I/III. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/give-up-on-denuclearizing-north-korea/535347/?utm_source=atltw
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un watches a military drill marking the 85th anniversary of the establishment of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in this handout photo by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) made available on April 26, 2017. KCNA/Handout via REUTERS/File PhotoKCNA Give Up on Denuclearizing North Korea The question now is how to convince it not to use its weapons. JON WOLFSTHAL JUL 28, 2017 GLOBAL Strategic milestones don’t come along everyday. Today was one of those days. On Friday, North Korea tested a missile than can deliver a nuclear weapon to almost any target in the continental United States, marking a major accomplishment for a state than many thought was on its last legs in the early 1990s. But far from dead, North Korea has managed to evade every political, military, and economic barrier that five successive U.S. presidents put in its way. Now, the United States under President Donald Trump has a massive but surmountable challenge on its hands—deterring a nuclear-armed North Korea and preserving and strengthening America’s alliances with South Korea and Japan, countries currently questioning whether Kim Jong Un’s new capabilities might prevent the United States from coming to their defense. In recent years, America’s North Korea debate has focused on whether Washington should talk to Pyongyang and seek a freeze on its program. Those debates now seem pretty played out. Today, the main challenge is preventing North Korea from hurting the United States and its allies now that the Kim regime has long-range nuclear missiles. This debate is the one that Washington should have been having for years—may as well have it now. The first question for U.S. policymakers: What are America’s deterrence objectives for North Korea? In other words, what does it want North Korea not to do, and how can it be convinced not to do those things? Kim Jong Un must be made to understand that, under no uncertain terms, can he ever use his nuclear weapons; doing so would mean the end of North Korea. Whether the United States likes it or not, the country now poses a clear strategic threat, and it must be treated as such. Deterrence is by no means a perfect solution, but for it to have a chance of success, the Trump administration must communicate directly with its North Korean counterparts to ensure they have a clear understanding of what actions would provoke a direct U.S. response. There are lots of ways to ensure North Korea gets the message, but none are as reliable or convincing as direct U.S. discussions with North Korean officials. These could take the form of military-to-military contacts, but whatever the choice, it will need to be well above the traditional channel U.S. diplomats have used in New York at the UN. Even communicating through China, as the United States has done in the past, won’t be enough to ensure that Pyongyang feels the full impact of these messages. Those messages must make clear that the use of nuclear weapons, and any transfer of nuclear weapons or ICBMs or production capabilities to other states, is unacceptable. If America cannot prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, it has to make clear that any decision to use them would be the last one any North Korean leader would ever make. Senior officials in the Obama administration, where I worked on nuclear nonproliferation at the National Security Council, began to unpack these issues in anticipation that North Korea would continue to pursue an ICBM. It has now fallen to Trump to take that work and find a way to influence North Korea’s future actions. As much as I would like North Korea to freeze and end its nuclear program, no combination of threats, engagement, negotiations, and sanctions, has produced that outcome. At best, any negotiations with the North must seek an agreement to avoid steps that could provoke a crisis, including no regular deployments of mobile missiles and an agreement to end or limit missile and nuclear weapon tests. In a perfect world, the United States could eventually start to negotiate an agreement where North Korea caps its nuclear program and stops producing materials that can be used to build nuclear weapons. But Washington does not know, and North Korea will not say, where all of its productions sites are. Nor will it allow inspectors access to verify they are shut down. Short of this, a ban is not viable and should not be a major focus of U.S. action. The United States does not yet know what North Korea might demand in return for such constraints, but Washington and Seoul should consider offering their own steps that could reduce the risk of a military confrontation or escalation—something that’s in no one’s interest. As important as deterrence is now, reassuring South Korea and Japan may be even tougher in the face of a growing North Korean threat. Leaders in both countries have been wondering if America will risk New York or Los Angeles to protect Tokyo and Seoul. Now that North Korea can reach those American cities with its missiles, those worries will naturally grow. America worked for decades to convince European states that it would defend them even in the face