And, with due apology, the last one on this thread, from this end. https://indiaevm.org/qa.html
India's EVMs are Vulnerable to Fraud Hari K. Prasad, J. Alex Halderman, Rop Gonggrijp Questions & Answers Q: Who are you? A: We are scientists and technologists. Some of us have studied other voting systems in Europe and the US and have discovered serious flaws. In some cases these discoveries have led to the use of such systems being discontinued. Q: Why did you study India's EVMs? A: The Election Commission of India has spoken of India's EVMs as "infallible" and "perfect", yet similar electronic voting machines used around the world have been shown to suffer from serious security problems. India's machines had never been subjected to credible independent research. Q: How did you get the EVM you studied? A: It was provided by a source who has asked to remain anonymous. Q: What have you found? A: We found that an attacker with brief access to EVMs can tamper with votes and potentially change election outcomes. We demonstrate two attacks that involve physically tampering with the EVMs’ hardware. First, we show how dishonest election insiders or other criminals could alter election results by replacing parts of the machines with malicious look-alike parts. Such attacks could be accomplished without the involvement of any local poll officials. Second, we show how attackers could use portable hardware devices to change the vote records stored in the machines. This attack could be carried out by local election officials without being detected by the national authorities or the EVM manufacturers. Safeguards against these attacks are either absent or woefully inadequate. For the full details, please read our technical paper. Q. Did you demonstrate attacks on a real EVM? A: Yes. The EVM we worked with is a real EVM that has been used in recent national elections. Q: How could you manipulate the internal memory to change the vote records? These EVMs are sealed. A: The seals quite literally consist of stickers, string, and red wax. Tampering with them would not present a challenge to an attacker. Our video has an excerpt from an official training film showing some of the seals being applied. Have a look and see if you feel you could manipulate these seals yourself. Q: How could a dishonest EVM know which candidate to favour? A: Our dishonest display board attack adds a Bluetooth radio, so criminals could wirelessly signal which candidate to favour. Our memory manipulation attacks happen between election and counting, when everything an attacker needs to know is already public. In our paper we explain more complicated attacks that use the total number of candidates in a constituency as a signaling mechanism. These don't need radio signals and could already be hidden in the software of the EVMs today. Q: But I watched the election officials perform a mock poll, and that was fine. A: It would be easy to program a dishonest EVM or EVM component so that the manipulation is only performed after voting has been going on for a long time, or if the total number of votes is in the hundreds. That way, simple mock polls will show the proper results, but all the final election results will be manipulated. Q: Your video shows a mobile phone signaling to the EVM, but mobile phones are not allowed at polls and counting. A: We are merely proving that we can send the signal wirelessly. Attacks could use many other forms of radio signaling, such as opener that sends the signal. Wireless devices are extremely easy to conceal and could be secretly carried into polling places in countless ways. Q: How can the EVMs be as insecure as you claim while the Election Commission of India says they are "infallible" and "perfect"? A: Until now, the EVMs have not been subjected to rigorous, independent, public scrutiny. Claims that the EVMs are "perfect" and "infallible" are not based on verifiable arguments. If the Election Commission disagrees with our claims, we look forward to a proper scientific debate based on credible, published evidence. Q: The Election Commission has hired scientists too. How do we know you are right and the Election Commission is wrong? A: The Election Commission's two expert committee reports were rather minimal and were performed by scientists with no apparent electronic voting security credentials. These studies were conducted without access to the machines' source code and relied on presentations and site visits with the manufacturers. In contrast, we performed our own experiments with a real machine and demonstrate working attacks. Q: Haven't you just made our secure EVMs insecure by publishing this? A: No. The fact that the election authorities have not allowed public scrutiny of the security of EVMs doesn't make them secure. There are more than 1.4 million EVMs in India, and criminal attackers would likely have less difficulty getting access to a machine than we did. Unlike actual criminals, we are working to inform the public about the security problems we found. Q: Can the problems with EVMs be fixed? A: Not easily. The entire class of voting systems to which these EVMs belong has inherent problems that stem from a lack of transparency. They force voters to trust software and hardware without proper means of verification. Q: Surely there must be something we can do to enhance security? A: The Election Commission likes to speak of "checks and balances", with various procedures