[For far too long the BJP-RSS has chanted the hardline Hindutva mantra that "terror and talks cannot go together". It'd be quite interesting to watch how it navigates the current imbroglio.
If it cancels the forthcoming talks, due by middle of this month, between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, then Modi's surprise visit to Lahore to personally greet his Pakistani counterpart in person on his birthday would look like, at best, an amateurish misadventure. If it does not, it'd, even by a significant section of its own core constituency, be charged of rank inconsistency, or still worse.] I/III. http://scroll.in/article/801319/as-shadow-of-terror-hangs-over-talks-with-pakistan-narasimha-rao-has-a-lesson-for-modi INDO-PAKISTAN TALKS As shadow of terror hangs over talks with Pakistan, Narasimha Rao has a lesson for Modi The prime minister should revisit his predecessor's brave initiative regarding Iran in 1993. MK Bhadrakumar · Today · 08:00 am The terror strike at the Pathankot air base on Saturday once again brings to the fore the question of whether New Delhi should push for closer ties with Islamabad even though it is clear that this strategy lacks national consensus. >From available indications, it seems that the terrorists crossed over into India two or three days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi's stopover in Lahore on December 25. A link between the two events seems inconceivable. Yet the narrative has come to focus on the very efficacy of India-Pakistan dialogue. There is a sense of triumphalism among many of those who oppose dialogue with Pakistan. They believe that their so-called hardline thinking – "no dialogue while terrorism continues" – stands vindicated. On the other hand, the advocates of dialogue have gone on the defensive. This polarisation of opinion in favor of the hardliners may not be a true reflection of the mainstream opinion. But in the absence of a national consensus, it is yet to be rejected. An echo of the past The government faces the same dilemma that gripped the dialogue process during the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance regime: the voices of reason and moderation are allowing themselves to be overwhelmed. Prime Minister Narendra Modi would be well served if he were to take a leaf out of Narasimha Rao’s practice of statecraft in the early nineties to push the initiative on Pakistan. The year was 1993, circa June. The Babri Masjid had been destroyed six months before. As the anger in the Muslim world was still overflowing, Rao took a controversial decision to pay a path-breaking visit to Iran. It was entirely Rao’s decision; the South Block bureaucracy was merely informed about it. The opening to Iran resulted from an acutely felt need to acquire more space in India’s diplomatic manoeuverings, in particular with regard to the Kashmir problem. This was because for the first time in the post-Cold War world, after several decades of seamless Soviet support, Delhi was being called upon to handle the issue on its own on the international stage. Given the US's unfriendly attitude toward India in the full flush of the victory over socialism, it made additional sense to cultivate Iran, a powerful voice in the Islamic world and a country that is rooted in safeguarding its strategic autonomy. A well-considered strategy The opening to Tehran was borne out of strong compulsions, not of whimsical choice. Nonetheless, Rao was apprehensive about how his minority government would defend itself against adverse domestic public opinion. At the time, India was a hopelessly polarised polity. Besides, Iran had been a strident critic of the tumultuous happenings in India in late 1992 and early 1993. Rao directed that someone from Ministry of External Affairs should go over to meet the Bharatiya Janata Party's’s Great Helmsman at that time, LK Advani, to explain the raison d’être of the Iran opening, and try to carry the saffron party along. On the instructions of JN Dixit, the foreign secretary at the time, I undertook the mission. I began with trepidation when Advani received me at his Pandara Road apartment. Through the 40-minute briefing, I explained the various dimensions of our initiative on Iran – against the backdrop of the uproar in the Muslim world over Babri Masjid and the communal riots that followed, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan-sponsored insurgency, the headwinds in the United Nations on account of India’s human rights record, the disarray in the Russian policies under President Boris Yeltsin and the vengeful attitude of Washington towards non-aligned India, and so on. At the end of the briefing, which Advani listened to attentively, he asked a few searching questions, reflected for a while, and then went on to say something like the following: "You people are doing something that is very much in the national interests and we will never stand in the way. I will apprise Atalji. Indeed, our party will discharge its role as a responsible Opposition in the parliament and we will continue to express our misgivings about government policies, but you should go ahead with this initiative. I wish all success for the PM’s visit to Iran." Changed situation How times have changed. Today, there is no such working relationship at the level of the leaderships of the Bharatiya Janta Party and the Congress Party. Modi as prime minister did not apparently feel the need to explain to the Congress leadership his profound considerations in making repeated overtures to his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif as he did in Ufa, Paris and Lahore over the past six months; the Congress and the BJP are actually locked in a curious role reversal with the latter having having