[During the 840 days of its grid connection (on 22 October 2013), the
reactor worked for 372 days, tripped (forced outage) for 20 times and
was off-grid for 468 days and its capacity factor has been less than
25%.]

http://www.countercurrents.org/vtp120216.htm

Quality Of Components In Koodankulam Nuclear Power Plant In India -
Case Study Of The Defective And Prematurely Aged Polar Cranes

By VT Padmanabhan

12 February, 2016
Countercurrents.org

During the two and a half years of its operation, the first reactor at
the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP-1), built jointly by the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and the Russian company
Atomstroyexport (ASE) has not reported any serious accident. This
first and only operating pressurized water reactor (VVER-1000)
belonging to Generation-III is advertised as the safest reactor in the
world. There are plans to build four more reactors of similar vintage
at the same site located on the coast of the Bay of Bengal in the
Tamil Nadu state of India.

***During the 840 days of its grid connection (on 22 October 2013),
the reactor worked for 372 days, tripped (forced outage) for 20 times
and was off-grid for 468 days and its capacity factor has been less
than 25%*** [emphasis added]. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)
attributes these as teething problems due to novelties in the design.
The issue of sub-standard and counterfeit components and equipment
used at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) has been under
discussion for the past four years. In the light of the dismal
performances of the first unit (KKNPP-1) which has been grid connected
in October 2013, Dr A Gopalakrishnan, the former Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reiterated that KKNPP-1 “was one
of (the) dangerous reactors in the country, the components that went
into the construction of the unit at Kudankulam were not checked
properly for quality, n there was no proper quality check on the
components used for the reactor, and no one knows which part of the
KKNPP is going to breakdown and on which day.”[1]

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) claimed that
‘unflinching commitment to quality and safety are the hallmarks of
Indian nuclear power plants”. Quote from the letter No
NPCIL/CP&CC/2016/M dated Feb 03 2016:

[Facsimile]

This case study of the polar cranes installed in KKNPP reactor
buildings is a live testimony of the quality assurance programme of
NPCIL and the role of AERB in ensuring this.

The Polar Crane

The polar crane of KKNPP weighs 600 tons and according to the Russian
manufacturer, its nominal and maximum hoisting force is 350 tons and
450 tons respectively. The first use of the polar crane is for the
erection of nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) equipment such as the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV), pressurizer and steam generators (SG).
It will be also used for repairs of equipments and transportation of
hazardous loads such as spent fuel.[2] This is a safety grade
component which moves on a circular rail above the reactor shaft to
perform transportation and hoisting operations anywhere in the reactor
building. Safety grade means that it has a role in prevention and
mitigation of accident, besides the role in normal operation.

The Crane according to AERB in 2008

The ship carrying the first crane reached the Kudankulam mini port in
January 2005 and on 25 October 2005, the NPCIL said that erection of
the "polar crane and other equipment were under way"[3] The AERB
annual report for 2007-08[4] recorded that its “Advisory Committee for
Project Safety Review (ACPSR) held four meetings and reviewed the
problems observed in polar crane erection and implementation of
corrective measures.” (page 8) The narration of the problems and their
remedial actions given on pages 12-13 of the same report: "As per the
joint protocol between the Site (NPCIL) and the Russians", it was
decided “to temporarily limit the maximum load capacity of the polar
crane up to 332 Tons due to tilting of the main hoist fork under a
load of 350 Tons. The polar crane was then released for the erection
of steam generator (SG), reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and pressurizer
for unit-1. Suitable modifications were incorporated to eliminate the
problem subsequently” (pages 12-13). (Italics ours)

AERB and NPCIL about the crane in 2015

So in 2008, the maximum load capacity of the crane was 332 tons
against its nameplate capacity of 450 tons. Seven years later, in
2015, the AERB and the NPCIL gracefully replied to the queries about
the capacity of the polar cranes of the two reactors at KKNPP and
excerpts from their replies are given below:

The AERB’s letter dated 20 November 2015 said: “as the activity at
that time (in 2008) was only limited to handling of SG, RPV and
pressurizer, all of which have weight <332 t, hence temporarily AERB
agreed to restrict the safe working load (SWL) of polar crane upto 332
T” and “subsequently, site installed permanent stoppers for
eliminating the problem of inadmissible tilt of main hoist and then
polar crane was permanently re-rated back to 350 T capacity. This was
checked during regulatory inspections.”[5]

The NPCIL letter dated 11 December 2015, “informed that the hoisting
capacity of the polar cranes at KKNPP-1 and 2 is 320 tones.”[6]

The capacity of the cranes in 2008 was 332 tons. Seven years later it
increased to 350 tons according to the regulator and decreased to 320
tons according to the operator. The regulator gives the credit for
increasing the capacity to the remedial action by the NPCIL, while the
latter is totally unaware of this and says that the hoisting capacity
has actually been reduced by 12 tons.