believed to make fraud harder. Drastically improving procedures might make some kinds of fraud more difficult, but cannot eliminate the risks we describe. For EVMs to be used, the people of India would need to continue to place trust in an election technology that they cannot observe. Q: Can you help me investigate suspected fraud in the recent election in xxxx ? A: Regrettably, probably not. If our research shows something, it is that for the concerned citizen there is very likely to be nothing to observe, study and/or investigate (either before, during or after the election) that would allow anyone to tell the difference between an honest and a dishonest election. That means you are left either trusting or not trusting your election, with no hard facts to guide you. We know that this is not a satisfactory answer, which is exactly why this type of voting machine should be abolished. Q: Why shouldn't India be at the forefront of technology? A: We are technologists with a deep passion for things technical, but we also see the limitations of technology. These electronic voting machines have replaced decidedly imperfect but observable paper ballots with insecure and completely non-auditable technology. Germany and the Netherlands are modern democracies. They both used electronic voting machines of the same basic type as used in India. In the Netherlands, almost 100% of voters used these machines, but when it was discovered that these machines had severe security problems and that there was inadequate transparency, the machines were abolished and paper ballots were reintroduced. Technological advance is not just about adopting the latest new inventions. Innovation also lies in the ability to take a second look and examine whether what seemed like a good idea ten years ago is still a good idea today. Q. Where can I find more information about the EVM debate in India? A. An Indian citizens' group called VeTA maintains a web site advocating election transparency. Our research is independent from VeTA, but we find their site to be generally informative about the e-voting debate in India. It can be found at IndianEVM.com. On 15/03/2017, Sukla Sen <[email protected]> wrote: > Still further: > > In its recent order, Justice Gogoi directed the EC “to bring on record > the approximate time within which the entire system of the VVPAT can > be introduced, subject to grant of sanction and release of funds as > and when required.” > The court has listed the ***petition filed by the Backward and > Minority Community Employees Federation*** [emphasis added] for > hearing after eight weeks. > Three years ago, a Bench of then Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam > and Justice Gogoi had observed that VVPAT in EVMs would ensure “free > and fair” polls and help in “sorting out disputes”. > > (Source: 'SC wants paper trail in EVMs for fair poll', Jan. 8 2017 at > <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/SC-wants-paper-trail-in-EVMs-for-fair-poll/article17009568.ece>.) > > Sukla > > On 15/03/2017, Sukla Sen <[email protected]> wrote: >> Further to the following: >> >> Excerpt from the The Supreme Court on the subject issue on October 8 >> 2013: >> >> "From the materials placed by both the sides, we are >> satisfied that the “paper trail” is an indispensable >> requirement of free and fair elections. The confidence of the >> voters in the EVMs can be achieved only with the >> introduction of the “paper trail”. EVMs with VVPAT system >> ensure the accuracy of the voting system. With an intent to >> have fullest transparency in the system and to restore the >> confidence of the voters, it is necessary to set up EVMs with >> VVPAT system because vote is nothing but an act of >> expression which has immense importance in democratic >> system." >> >> (Source: P 18/20 at >> <http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/9093.pdf>.) >> >> While the EC has been asked to introduce it in a phased manner, no >> specific deadline seems to have been laid down. >> >> Also (highly) relevant: >> >> "We have reached a stage where people are demanding hundred per cent >> deployment of paper audit trail machine. We have preserved the secrecy >> (in this system) as well. Our plan is that by 2019, the whole country >> will be covered by paper audit trail machines. The budget for this has >> been committed now," Zaidi [the CEC] said while addressing an >> international seminar today. >> The next general elections are due in 2019. >> >> (Source: >> <http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/2019-general-elections-to-have-paper-trail-evms-cec-116022300504_1.html>.) >> >> Sukla >> >> On 15/03/2017, Sukla Sen <[email protected]> wrote: >>> [With parties, activists and candidates constantly alleging rigging of >>> EVMs despite repeated assurances, the EC called a meeting of all state >>> and national political parties on October 4, 2010 to discuss the >>> issue. At this meeting, some parties suggested that in order to >>> increase transparency, the EC should explore the possibility of >>> introducing VVPAT, in which a voter immediately gets a printout of her >>> vote, which is then deposited in the ballot box. So, every voter can >>> see whether her vote has been registered correctly. >>> ... Subsequently, the Supreme Court ordered the EC to use VVPATs >>> across all seats in the 2019 Lok Sabha election. >>> >>> (The demand for implementing the VVPAT at least by the time the next >>> Lok Sabha poll is held has got to be pursued with all seriousness.)] >>> >>> http://indianexpress.com/elections/how-evms-work-why-many-parties-have-suspected-they-can-be-rigged-4569390/ >>> >>> How EVMs work, why many parties have suspected they can be rigged >>> Mayawati and Harish Rawat have alleged voting machines were tampered >>> with. Ritika Chopra recaps a seemingly endless controversy. >>> >>> Written by Ritika Chopra | Published:March 15, 2017 2:58 am >>> >>> Leaders who lost the recent elections — Mayawati and Harish Rawat >>> among them — have alleged voting machines were tampered with. Ritika >>> Chopra recaps a seemingly endless controversy. >>> >>> *How does an Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) work?