of global nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This process of making sure extended deterrence is credible continues to this day, especially in light of increasingly dangerous Russian behavior. It’s time to extend the principle to America’s friends in Asia. Reassurance is hard—even harder these days because official U.S. statements and policies are difficult to discern and less consistent. But this is one challenge the country must get right, both through political statements and with increased military and security cooperation in the region, including possible increased deployments of missile defenses and other conventional systems in South Korea and Japan. These actions must, first and foremost, defend U.S. allies, but may also make clear to China that it, too, has a price to pay. Having gone soft on North Korea for decades, Beijing has much to answer for in North Korea’s new nuclear status. If U.S. actions to defend its troops and allies in the region also undermine China’s security, that should no longer be a major impediment to action. Then, perhaps, China can use its influence to convince North Korea to accept certain limits on its program. This day has been a long time coming. North Korea began its nuclear efforts in the 1950s. But the world is long since past the point of deciding whether or not to not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. The question is how the United States can convince the world that these new weapons are unusable, and convince its allies that it means what it says. The first step: deciding, on its own, what to do. The good news is America has done all this before, with more threatening states like the Soviet Union and China. The bad news is that it has lost valuable time and now has to play catch up. The Trump administration has its work cut out for it. II/III. http://www.thedailybeast.com/north-koreas-terrifying-reveal-an-unknown-number-of-secret-missile-bases?utm_content=bufferaeabe&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer North Korea’s Terrifying Reveal: An Unknown Number of Secret Missile Bases We should consider it a likely possibility that North Korea has dispersed a number of ICBMs around the Hermit Kingdom. Jeffrey Lewis JEFFREY LEWIS 07.28.17 10:25 PM ET REUTERS/TORU HANAI/FILE PHOTO A few weeks ago, some crackpot in The Daily Beast wrote a column arguing that North Korea’s new ICBM, the one tested on July 4, could travel a lot farther than Alaska. He said that models of the missile based on its size, the type of fuel, and the power of the engine, that North Korea could strike targets throughout the United States, including New York City. I told you so. So, while everyone is freaking out that, yes, North Korea’s missile test on Friday really does prove that North Korea can deliver a missile to Trump Tower, that’s old news. What is truly worrisome about the missile launch is that the regime performed it at night, from deep within North Korea. You may recall that, after North Korea’s missile test on July 4, Ankit Panda reported that the United States had detected launch preparations for the ICBM more than an hour before North Korea fired it. That triggered all sorts of absurd chest thumping in the United States, with keyboard warriors demanding that the United States blow up the missile or try to kill Kim Jong Un. This was not helpful. I presume the North Koreans noticed all that. And this time, they did something unexpected: They tested from a surprise location deep inside North Korea, near the Chinese border where it would be hard to strike. And they did it at night when satellites that rely on optical images are useless. (That’s not every satellite, but it is a good number of them.) This looks like a test from an operational missile base. You know that Washington Post report that the missile will “will have advanced from prototype to assembly line” sometime in 2018? Surprise! North Korea may have dispersed a number of ICBMs prior to its first test in July. This is not a capability North Korea will have next year—it is a capability North Korea has now. We’re just getting let in on the secret. It might seem risky to deploy a missile before testing it, but with the the 101st Fighting Editorialists over at The Wall Street Journal still talking about regime change, maybe Kim Jong Un decided that was a risk worth taking. It seems to have worked out for him. To be fair, I don’t know whether the U.S. was surprised by the location of the launch, but I do notice something disturbing. The press was abuzz with rumors that North Korea was going to launch a missile on July 27, weather permitting. The buzz was so strong that I wore a jacket to the office yesterday and then again today—something that is pretty damn weird in California. But the prelaunch rumors suggested that North Korea was going to do another launch out of Kusong. I am left with the very uncomfortable feeling that North Korea distracted us by setting up to launch from one place, then surprised us by launching from another. Forget Alaska. N. Korea Might Soon Be Able to Nuke New York. America Has No Plan to Stop North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions North Korea’s Nuclear and America Has No Plan to Stop It Hey Trump, North Korea Missiles Fly on Chinese Tech This test, from a missile base deep within North