Manufacturing history

According to the manufacturer “it is the first time that cranes
meeting such stringent requirements are manufactured in Russia.”[7]
Media reports from Russia show that the NPCIL’s quality assurance (QA)
experts posted in Russia had done their QA job with textbook
precision. A report dated 26 March 2004 states that “on March 19,
2003, they visited the UHMEW for auditing the manufacturing
capabilities and signed the protocol.”[8] Fifteen months later,
www.nuclear.ru reported that an “an acceptance-transfer test on 17
August 2004 showed that the first polar crane "complies with stringent
technical requirements,”[9] and it was shipped to India on 17 December
2004.[10]

During 2005-11, UHMEW manufactured 125 small and large cranes, of
which, 57 were supplied to Kudankulam. The polar cranes supplied to
KKNPP are not mentioned in the list of cranes manufactured by it.
UHMEW did not manufacture a polar crane for any other NPP either.[11]
But they are still ready to make them for India as this February 2015
website entry affirms: “it has delivered for the Indian NPP two circle
(polar) cranes with lifting capacity of 350+190/32 tons” and the
“references obtained will allow us to have advantages when
participating in tenders for manufacturing equipment for the third and
the fourth power generating units for the Indian station.”[12]

The Russia-India joint protocol for Quality Assurance

The AERB annual report mentions about the ‘the joint protocol between
the Site (NPCIL) and the Russians’ in which the issue of polar crane
was resolved. The exact agenda, date and venue of this protocol is not
known. But there are some details about a VVIP conclave at Kudankulam,
two months before the commissioning of the polar crane. On 23 January
2007, The Hindu reported that the Russian Minister for Atomic Energy
(currently the chief of Rosatom, the Russian civil nuclear
manufacturing conglomerate) Sergie Kirienko visited Kudankulam two
days before the Delhi visit of the President of the Russian
Federation. He held “discussions with Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Anil Kakodkar and top officials of the NPCIL including its
CMD S.K. Jain, Director (Projects) S.K. Agrawal and Project Director
(KKNPP) K.C. Purohit after inspecting “the RPV installed in the first
reactor”.[13] Inspection of equipment is done by specialists; Kirienko
is a bureaucrat turned politician turned businessman. The polar crane
of KKNPP-1 was commissioned in April 2007, two months after this
conclave.

Here, two brand new cranes with a name-plate capacity of 450 tons
could lift only 332 tons. About the crane for the second reactor, AERB
says that “some base metal defects and weld defects were observed at
site for polar crane for unit-2, which were not observed in the
manufacturing plant" and "these defects were rectified at
site.”[14](Ref 46 pp 12-13) We will revert to the quality culture of
DAE and NPCIL after a brief description of what two other regulators
say about the safety significance of the polar crane.

The Safety significance of the polar crane

The Finnish regulator, STUK says that “there are tens of cranes in use
at the nuclear power plant, but only the (polar) cranes used in the
transfer of nuclear fuel or in other safety significant lifting
operations are under its special control."[15] No wonder the Indian
regulator held four advisory meetings on the issue.

A US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Survey of Crane Operating
Experience at NPPs during 1968-2002 shows an increase in “load drop
events involving overhead cranes during 1992-2002.”[16] KKNPP-1 polar
crane started shivering -an ageing effect- even before the erection.
According to another NRC study “the principal safety concerns related
to heavy load handling, involve load drops that damage either the
spent fuel storage facilities, the fuel in RPV, or the residual heat
removal capability while the plant is shut down with fuel in the
reactor vessel. If a floor breach were to occur during a load drop,
safety-related components located on the lower floors could be
adversely affected. A load drop that penetrates the operating floor in
certain areas could simultaneously initiate an accident and disable
the equipment necessary to mitigate the accident”.[17]