* >>> An EVM consists of a ‘control unit’ and a ‘balloting unit’, connected >>> by a 5-metre cable. The control unit is with the Election >>> Commission-appointed polling officer; the balloting unit is in the >>> voting compartment into which the voter enters to cast her vote in >>> secret by pressing the button against the name and symbol of the >>> candidate of her choice. The control unit is the EVM’s ‘brain’ — the >>> balloting unit is turned on only after the polling officer presses the >>> ‘Ballot’ button on it. The EVM runs on a 6 volt single alkaline >>> battery fitted in the control unit, and can even be used in areas that >>> have no electricity. >>> When did the EC decide to switch to EVMs? Why were they deemed >>> superior to traditional paper ballots? >>> >>> Paper ballots have inherent problems — their printing, storage and >>> transportation involve huge expenditure; lakhs of ballot boxes are >>> needed for each election, and there are logistics issues with their >>> safe storage between elections. There were instances when the number >>> of invalid votes (marked incorrectly by illiterate voters) exceeded >>> the winning margin. Also, the counting of ballot papers could take a >>> full day or more. >>> >>> To overcome these problems, the EC approached the Electronics >>> Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) in 1977 to develop the prototype >>> of an EVM. On August 6, 1980, the EC demonstrated the ECIL prototype >>> to representatives of political parties to a generally positive >>> reaction. The EC subsequently also drafted Bharat Electronics Limited >>> (BEL) to manufacture EVMs. >>> >>> *When were EVMs first used in elections?* >>> The EC decided on a trial run at a few polling stations during the >>> 1982 Kerala Assembly elections. Since the Representation of the People >>> (RP) Act, 1951, only allowed ballot papers and ballot boxes, it urged >>> the government to amend the law. It did not, however, wait for the >>> amendment, and invoked its emergency powers under Article 324 to use >>> voting machines in 50 out of the 84 polling stations of Paravur >>> constituency, where Congress candidate A C Jose was pitted against the >>> CPI’s Sivan Pillai. >>> >>> *And when and from whom did they face their first challenge?* >>> CPI’s Pillai filed a writ petition in Kerala High Court days before >>> polling, questioning the use and functioning of EVMs. After the EC >>> demonstrated the machines to the HC, the court refused to interfere. >>> But after Pillai won by a margin of just 123 votes, the Congress’s >>> Jose went to the HC saying the RP Act, 1951, and Conduct of Elections >>> Rules, 1961, did not allow use of EVMs. The HC again ruled in the EC’s >>> favour, but the Supreme Court reversed the verdict and ordered a >>> repoll at all 50 polling stations using conventional ballots. This >>> time, Jose won. >>> >>> The EC then suspended the use of EVMs until Parliament, in 1988, >>> inserted Section 61A in the RP Act and Rules, legitimising them. In >>> November 1998, they were used on an experimental basis in 16 Assembly >>> seats — 5 each in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, and 6 in Delhi. In the >>> Lok Sabha elections of 2004, the entire country voted using EVMs. >>> Broadly, what position have the courts taken on the alleged >>> tamperability of EVMs? >>> The 1984 SC verdict striking down the pilot run of EVMs in Kerala had >>> little to do with the machines’ efficiency. It was passed on the >>> ground that there was no provision for them in the existing law. But >>> political parties and experts have repeatedly questioned the >>> functioning of EVMs in court. In 2004, advocate Pran Nath Lekhi sought >>> to establish before the Delhi High Court that EVMs had been doctored >>> to favour the UPA in the Lok Sabha elections. Lekhi pleaded that the >>> result of the election was the opposite of the projections (of an NDA >>> win) made by opinion and exit polls. The HC found no merit in the >>> petition, and Lekhi was forced to withdraw. >>> >>> In 2005, the Karnataka High Court upheld the use of EVMs, and >>> described them as a “great achievement” and a source of “national >>> pride”. The HC order was passed on an election petition filed in 1999 >>> by an unsuccessful candidate who challenged the integrity of EVMs used >>> in the Yelahanka parliamentary constituency. The court examined BEL >>> scientists and studied the safety features of the machines before >>> ruling that the EVMs were tamper-proof, and an attempt to doctor them >>> could not be kept hidden. >>> >>> *How has the EC responded to criticisms of EVMs?