potential nuclear deal > between the United States and Pakistan that could eventually > mainstream the latter into the global nuclear order? New Delhi’s > initial reactions to media reports about a possible deal indicate that > it would unambiguously resist any such move by the United States. In a > recent Washington Post column, David Ignatius wrote that “the United > States might support an eventual waiver for Pakistan by the 48-nation > Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which the United States is a member… the > issue is being discussed quietly in the run-up to Prime Minister Nawaz > Sharif’s visit to Washington on October 22”. > > The Indian Ministry of External Affairs quickly responded to what Mr. > Ignatius called a potential U.S.-Pak “diplomatic blockbuster” in the > following words: “We’ve seen these reports and it is not for the first > time this issue has surfaced. Whosoever is examining that particular > dossier should be well-aware of Pakistan’s track record in the area of > proliferation. When India got this particular deal it was on the basis > of our own impeccable non-proliferation track record. That is the > reason the U.S. gave us 123 Agreement in 2005 and that is why we got a > NSG waiver in 2008. Pakistan’s track record is completely different, > so we hope that will be taken into account in making any such > decision”. > > The Ignatius piece should be seen in the context of a number of > important developments which should be taken on board by India while > evaluating the merits of Pakistan’s admission into the nuclear order. > The NSG has been organising outreach meetings with Pakistan regarding > nuclear exports for sometime now. Pakistan has also reached out to the > international community to help end its status as a nuclear outcast > and to be treated on par with India. > > At the Hague Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, Prime Minister > Nawaz Sharif called for “Pakistan’s inclusion in all international > export control regimes, especially the Nuclear Suppliers Group.” > Pakistan also holds the key to the commencement of negotiations on a > Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on > Disarmament. > > Chinese support > > Moreover, China, whose consent is necessary for admitting new members > to the NSG, has consistently supported Pakistan’s entry into the NSG. > When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in May this year, the > Sino-Indian joint statement had an interesting sentence: “The Chinese > side took note of India’s aspirations to become a member of the NSG, > in a bid to strengthen international non-proliferation efforts”. A > month later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry carefully balanced its > support for India: “China has noted Pakistan's aspirations for NSG > membership”. Given that Beijing has previously opposed Washington’s > efforts at helping New Delhi to get the NSG membership, the Chinese > willingness today to consider membership for both India and Pakistan > will influence the thinking in Washington and key Western capitals. > > Pakistan-watchers in Washington do not think that the proposal for a > nuclear deal for Pakistan would fructify anytime soon, and even if it > does materialise, it will come with a number of conditionalities, many > of them unacceptable to the Pakistan Army, the custodian of the > country’s nuclear arsenal. Moreover, even if the negotiation process > between the U.S. and Pakistan eventually leads to a civilian nuclear > deal, there is absolutely no reason for New Delhi to lose sleep over > it, unless, of course, New Delhi wants to get back at Islamabad for > crying foul when the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal was being negotiated over > a decade ago. > > Critics of the U.S.-Pakistan deal advance a number of arguments why > Pakistan should not be offered a nuclear deal by the United States. > One, they point out that Pakistan has a terrible track record of > nuclear proliferation and that a nuclear deal would be seen as > rewarding such irresponsible behaviour. Two, the argue that it would > enable Pakistan to enhance its nuclear arsenal which, of course, is > directed against India, making the latter more insecure. Third, they > feel a U.S.-Pakistan nuclear deal will hyphenate India and Pakistan > once again in the international discourse, something New Delhi > viscerally detests. > > Yet another objection is an emotional, if not substantive, one. > Consider, for instance, the following remark of a senior Indian > commentator on the potential U.S.-Pak deal: “it will show how hollow > is the strategic relationship between India and the U.S., and why it > would not be wise to trust the U.S. The India-U.S. nuclear deal will > be eroded of much of its strategic importance bilaterally as result.” > > Issues of national interest and strategy should be approached with > clinical logic and incisive reasoning and pursued keeping in mind the > long-term interests of the country. Rhetorical questions like “How can > the Americans treat India and Pakistan in the same way?” do not meet > the above criteria. To my mind, there are at least four sets of > reasons why a ‘conditional nuclear deal’ between U.S. and Pakistan > would be in India’s national interest. > > First of all, Pakistan’s admission to the global nuclear order is good > news for the international non-proliferation regime. An isolated > nuclear Pakistan would not be in the interest of the international > community or India. Critics of the deal would argue that given > Pakistan’s well-known history of engaging in external nuclear > proliferation, we should be wary of inviting it to be part of the > global normative framework. To me, that is precisely the reason > Pakistan should be mainstreamed rather than kept out. I am not sure > having a terror-infested nuclear-armed state for a neighbour — > operating outside the reach and supervision of the global nuclear > institutions — is in India’s best interests. > > Second, it is in India’s interest to ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear > programme is under international safeguards, if not control. It is > indeed better for the international community to be in the know of > Pakistan’s nuclear programme, as far as possible, than having > absolutely no clue about what it is doing with its nuclear material > and technology. The only nuclear relationship that Pakistan has today > is with China. How can such an exclusive and obscure nuclear > partnership be better for India than having a Pakistan whose nuclear > programme is under continuous international supervision? > > More importantly, the long-drawn-out process of mainstreaming will > have a great deal of impact on Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour and will > most certainly bring the Sino-Pak. nuclear relations under > international scrutiny. > > Let us not confuse a nuclear deal with status alone. A nuclear deal is > primarily about undertaking responsibilities and the constant > demonstration of good behaviour in exchange for an ability to engage > in nuclear commerce and energy production. In short, the more the > international control over Pakistan’s nuclear programme, the better it > is for India. > > Third, if India’s experience of inking the nuclear deal with the U.S. > and other states, besides getting the NSG waiver and signing the > India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic > Energy Agency (IAEA), is anything to go by, the road to nuclear > normalcy is not going to be a smooth one for Islamabad. It would most > certainly mean passing the non-proliferation regime’s ‘admission > tests’ as well as jumping through a number of hoops imposed by > strategic conditionalities. > > Pakistan should meet conditions > > The international community will place a number of demands on > Pakistan, given the latter’s negligent nuclear history and the > offensive nuclear posture today. For one, it would have to separate > its civilian and military facilities, like India did, as part of a > potential deal with the IAEA, leading to a less feverish production of > fissile material by Pakistan, thereby producing fewer nuclear > warheads. Second, it may be asked to accept restrictions on its > weapons programme, materially and doctrinally — such as giving up the > policy of early use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with > India. Third, Pakistan will have to give up its opposition to FMCT > negotiations as a precondition for the deal. > > A recent Stimson-Carnegie report on a potential U.S.-Pak nuclear deal > identified five initiatives that Pakistan may have to undertake to > mainstream itself into the global nuclear order: shift declaratory > policy from a “full spectrum deterrence” to “strategic deterrence”; > commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of > short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons; lift > Pakistan’s veto on FMCT negotiations and reduce or stop fissile > material production; separate civilian and military nuclear > facilities; and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), without > waiting for India to do the same. > > Reports also indicate that there is a great deal of concern in > Rawalpindi about a nuclear deal with the U.S. since the Pakistan Army > considers many of the preconditions conveyed to Pakistan to be harmful > to its interests. > > Finally, unlike what some Indian analysts argue, a U.S.-Pakistan > civilian nuclear deal will make absolutely no difference to India’s > national security interests. Indeed, if some of the conditions > identified above can be imposed on Pakistan in the process of the > negotiation process, which is likely to happen, that would be a bonus > for us. One concern is that such a deal will enable Pakistan to make > more nuclear warheads. But even without a nuclear deal, Pakistan has > more nuclear warheads than India. India, if it chooses to, can outpace > Pakistan, but it has wisely chosen not to. However, if New Delhi’s > concern is about a ‘status equivalence’ with Pakistan, it should note > that the India-U.S. deal imposes hardly any conditions on India, > unlike what is likely to be the case with a U.S.