Korea and conducted in the dead of night, helps illustrate precisely why it would have been a terrible mistake to try to attack North Korea before the last test or try to kill Kim Jong Un: because there are more missiles out there, in places we might not expect, and probably armed with nuclear weapons. More hawkish voices sometimes talk about the importance of “preemption” or “preventive war” in regard to countries that threaten to develop nuclear weapon. That’s how we got into Iraq. The thing is—and I hate to be pedantic—but the “pre-” in “preventive attack” means “before.” If you attack a country after it develops nuclear weapons, like North Korea has, you are just having a plain old nuclear war. III. http://www.38north.org/2014/02/jlewis020314/ That Ain’t My Truck: Where North Korea Assembled Its Chinese Transporter-Erector-Launchers BY: JEFFREY LEWIS FEBRUARY 3, 2014WMD This article is co-authored by Jeffrey Lewis, Melissa Hanham and Amber Lee. On April 15, 2012, North Korea paraded what appeared to be six road-mobile missiles, quickly identified in the media as KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), through Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang.[1][2] Attention immediately focused on these unusual vehicles, after Chinese bloggers identified them as Chinese-manufactured transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) used by Beijing’s strategic missile forces.[3] Officials in Beijing initially denied exporting “any items prohibited by relevant UN Security Council resolutions and Chinese laws and regulations.” However they later stated that the Chinese firm in question had only exported civilian-use chassis, which can be used for a variety of civil purposes, including logging and construction.[4] Although the chassis export appeared to violate sanctions on North Korea and Chinese domestic law,[5] the Chinese showed evidence that the North Koreans had provided the name of a false end-user for the vehicles, a standard tactic for evading export controls, and stated that North Korea had added the erectors and other specialized equipment to the chassis themselves.[6] It is possible, using open source information, to make some preliminary judgments about China’s claim, as well as North Korea’s infrastructure for producing TELs. Although it is hard to believe that the Chinese were not aware that North Korea would use the vehicle chassis for its illicit missile program, available evidence suggests that Pyongyang did indeed add the erectors at facilities known to assemble missile TELs. The Wanshan Special Vehicle Sale Following the April 2012 parade, Chinese officials told the United Nations Panel of Experts charged with monitoring sanctions enforcement that a Chinese firm, the Wanshan Special Vehicle Company (WSV), had exported six heavy-duty vehicle chassis to North Korea in 2011.[7] The delivery appears to have been made in two shipments: two chassis in May 2011 followed by another four in October 2011.[8] In retrospect, information concerning the shipments was available in the public domain. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC or 国资委) announced the export of heavy-duty vehicle chassis to an unnamed foreign customer at the time of the sale, as did WSV.[9] Neither statement mentioned the number of chassis or the identity of the customer, but they did indicate that the recipient—China’s first foreign customer for such vehicles—paid 12 million RMB in advance on a 30 million RMB order.[10] Chinese officials subsequently claimed that Pyongyang had told them that the vehicles were to be used in logging by the Ministry of Forestry. Although the story is difficult to believe, logging and construction are plausible civil uses for these otherwise highly specialized vehicles. Figure 1. April 15, 2012 Parade Image and Marketing Photo of the Chinese WS51200 For all photos, click to enlarge. Photo (left) KCNA; (right) wstech.com.cn. One question that remained was whether the Chinese exported fully assembled launchers, or, as Chinese officials claimed, just the chassis-and-cab assembly, leaving North Korea to mount the launcher and other specialized equipment. Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country In 2013, North Korea released a commemorative video entitled, Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country, posted by pro-North Korean groups on YouTube. Although it is strange to think of North Korea using social media extensively, the country’s state-run propaganda apparatus and affiliated groups in foreign countries make extensive use of such platforms to share and distribute the regime’s propaganda internationally. This propaganda also can provide outside analysts with important clues about activities in the North that otherwise are off limits to foreigners, for example, factories where North Korean leaders conduct field inspections. Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country contains the only known footage taken inside North Korea’s facility for completing assembly of TELs for ballistic missiles. Three clips lasting a few seconds show Nodong TELs inside a spacious, rectangular, high-bay building as well as a KN-08 TEL in a very similar building. Kim Jong Il appears in some frames, looking at a Nodong TEL.