* >>> From August 3 to 8, 2009, the Commission undertook the extraordinary >>> step of inviting sceptics to demonstrate the alleged fallibility of >>> EVMs, using 100 randomly sourced machines from 10 states. “The outcome >>> of this exercise is that none of the persons, who were given the >>> opportunity, could actually demonstrate any tamperability of the >>> ECI-EVM, in any of the 100 machines put on display. They either failed >>> or chose not to demonstrate,” the EC said in a press note on August 8. >>> The machines, the EC said, could neither be reprogrammed nor >>> controlled by an external device. “The source code (for the EVM) is so >>> designed that it allows a voter to cast the vote only once. The next >>> vote can be recorded only after the Presiding Officer enables the >>> ballot on the Control Unit. In between the machine becomes dead to any >>> signal from outside (except from the Control Unit),” the 2009 >>> statement said. >>> >>> The Commission has said that comparisons between EVMs in India and >>> abroad, where they have failed, “are both misplaced and misguided”. >>> This is because “most of the systems used in other countries are PC >>> based and running on operating systems. Hence, these could be >>> vulnerable to hacking. >>> >>> “The EVM in India on the other hand is a fully standalone machine >>> without being part of any network and with no provision for any input… >>> The software in the EVM chip is one time programmable and is burnt >>> into the chip at the time of manufacture. Nothing can be written on >>> the chip after manufacture. Thus the ECI-EVMs are fundamentally >>> different… (and) any surmise based on foreign studies or operating >>> system based EVMs… would be completely erroneous.” >>> >>> *Which are the countries that have junked EVMs?* >>> Germany and the Netherlands banned EVMs for lack of transparency. >>> Italy felt e-voting results could be fudged. Ireland junked EVMs after >>> spending 51 million pounds researching them for 3 years. In the US, >>> California and many other states have banned EVMs without a paper >>> trail. However, the size of the electorate at all these places is a >>> fraction of the size in India — and the time, energy and expenses of >>> going the same way here are not comparable. >>> >>> *If the EC is so confident of the integrity of EVMs, why has it agreed >>> to Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)?* >>> ***With parties, activists and candidates constantly alleging rigging >>> of EVMs despite repeated assurances, the EC called a meeting of all >>> state and national political parties on October 4, 2010 to discuss the >>> issue. At this meeting, some parties suggested that in order to >>> increase transparency, the EC should explore the possibility of >>> introducing VVPAT, in which a voter immediately gets a printout of her >>> vote, which is then deposited in the ballot box. So, every voter can >>> see whether her vote has been registered correctly.*** [Emphasis >>> added.] >>> >>> Around the same time, BJP leader Subramanian Swamy, who was then the >>> president of the Janata Party, filed a writ petition in Delhi High >>> Court alleging that EVMs were vulnerable to rigging, and demanding a >>> paper back-up of the EVM vote. The EC informed the court that it was >>> already exploring the idea of VVPAT. In 2012, the HC observed that >>> EVMs in their present form were not “tamper-proof”, and the VVPAT >>> system may be developed early in consultation with political parties. >>> ***Subsequently, the Supreme Court ordered the EC to use VVPATs across >>> all seats in the 2019 Lok Sabha election.*** [Emphasis added.] >>> >>> *What was the EVM hacking controversy of 2010?* >>> In probably the biggest controversy around EVMs, in 2010, three >>> scientists claimed they had developed a way to hack into the machines. >>> A video posted on the Internet by the researchers purportedly showed >>> them connecting a home-made electronic device to an actual ECI-EVM. >>> Professor J Alex Halderman from the University of Michigan, who led >>> the project, said the device allowed them to change the results on the >>> machine by sending it messages from a mobile phone. The EC once again >>> denied the allegations, and nothing much came of the video except that >>> the Indian scientist out of the three, Hari Prasad, was arrested for >>> allegedly stealing an EVM from the Collector’s office in Mumbai. >>> >>> *Where is this controversy now headed?* >>> All political parties have criticised EVMs only when they have lost >>> elections. Five days ahead of the Delhi Assembly election results in >>> February 2015, Arvind Kejriwal had tweeted about possible tampering of >>> EVMs. He did not pursue his allegation after the same EVMs registered >>> a record mandate for his party, which won 67 out of 70 seats. >>> Similarly, while the BJP seems happy with EVMs today, before the 2014 >>> general election, it had alleged tampering on many occasions — in >>> fact, BJP spokesperson GVL Narasimha Rao had even written a book >>> titled Democracy At Risk! Can We Trust Our Electronic Voting >>> Machines?, with a foreword by L K Advani. Mayawati is only the latest >>> politician to attack EVMs; before her the RJD, TDP, SP, JD(U) and Left >>> have all targeted the machines. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peace Is Doable >>> >> >> >> -- >> Peace Is Doable >> > > > -- > Peace Is Doable > -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