virtually usurped the Congress’ Pakistan policy but still lacking the imagination to explain its motivations through the prism of national interest. >From indications available so far, the government appears to be sticking to its action plan with regard to dispatching the foreign secretary for talks in Islamabad on January 15, the terror attack on Pathankot base notwithstanding. That, of course, will indeed be the right thing to do. But the big question remains: In the absence of a political consensus at home, how far can Modi possibly advance his Pakistan policies? Put differently, what is the big deal about dialogue if the talks get reduced to a mere charade that needs to be somehow gone through lest the international community view India as intransigent? To be sure, a crisis of confidence is likely to arise after the Pathankot attack. The will to advance the dialogue process and to take bold initiatives to normalise relations on the part of the government – even to pluck the low-hanging fruit – may have taken a blow. Clearly, the government’s priority at the moment will be to ensure that Modi’s personal prestige is not affected. Looking ahead, therefore, it remains to be seen how long the dialogue can be sequestered – as it ought to be – from such lateral hits from across the border. The only way the dialogue process can be insulated and be made uninterruptible will be by making it the finest foreign-policy flower of a national consensus. Here, the onus is entirely on the government to reach out to the Opposition. An opportune moment But, as things stand, one gets the sinking feeling that the BJP is not interested in getting down from the high horse, nor is the Congress in a mood to be helpful. But, fundamentally speaking, our eclectic political culture is such that if Modi were to switch tack and reach out, as Rao did in 1993, the Congress leadership will not be found wanting. The heart of the matter is that New Delhi has been presented with an opportunity to seek an enduring normalisation with Pakistan, making India’s relations with that country tension-free, predictable and mutually beneficial. Pakistan has changed significantly in recent years and its priorities and concerns have altered. The entire region stands to gain from India-Pakistan dialogue. Paradoxically, Pakistan for the first time seems to have a national consensus on ties with India – although our old mindset regarding the power calculus in that country prevents us from sensing it. On the other hand, the borderline that separates India’s two main national parties is now covered in moss, and lies beneath layers of fallen and decaying leaves. Rao’s initiative in another time of great turbulence and acute polarisation in Indian politics remain hidden. But the good thing is that there are incipient signs that the country's leadership at the highest level seems finally to be realising that unless the problematic relations with Pakistan are set right and unless we shift from the crisis-management mode to an earnest attempt at resolving our differences with our neighbouring country, India’s overall performance as an emerging power will remain sub-optimal. The good thing is, equally, that today there is no third party that strives to exploit India-Pakistan tensions with a view to advance its regional strategies. This includes, most importantly, both the US and China. Thus, all said, the major hurdle in the path of the dialogue is entirely of our making, and only we can remove it. If he trains his mind, Modi will be able to hear Rao's footsteps. II/III. http://scroll.in/article/801337/the-jaish-and-the-pathankot-attacks-when-masood-azhar-was-freed BOOK EXCERPT The Jaish and the Pathankot attacks: When Masood Azhar was freed The 1999 release of three terrorists to save the lives of IC 814 passengers was followed by the formation of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, accused of masterminding the Pathankot attack. Barkha Dutt · Yesterday · 04:30 pm There was a distinct chill in the air in Delhi on the morning of 31 December 1999, and it wasn’t due to the wintry weather alone. A little over a thousand miles away, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the lives of 190 Indians on board the hijacked Indian Airlines plane, IC 814, were hanging by the thread of a decision that would come to haunt the Indian government and the then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh for years to come. Singh was getting ready to escort three dreaded terrorists, who had just been released from prison in Jammu and Kashmir to Afghanistan in exchange for the safety of the passengers and crew. The mood outside the high-security Indian Air Force-managed technical area of Delhi airport (where journalists were being kept at a safe distance) was tense. It was then that I spotted a battered Maruti van approaching the gate. As it slowed down for security checks at the multiple barriers that had been set up, I discovered that it was carrying food for the officials inside. I used the few seconds available to plead with the driver to let me hop on. Sitting at the back between astonished food vendors and boxes of squishy sandwiches, I managed to make my way in past security. I reached the aircraft just as Jaswant Singh was climbing the steps of the Boeing 737. Eight officials from the intelligence agencies and the foreign ministry were already on board. Next to the plane was parked a jeep. Inside were the three terrorists, their faces completely masked. I soaked in the details. It was a week earlier, on 24 December, that IC 814 was hijacked and the conditions set for the release of the passengers. The identity of the men had not yet been officially released. Brajesh Mishra – who was both principal