The Role of AERB in Quality Assurance

The AERB has been involved in literature survey on quality assurance
in nuclear plants since at least 1993 and it has so far published 10
guidelines on this topic. The AERB’s QA Guidelines (2009 revision)
assigns only a minor insignificant role for the regulator, as the
ultimate authority on QA of nuclear installations in India is the
responsible organization (RO). “The RO is the “organization having
overall responsibility for siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a facility”. By this
definition, QA is the responsibility of the NPCIL. While in other
countries, safety significant components are manufactured under the
supervision of the regulator, the AERB does not mix up with the
contractors. For instance, 2003 the AERB wanted to know the elemental
balance sheet of the steel that was used for the fabrication of the
KKNPP reactor pressure vessel. The NPCIL replied only years after the
arrival of the RPV. All what the AERB does in the field of quality
assurance is the regulatory inspections at the construction sites.
During 5 years between 2004-08, components weighing about 50,000 tons
were received from Russia and the AERB conducted 15 regulatory
inspections KKNPP-1.

What happens if substandard components are detected? The product or
process that does not conform to the “specified requirements shall be
identified, segregated, controlled, recorded and reported to an
appropriate level of management within the organisation” and “the
impact of non-conformances shall be evaluated and non conforming
products or processes shall be either (a) rejected, (b) repaired, (c)
reworked, (d) accepted with modifications, or (e) accepted as is.”[18]

This evaluation has to be done by the NPCIL and that is what happened
in the case of polar cranes. The AERB detected the defects, held four
advisory committee meetings and informed the NPCIL accordingly. The
NPCIL evaluated the defects, held a high level joint protocol between
the DAE/NPCIL and the Rosatom and accepted the cranes as they were.
There it ends. One does not need more evidences for assessing the
quality assurance culture of NPCIL. There are a couple of other
instances too, as the polar crane is not the only junk piece of
equipment installed at KKNPP.

The quality-safety conscious scientists of AERB committee succeeded in
holding back the underperforming crane for two years. That was their
self-imposed limit as per AERB’s own Safety Guideline. They also
recorded their findings and experiences for posterity, so that they
will not be blamed if the unthinkable happens. Those 50 odd words
speak volumes on the quality and safety culture of the Department of
Atomic Energy. In spite of the absence of autonomy and whistle-blower
protection, the AERB scientists have done their best, and kept the
KKNPP safety debate alive with their cryptic comments in so few words.

DAE’s Quality Control in the Courts

The issue of safety of the components at KKNPP was raised in the writs
and appeals in the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court of India.
The Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jyothimani and the Hon’ble Mr.Justice
M.Duraiswamy wrote in their judgment dated, 31.8.2012 in W.P.Nos.24770
etc in the Madras High Court:

“It is seen that at various stages of commissioning of the plant, the
AERB acts as a continuous supervisor, being an expert body, and at
every point starting from the initiation of the nuclear power plant,
apart from other plants like heavy water plants; Uranium/Thorium
processing and fuel fabrication plants; mining and processing of
radioactive ores and minerals; the Code contemplates various stages of
consenting process, namely siting, construction, commissioning,
operation and decommissioning.”[19]

The affidavit submitted by Soumen Sinha, scientific officer of the
AERB in the Special leave petition (Civil) No 36179 of 2013 in the
Supreme Court of India, contains a copy of the AERB Safety Code No
AERB/NPP/SC/QA (pages 45 to 82). If the Honourable Judges had read
this 37 page document, would they have painted a larger than life
image of the AERB ‘as a continuous supervisor’ and dismissed the
concerns of poor quality control at KKNPP? Incidentally, the details
of the polar cranes and other obsolete equipment at KKNPP were
available in the public domain during the hearings.[20]

Conclusion

NPCIL’s reply to the query under the Right to Information Act shows
that the hoisting capacity of the cranes has decreased by 12 tons
(from 332 tons to 320 tons) during seven years post-erection. The AERB
says that some of the equipment inside the RB weigh 330 tons. This
means, KKNPP does not have a functional polar crane. Is it safe to run
this reactor? Time for another joint protocol between the DAE and the
RF?

The aged and shivering polar crane will not initiate an accident in
the immediate future as it has no role to play in the day-to-day
operation of the plant. Nevertheless, the DAE/NPCIL/AERB may consider
responding to this specific safety issue, point by point. Quotes from
textbooks on QA are good for kids writing their term papers.

