[The new Indian Army chief, General Bipin Rawat became the first senior official who publicly confirmed the existence of the Cold Start doctrine. The strategic community was alerted by his assertions. Vipin Narang and Walter C. Ladwig III wrote in The Hindu that the Indian army lacks the material and organisation to implement the Cold Start strategy. They argued that India has too few troops and tanks, it faces critical equipment shortages, and the army and air force do not coordinate air support. “This has put India in the worst possible strategic position: claiming a capability that it does not have, but which provides justification for Pakistan’s aggressive expansion of its conventional and nuclear forces”, they added. The western policy makers were always cynical about the Cold Start doctrine. They argue that the doctrine has pushed Pakistan into developing the TNWs. There is a further angle to it. “Given the Nasr missile’s range of just 60 kilometres, TNWs would per force be physically located with forward commanders, and control over them decentralised early in any conflict”, writes Ajai Shukla in the Business Standard. He further said, “de-centralisation would render TNWs vulnerable to theft by jihadi groups, or unauthorised use by renegade Pakistani commanders”.]
http://m.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/-cold-start-is-too-hot-to-manage/239646.html ‘Cold Start’ is too hot to manage Have non-military solutions to resolve problems Sajad Padder Srinagar | Posted : Jan 26 2017 1:03AM | Updated: Jan 25 2017 10:11PM File Photo Few days back, the outgoing US Vice President Joe Biden discussed the Obama administration’s achievements in addressing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons under the Prague Agenda, and highlighted the nuclear security challenges facing the next administration. He underlined that the nuclear weapons, the proliferation of this deadly knowledge to more nations, and the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear materials, remain among the most pressing security challenges. In his speech, her further empahsised: “Not just North Korea, but Russia, Pakistan, and others have made counterproductive moves that only increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a regional conflict in Europe, South Asia, or East Asia”. The reference to Pakistan concerns us all in the region and it’s important to understand the changing nuclear dynamics in South Asia. Nuclear weapons have nutralised India’s conventional military superiority. It’s partly responsible for frustrating India’s capacity to react to “Pakistan’s constant provocations”. The first test came during the Kargil war of 1999. In Kargil, although the guerrillas and Pak army had crossed the Line of Control (LoC), the Indian military response was limited to defending its part of territory rather than striking the targets across the border. India had ensured that its forces including the air force shall stay within the Indian territory. The second major incident was the attack on Parliament in 2001. In response to this provocation, Indian mobilised its troops along the LoC and International border but with no effect. The intension was to put pressure on Pakistan and to invite international condemnation for its irresponsible behaviour. The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks also mandated a rethink over the appropriate response to the cross border provocations. In his book ‘Choices: Inside the making of India’s Foreign Policy’, India’s former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon wrote that in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and he as the foreign secretary had favoured immediate retaliatory strikes inside Pakistan and Pak-Administered Kashmir which did not happen. India tried to deal with this dilemma in at least two ways. After the Kargil war, Indian military and some political leaders suggested that despite nuclearisation India reserves the right to fight a limited conventional war. The assumption was to punish Pakistan in a brief and swift scuffle without worrying for the escalation. But this ‘limited war doctrine’ couldn’t gain much traction thereafter. After the Parakram failure, the Indian army came up with the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine’. It’s an operational plan for swift mobilisation of troops to launch lightning strikes across the border before the international community could intercede. Though the army and other services have conducted several military exercises to test out elements of the Cold Start doctrine, its political status remained uncertain. No political leaders have so far used the concept publicly or spoken about it, not even the present BJP led government. The key issue, as rightly put forth by the strategic community, is not so much of the speed with which Indian forces can be mobilised but the question of whether there are any military solutions to the problem of “Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism” itself. There’re no easy answers. ***The new Indian Army chief, General Bipin Rawat became the first senior official who publicly confirmed the existence of the Cold Start doctrine. The strategic community was alerted by his assertions. Vipin Narang and Walter C. Ladwig III wrote in The Hindu that the Indian army lacks the material and organisation to implement the Cold Start strategy. They argued that India has too few troops and tanks, it faces critical equipment shortages, and the army and air force do not coordinate air support. “This has put India in the worst possible strategic position: claiming a capability that it does not have, but which provides justification for Pakistan’s aggressive expansion of its conventional and nuclear forces”, they added.*** [Emphasis added.] ***The western policy makers were always cynical about the Cold Start doctrine. They argue that the doctrine has pushed Pakistan into developing the TNWs. There is a further angle to it. “Given the Nasr missile’s range of just 60 kilometres, TNWs would per force be physically located with forward commanders, and control over them decentralised early in any conflict”, writes Ajai Shukla in the Business Standard. He further said, “de-centralisation would render TNWs vulnerable to theft by jihadi groups, or unauthorised use by renegade Pakistani commanders”.*** [Emphasis added.] Joe Biden warns in his speech: “We know that terrorists have both the capacity and the goal of transforming nuclear materials into weapons to sow havoc. And we know that no nation acting alone can defeat this threat.” This advice from a veteran politician must prevail upon the policy makers of India and Pakistan. For the safety and security of South Asia, both countries need to put in place a series of nuclear Confidence Building Measures to avoid any future catastrophe. The issue of TNWs and Cold Start probably never came up for discussion during the bilateral meetings. Both countries must avail non-military solutions to resolve their problems. A better way forward is to revive the composite dialogue process which was put under suspension after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. The dialogue framework satisfies both the sides with Kashmir, terrorism and CBMs high on the agenda. (The author has done his PhD in Political Science from the University of Kashmir, Srinagar) -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