secretary to the prime minister and the national security adviser at the time – would tell us who they were only after the plane was airborne. By this time the journalists outside the gate had begun calling every high-ranking bureaucrat they knew to protest my presence inside the security perimeter. Mishra made an anxious call to my bosses. Determined to take my chance, I implored the minister to let me accompany him to Afghanistan, offering to leave my camera behind if that made taking me along more viable. I begged, I tried everything I could to somehow climb those steps to the aircraft with him. But in his firm yet gentle baritone he told me I must leave. Minutes later, Maulana Masood Azhar (who in less than two years would plan the attack on the Indian Parliament), Omar Saeed Sheikh (who would go on to kidnap and decapitate journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002), and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar (or “Latram” as he was known in the Kashmir Valley where he had three dozen murder cases registered against him) were taken out of the jeep. They were the last to emplane. In many ways, their flight to freedom would, in the months and years to come, change the very nature of insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. “The minute we gave in, India became a soft state,” an apoplectic Farooq Abdullah, who was chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir during the hijacking of IC 814, would tell me later. He had phoned LK Advani, the then home minister, to vehemently oppose the release of the terrorists. “Yeh desh ke saath gaddari hai ( is is a betrayal of the nation),” he told Advani. Farooq’s impression was that Advani himself was not comfortable with the decision but if that were the case, Advani did not let on. Threatening to resign, he told the state’s governor, Girish Saxena, that he could not continue as chief minister if the men were released from Jammu’s Kot Balwal prison on his watch. “Hindustan ka janaaza niklega ( is is as good as taking out India’s funeral procession),” he shouted at the governor. Finally, AS Dulat, India’s RAW chief at the time (and Farooq’s golfing buddy) was dispatched to the state to convince the chief minister that this was the only way to save lives. It was five hours before Farooq relented. But not before giving them a dire warning. “We were already weak; now we are finished.” So began a new and bloody phase of militant violence in Jammu and Kashmir. Four months later, a seventeen-year-old student from downtown Srinagar, Afaq Ahmed Shah, the quiet, somewhat reclusive son of a teacher who had dreams of becoming a doctor, drove a stolen red Maruti laden with explosives into the high-security barrier of the army headquarters in Badami Bagh, blowing himself up at the entry gate. It was the very first suicide attack in the Valley and Masood Azhar’s recently launched terror outfit – the Jaish-e-Mohammed – was quick to own responsibility. Previous “fidayeen” squads who stormed security installations employed a hit-and-run strategy, leaving themselves a fighting chance of making it out alive. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which had first unleashed these attacks, stopped short of endorsing suicide as a battle tactic because of the disapproval of taking your own life in Islam. But when Afaq blew himself up, he became the Valley’s first human bomb, forfeiting the option of survival the moment he accepted the mission. Masood Azhar, now ensconced comfortably in Pakistan, was back in business. On Christmas day that same year, the Jaish ordered another young suicide bomber to strike at the army barracks in Srinagar. This time, when the bomb exploded, six soldiers and three Kashmiri students returning home for Eid were killed. Thee Zarb-i-Momin, a weekly mouthpiece for the Jaish, eulogised the twenty-four-year- old bomber from Birmingham, Mohammad Bilal, and called him a “martyr”. This was proof that the attempt by the militants and their sponsors to internationalise the Kashmir issue by locating it within the larger global “jihad” was beginning to make headway. The homespun separatist insurgency of the late eighties and early nineties was moving firmly into the control of foreign hands, simultaneously transforming in nature from the political to the religious. Over the next few years, in graveyards across the Kashmir Valley, I would see tombstones commemorating “fighters” not just from across the border in Pakistan or Kalashnikov-rich Afghanistan, but also from as far away as Sudan and Libya. With the conflict now lurking in the deep shadows of global terrorism, it was often impossible to isolate the enemy. Excerpted with permission from This Unquiet Land: Stories From India’s Fault Lines, Barkha Dutt, Aleph Book Company. III. http://scroll.in/article/801343/only-nixon-could-go-to-china-or-why-modi-can-calmly-tweet-about-yoga-during-a-terror-attack ROLE REVERSAL 'Only Nixon could go to China': Or why Modi can calmly tweet about Yoga during a terror attack The prime minister's career-long hardline stance on Pakistan has given him immense leeway when dealing with terror. Shoaib Daniyal · Today · 09:00 am Reprising memories of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, terrorists reportedly linked to Pakistan’s Jaish-e-Mohammed have attacked an air force base in Pathankot in Punjab. While the government initially tried to downplay the scale of the attack – home minister Rajnath Singh even prematurely tweeted on Saturday of a “successful operation” – the assault has gone on for two days and till Sunday night had resulted in the death of at least seven Indian security personnel, including a Lieutenant Colonel, Niranjan Kumar, from the elite National Security