As mentioned earlier, there are other safety grade components whose
defects were revealed since the first failed attempt of fuel-loading
of the reactor in September 2012. Most of them were fabricated in the
Soviet Union during the 1980’s and were rendered surplus due to the
post-Chernobyl cancellation of over two dozens of VVER-1000 reactors.
A very important item in the primary coolant was ‘maked’ in India by
poorly qualified welders with no certification in nuclear-grade
welding. Some of the items were damaged and replaced by the
manufacturers. We will continue our gossips about the safest,
Generation-III reactor in the world. In the mean time, please remember
that the warranty period of the KKNPP-1, reactor which has already
expired on 30 December 2015, has been extended for another three
months. Let us pray that the operators of the reactor will not be
unduly pressurized to deliver, as they are dealing with the confined
spaces with high pressure, containing toxins that can inflict
unacceptable and unimaginable sufferings to millions of people.

VT Padmanabhan, a member of the Nuclear Consultancy Group (NCG) has
been writing on nuclear safety and health effects (genetic and
somatic) of ionizing radiation. All his reports on the Kudankulam
Nuclear Power Plant have been published in the Countercurrents.org
Most of his published works are available at
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Padmanabhan_VT.

Email : [email protected]

[1] The Hindu, January 31, 2016.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/kudankulam-
plant-not-safe-without- proper-quality-checks/article8173932.ece
[2] IAEA, 2013, Status report 107 - VVER-1200 (V-392M) (VVER-1200
(V-392M)) 
http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/aris/2013/35.VVER-1200%28V-392M%29.pdf
[3] The Hindu, 25 October 2005.
http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/25/stories/2005102506040500.htm
[4] AERB Annual Report 2007-2008. p 8,
www.aerb.gov.in/T/annrpt/2007/annrpt2k7.pdf
[5] AERB letter No AERB/RSD/RTI/Appl. No 646/2015/6530 dated 20 Nov
2015, addressed to VT Padmanabhan
[6] SK Shrivastava, 2015, NPCIL letter No
MPCIL/CPIO/MUMBAI-HQ/685/2015/1572/711 dated 11 Dec 2015 addressed to
VT Padmanabhan
[7] Tests of the second polar crane manufactured by Uralmashplant are
successfully completed at Kudankulam NPP in India, 14.12.2007.
http://www.uralmash.ru/eng/presscentre/news/aboutnews.htm?news=37
[8] Uralmashzavod manufacturing capabilities for NPP Kudankulam
equipment were inspected .21.03.2003.
http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1800136/
[9] Polar crane for Kudankulam NPP accepted. 17.08.2004.
http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1800949/
[10] http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1801140/
[11] United Heavy machinery , 2011, Precise Solutions For The Heavy
Industry http://www.omz.ru/media/press-center/OMZ_2011_eng.pdf
[12] http://www.omz.ru/en/news?id=511
[13] http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/23/stories/2007012316701200.htm
[14] AERB Annual Report 2007-2008. pp 12-13
www.aerb.gov.in/T/annrpt/2007/annrpt2k7.pdf
[15] 
http://www.stuk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/2006/en_GB/news_419/_files/89665450803012526/def
ault/investigationreport.pdf
[16] Lloyd, RL, 2003, A Survey of Crane Operating Experience at U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants from 1968 through 2002.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1774/sr1774.pdf
[17] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005, NRC Regulatory Issue
Summary 2005-25: Clarification of NRC guidelines for control of Heavy
Loads. 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2005/ri200525.pdf
[18] AERB Safety Code No. AERB/NPP/Sc/Qa (Rev. 1) Quality Assurance In
Nuclear Power Plants Approved by the Board on January 16, 2009
http://www.aerb.gov.in/AERBPortal/pages/English/t/publications/CODESGUIDES/SC-QA1.pdf
[19] The Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jyothimani and The Honourable Mr.Justice
M.Duraiswamy, 31.8.2012 W.P.Nos.24770 and connected Miscellaneous
Petitions in Madras High Court
[20] 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237087081_Counterfeitobsolete_Equipment_and_
Nuclear_Safety_issues_of_VVER-1000_Reactors_at_Kudankulam_India

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Peace Is Doable

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