-Pakistan deal. > > New Delhi should therefore, offer conditional support to Pakistan’s > inclusion in the global nuclear order. We must, however, ask the U.S. > and other stakeholders to press Islamabad to stop stalling the FMCT > negotiations, and agree to a nuclear ‘No-first-use’ agreement with > India, which is already part of the Indian doctrine. Firm commitments > should also be sought from Pakistan on clamping down on terrorism in > the country in order to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in > the region. Moreover, India should insist that Pakistan, as part of > the deal, should be asked to negotiate nuclear confidence building > measures (CBMs) with India without linking them to conventional arms > control. > > (Happymon Jacob teaches Disarmament and National Security at the > School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New > Delhi. E-mail: [email protected].) > > Keywords: Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Fissile Material Cut-off > Treaty, US-Pakistan nuclear deal, 123 Agreement in 2005 > > > > > > > > http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/DiHdS8OTX4tyyxMZz69GCI/The-hypocrisy-of-nonproliferation-ayatollahs.html > > The hypocrisy of non-proliferation ayatollahs > > India should be wary of putting all its eggs in the US basket > > ________________________________ > Livemint > Illustration: Jayachandran/Mint > > One possible item on the agenda when Nawaz Sharif visits Washington > next week should keep Indian strategists on their toes. The Washington > Post last week spilled the beans on what it described as a “diplomatic > blockbuster”. A civil nuclear deal between the US and Pakistan is > being explored, ostensibly to put “new limits and controls on > Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems”. Prime Minister > Narendra Modi should make his displeasure known, even as he lobbies > the other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Pakistan’s > proliferation record speaks for itself. > > There are two main reasons being put forward by those who seek > Pakistan to become part of the global nuclear mainstream. First is the > hackneyed argument that overstates the importance of Pakistan in > maintaining stability in Afghanistan. With the city of Kunduz in > northern Afghanistan falling to the Taliban, the argument has received > fresh impetus. The fall of Kunduz is an attempt to consolidate the > hold of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour over the Taliban, a project > sponsored by the Pakistan’s rogue intelligence agency ISI. The fight > for leadership within the Taliban—after the news of Mullah Omar’s > death came out—threw a spanner in the talks between the Afghan > government and Pakistan-chosen representatives of the Taliban. > > As farcical as it may sound, the US has once again come around to > believe that Pakistan is a part of the solution when it actually is > part of the problem. Islamabad, rather Rawalpindi, has to be appeased > in order to bring Mansour’s faction back to the negotiations table. > Henry Kissinger had once said that Obama’s exit strategy from > Afghanistan was more about exit and less about strategy. He was right. > > Second, Pakistan, with its burgeoning nuclear assets, is supposed to > be too dangerous to be kept outside the global nuclear order. A report > released in August by two US-based think tanks—Carnegie Endowment for > International Peace and Stimson Center—argued the same. The risibly > titled report, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, highlighted that with the > current rate of fissile material production, Pakistan can, in the next > five to 10 years, become the nation with the third largest nuclear > arsenal in the world, overtaking China, the UK and France. While India > made its claim for a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the > basis of its spotless non-proliferation record, Pakistan’s > candidature, ironically, stems from its abysmal record. > > A US-Pakistan civil nuclear deal is still not a given by any stretch > of imagination. Pakistan will have to accept, as The Washington Post > called it, “brackets” on its weapons and delivery systems. Pakistan > insisting on parity with India might make the negotiations extremely > demanding. However, if the US allows Pakistan to keep its strategic > programme alive in order to respond to “legitimate” threats from > India, then Rawalpindi will be willing to play the ball. The broken > bipartisan consensus in US domestic politics and Pakistan’s previous > proliferation records will make circumventing the resistance in US > Congress enormously difficult. By all estimates, Obama, even if he is > enthusiastic about it, is unlikely to see through the deal in his > tenure. A new president may simply choose not to pick up the threads. > > Yet, that the US is even contemplating such a deal with Pakistan > should be an eye-opener for India. The deal is being pushed by the > non-proliferation lobby in the US state department and some US think > tanks. Adding to the ironies, the non-proliferation ayatollahs who had > opposed the civil nuclear accord with India are the ones pushing the > deal with Pakistan. > > Pakistan has always been a blind spot for the US. It has widely been > claimed that the US’s support to India is instrumental in nature—to > build India as a strong maritime power that can, if needed, face up to > China in the Indian Ocean and provide support to the US and its allies > in the South China Sea and the western Pacific. On the contrary, the > US envisages a more balanced configuration of power in continental > South Asia. In the current milieu of geopolitical flux, India should > be wary of putting all its eggs in the US basket. India has much to > gain from a growing partnership with the US, but relations with other > powers, including Russia, are also important. > > How should India respond to US and Pakistan negotiating a civil > nuclear deal? Tell us at [email