Guard. As a number of observers have pointed out, a terror attack was almost expected after prime minster Narendra Modi’s grand overtures to Pakistan last week. This is not the surprising part: what’s extraordinary is the calm, almost clinical, response of the Modi government to this attack. Modi’s measured reaction Narendra Modi’s reaction to the attack was in sharp contrast to his earlier shrill politics on the issue of terror. He, in fact, took great care to not name Pakistan, blaming a more anodyne “enemies of humanity” for the attack on a military base. PMO India ✔@PMOIndia Enemies of humanity who can't see India progress, such elements attacked in Pathankot but our security forces did not let them succeed: PM 7:13 PM - 2 Jan 2016 1,363 1,363 Retweets 2,482 2,482 likes On the next day, Sunday, as Indian forces were involved in a fierce gunfight with the two remaining terrorists, Modi was tweeting about Yoga and the diversity of humanity. PMO India ✔@PMOIndia We need to create the best quality Yoga teachers: PM @narendramodi 4:10 PM - 3 Jan 2016 281 281 Retweets 680 680 likes PMO India ✔@PMOIndia Yoga is now a global heritage. And, the world is embracing traditional Indian medicine with great enthusiasm: PM @narendramodi 4:20 PM - 3 Jan 2016 496 496 Retweets 1,464 1,464 likes PMO India ✔@PMOIndia Humanity is wealthier for its diversity: PM @narendramodi 4:18 PM - 3 Jan 2016 227 227 Retweets 589 589 likes Of course, how Modi utilises this immense political capital he has with respect to Pakistan remains to be seen in the days to come. Will he snap back to his hardline stance? Or will he take advantage of his unique position to keep on engaging with Pakistan? Of course, this is in stark contrast to the earlier United Progressive Alliance government, which often came under heavy pressure to respond aggressively after a terror attack emanating from Pakistan. In 2013, for example, in response to a border attack which left five Indian troops dead, defence minister AK Antony was quick to blame Pakistan directly for the act of terrorism. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also called off his upcoming meeting with Nawaz Sharif. What explains this sharp difference in reaction? How is the Modi government so much more self-assured than Manmohan’s when dealing with Pakistan? The answer: Only Nixon could go to China. Outflanking the hardliners In 1972, President Richard Nixon started to take the first steps to normalise relations with China. Till then, the United States considered China to be an enemy country, so much so that it did not even recognise it diplomatically (the US recognised the government in Taiwan to be the representative of China). Of course, this restricted the US' freedom of movement. Relations with China would give the United States more leverage with the Soviet Union as well as help resolve the ongoing Vietnam War, in which China was a major player. With anti-Communist sentiment being high in the US, dealing with China carried with it significant political risks. The president before Nixon was Lyndon Johnson, who saw his “Democratic party as being vulnerable if it were seen to be soft on Communism, Soviet or Chinese”. Any perceived concessions by the liberal Democrats would be exploited politically by the right wing Republicans. Nixon, though, didn’t have this problem. He had made his entire political career as a shrill, right wing hardliner stridently opposed to Communism. While Johnson’s overtures to China could be exploited by the right, Nixon was the right personified. With his anti-communist credentials more than established amongst American hardliners, Nixon was able to usher in a new era in US-China relations. So impactful was this that the phrase "only Nixon could go to China" became a metaphor for a politician successfully taking a stance that, in the normal course, would have been strongly opposed by his support base. It became so popular that it even featured on Star Trek as an "old Vulcan proverb". Modi = Nixon This is, of course, exactly what’s happening with Modi. Narendra Modi has spent his entire career being extremely hawkish on Pakistan. In the 2002 state elections, he even managed to make Pakistan and “Miyan Musharaff” into a campaign issue. Hardliners trust Modi even in the face of grave provocations such as the Pathankot siege – a luxury the Congress did not have during its years in power. Even the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has come out in support of Modi's peace overtures towards Pakistan. For Pathankot, the Congress’ rather mild attack on the government, pointing out that “despite the PM's visit, ISI continues to sustain and support terror activities against India” has mostly gone unnoticed. The Bharatiya Janata Party simply dismissed it as "politicising" terror. In contrast, Narendra Modi had made a strong impact during the 2008 Mumbai attacks with his hardline stance on Pakistan. He flew down immediately to Mumbai while the attacks were on to address the media, criticised Manmohan Singh’s response as “disappointing” and even announced a compensation of Rs 1 crore for each Indian security guard killed. While the attacks were on, the Bharatiya Janata Party even published advertisements in major dailies to try and pressurise the government. [Facsimile: BJP ad published on November 28, 2008, as a response to the ongoing Mumbai terror attack] Of course, how Modi utilises this immense political capital he has with respect to Pakistan remains to be seen in the days to come. Will he snap back to his hardline stance? Or will he take advantage of his unique position to keep on engaging with Pakistan? -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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