protected] > > > > > > > > http://www.thenewstribe.com/2015/10/16/nawazs-visit-us-eyeing-deal-to-limit-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/ > > Nawaz’s visit: US eyeing deal to limit Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal > > Web Desk 9 hours ago Pakistan, Top Stories, USA Leave a comment > > NEW YORK: United State (US) is looking forward for a deal with > Pakistan on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s upcoming visit to limit > Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, claims a report published in The New York > Times. > > Prime Minister Nawaz is scheduled to visit the US while the officials > of different US departments are holding meetings to finalise a > proposal. > > The report says United States (US) has shown concern over Pakistan’s > growing nuclear arsenal and is striving to limit it. > > According to the reports, Pakistan’s nuclear programme is the fastest > growing in the world which has raised serious concerns for US and for > the world > > But US analysts suggest t said that Pakistan is far away from putting > any limitations on its programme due to tensions with neighbouring > India. They have said that Pakistan treats its nuclear programme as > its pride and would not compromise. > > It should also be mentioned here that Pakistan never signed Nuclear > Nonproliferation Treaty due to constant tensions with rival India. The > treaty bars nations from building or possessing nuclear warheads. > However, already declared nuclear states like the US are exceptions. > > Similarly, since Pakistan poses a constant threat to India, it has > also not signed the treaty. North Korea had left the treaty at least > two decades ago. > > Separately, PM Nawaz will expose India’s sponsorship of terror in > Pakistan’s Karachi and Balochistan on his visit. > > > > > > http://nation.com.pk/national/16-Oct-2015/obama-to-discuss-nuclear-security-concerns-with-pakistan > > Obama to discuss nuclear security concerns with Pakistan > > October 16, 2015, 9:37 am > Reuters > > WASHINGTON: The United States will discuss concerns about the security > of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal during a visit to Washington next week > by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the White House said on > Thursday. The News York Times reported on Thursday that the Obama > administration was concerned that Pakistan might be on the verge of > deploying a small tactical nuclear weapon that would be harder to > protect from falling into hands of militants. > > The paper said the administration was also seeking to prevent Pakistan > deploying missiles that could reach beyond its main foe India, and was > thus exploring a possible deal to limit the Pakistani arsenal that > could involve relaxing restrictions on access to nuclear technology. > > White House spokesman Josh Earnest played down the prospect of an > agreement when asked if there was a serious effort to reach a deal > with Pakistan on nuclear technology in the run-up to Sharif visit, > which is expected to start on Tuesday. > > "I would not be overly excited about the prospects of reaching the > kind of agreement that is being speculated about publicly," he told a > regular news briefing, adding that it was "not likely to come to > fruition next week. > > "But the United States and Pakistan are regularly engaged in a > dialogue about the importance of nuclear security. And I would > anticipate that dialogue would include conversations between the > leaders of our two countries." > > Earnest added that the administration was confident the Pakistani > government was "well aware of the range of potential threats to its > nuclear arsenal" and that "Pakistan has a professional and dedicated > security force that understands the importance and the high priority > that the world places on nuclear security." > > Nuclear-armed Pakistan is troubled by violent Islamist militancy, and > the prospect of a nuclear device falling into the hands of radicals > has long been a worst-case fear of Western security officials. > > The New York Times said the United States had spent as much as $100 > million during the Bush administration on a program to help secure > Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, an effort that had continued under Obama. > > The paper said U.S. officials were concerned that smaller, short-range > nuclear weapons Pakistan designed to use against any Indian invasion > were easier to steal and to use if they should fall into the hands of > a rogue commander. > > Pakistan maintains there is no chance of Islamist militants getting > their hands on atomic weapons. > > Pakistan has had the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, and a > report by two U.S. think tanks this year said its expansion "goes well > beyond the assurances of credible minimal deterrence provided by > Pakistani officials." > > The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center > said Pakistan had the capacity to add 20 warheads annually and could > have as many as 350 weapons in 10 years time. > > > > > > > > http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/will-the-us-really-offer-pakistan-a-nuclear-deal-dont-count-on-it/ > > Will the US Really Offer Pakistan a Nuclear Deal? Don't Count On It > > Pakistan won’t get a nuclear deal. Even if it did, it wouldn’t want one. > > By Akhilesh Pillalamarri > October 10, 2015 > > Recently, the political classes and the media in Pakistan and India > have been abuzz with some interesting news that could potentially be a > game changer in South Asia. On October 6, David Ignatius wrote in the > Washington Post: > > The White House is also exploring what could be a diplomatic > blockbuster: possible new limits and controls on Pakistan’s nuclear > weapons and delivery systems. Such an accord might eventually open a > path toward a Pakistani version of the civil nuclear deal that was > launched with India in 2005. > > According to Ignatius, the issue is “being discussed quietly in the > run-up to [Pakistani] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to > Washington” on October 22. The United States government has not > commented officially on the matter. Instead, a U.S. government > spokesperson told Dawn, a Pakistani paper, that “we are in regular > contact with the government of Pakistan on a range of issues as we > prepare for the prime minister’s visit… we’ll decline comment on the > specifics of these discussions.” > > Although some would like to see this as a nuclear deal similar to > India’s, it is unlikely that this is how the United States itself sees > it. For one, based on available information and a close examination of > Ignatius’ article, unlike the nuclear deal with India, a U.S. nuclear > deal with Pakistan would directly impact its weapons program. Ignatius > writes that: > > Pakistan would agree to restrict its nuclear program to weapons and > delivery systems that are appropriate to its actual defense needs > against India’s nuclear threat. Pakistan might agree not to deploy > missiles capable of reaching beyond a certain range, for example. > > India, on the other hand, faces no restrictions on the number of > weapons it can construct. Additionally, India already possesses ICBMs > that can go well beyond Pakistan or China, all the way to Europe. The > U.S. nuclear deal with India only covered civilian facilities, opening > them up to inspections, and allowing India to access nuclear material > from the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for civilian > purposes. This, in turn, allows India to use more of its own > indigenous radioactive material for weaponization. This served both > the interests of India and the United States, which under the George > W. Bush administration was beginning to see India as a counterforce to > China. > > On the other hand, even if Pakistan agrees to a deal, the “United > States might support an eventual waiver for Pakistan” by the NSG > (emphasis added). There is a mere possibility, not a guarantee, of > Pakistan gaining access to the same material as India. This is not > exactly the best deal for Pakistan and its rulers, especially its > powerful military, know this. This is why it is unlikely that such a > deal will go through in the long run. Ignatius himself acknowledges as > much, writing that “it’s not clear that Islamabad would be willing to > accept the limitations that would be required.” > > This would not be bad for the United States either, which would get > little out of the deal. The American calculus for a potential deal is > that by offering Pakistan such a deal, it can enhance bilateral > cooperation and influence Islamabad’s behavior, especially in > Afghanistan. Additionally, it would decrease the likelihood of > Pakistan potentially threatening Israel or transferring a bomb to a > state that would. This last possibility is unlikely, unless a > radically different government takes power in Pakistan. > > The possibility of increased cooperation between the United States and > Pakistan, however, is also unlikely. Pakistan is not analogous to > Iran, a country that has become somewhat more cooperative with the > West through the negotiation of a nuclear deal. Unlike Iran in Iraq > and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic interests do not converge with > the United States’ in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan is already > receiving military aid from the West and does not need to be enticed > back into an international system that it is already a part of. There > is little incentive for Islamabad to make a deal, which would > constrain Pakistan while offering little in return. But even if > Islamabad enters a deal, it is unlikely to cooperate fully with the > West, particularly in Afghanistan. > > Pakistan’s security strategy depends largely on nuclear weapons, which > it believes balances out the asymmetry in conventional power between > itself and India, which has six to seven times as many people and a > more modern industrial base. As a result, Pakistan not only has more > nuclear weapons than India, but has developed tactical weapons for use > on the battlefield. Due to fears of Indian encirclement, Pakistan > continues to regard Afghanistan as “territorial depth” and extends > support to the Taliban. This does not sound like a state that would > accept the constraints an American deal would impose on it, unless it > has a radical change in its assessment of its security situation. And > if a deal is sealed with Pakistan, it would likely not be adhered to > fully. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Nuclear News List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/nuclear-news-list/CAHE2ApRKc4w1h6%3Dqk2zwYS6hfm0N7H5cm17CMu5Cketyyiu00w%40mail.gmail.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. 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