[11] The first analysis of the film, along with still images, appeared on North Korea Leadership Watch, a website which regularly analyzes North Korean propaganda.[12] Figure 2. Stills from Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country All images stills from KCTV, “Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country.” Modeling the Building from the Inside Out Because the internal images show a distinct building, it is possible to model the outside of the structure by first simulating the inside. First, along one of the long sides of the building there is an unusual pattern of clerestory windows—high windows above eye level—as well as the cupola-like structure near the center of the building. Second, windows run along only one of the long sides of the building, suggesting that it is either partially buried or has an adjoining structure on the opposite side. Finally, the windows along the short side of the building are spaced in an irregular manner and make an identifiable pattern. Referencing the video footage, we digitally constructed the building interior on SketchUp, a free, widely-available 3D modeling program. This rendering revealed the structure’s approximate dimensions, and based on the windows and roof, suggested that the two clips may have been filmed in different buildings. Figure 3. Comparison of Stills with the Virtual Model Images (top) KCTV, “Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country”; (bottom) Melissa Hanham/ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Combining what we knew about the windows, roof, and building dimensions, we created external models of the two buildings—one with a square cupola, and another with a larger cupola spanning the width of the roof. Figure 4. Artist Sketches of Nodong Building and KN-08 Building Images: Melissa Hanham/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Defining the Search Area Once the configurations of the structures were identified, the next question we addressed was, where might such unusual buildings be located? Google Earth houses an enormous repository of high-resolution satellite and aerial images, including fairly comprehensive coverage of built-up areas of North Korea. Additional images can be purchased from other providers, such as Astrium. The only problem is where to start looking. A number of defector accounts describe the location of various North Korean defense industries, including some linked to the production of vehicle chassis and the final assembly of transporter-erector-launchers. We mined Korean-language social media sites and other electronic resources containing defector accounts to create a search area. Although the accounts differ from one another, descriptions of facilities to assemble missile launchers converged on an area in Chagang (Jaggang) Province that is well known as the heart of North Korea’s defense industries. (Chagang is also a center of forestry, an amusing coincidence given the stated end-use for the Chinese vehicles.) Figure 5. Ch’onch’on, Chagang-do (also written Jonchon, Jagang Province) Image: 38 North: DPRK Digital Atlas. Image: 38 North: DPRK Digital Atlas. For example, Ko Chong Song, a North Korean defector, published a book in Japan describing the locations of defense enterprises, stating Pyongyang produces “missile launchers” at the No. 81 Factory located in the “Chungsonggan workers’ district, Songgan County, Chagang Province, about 2.5 to 3 kilometers from Songgan-up.”[13] However, Ko cautions that the No. 81 Factory may only produce some components for launchers with final assembly done elsewhere. Another account, posted online by an anti-DPRK dissident group, describes a gruesome incident of cannibalism at the “No.11 munitions factory (Hakmu worker’s district 6 km northwest of Jonchon, Jagang) where missile launchers are manufactured…”[14] Jonchon and Songgan are close to one another, lying about 10 kilometers apart along a river valley. Songgan, Chunsonggan and Jonchon (Chonchon) all appear in the Gazetteer maintained by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.[15] Hakmu does not—although the description of the place as about 6 kilometers northwest of Jonchon is consistent with a mention in a survey conducted by UNICEF and the World Health Organization.[16] Ko also mentions Factory 11—although he claims it is near Songgan. All of these locations are within a few kilometers of each other, creating a manageable search area centered on the river valley between Songgan and Jonchon, particularly the Chungsonggan and Hakmu Worker’s Districts, which lie between the two locations. There are other possible locations mentioned in defector accounts, but this is the only cluster of possibilities. This became our initial search area. While the ten kilometers along the river valley between Jonchon and Songgan represent a manageable search area, it was further simplified through crowdsourcing. The social media site Wikimapia and the North Korea Uncovered KMZ file offered by North Korean Economy Watch provide the locations of many known defense sites, including surface-to-air missile installations. Although the No. 81 and No. 11 Factories are not listed, clusters of surface-to-air missiles sites often help identify locations that the North Koreans regard as important enough to warrant air defenses.[17] The area six kilometers northwest of Jonchon—consistent with the location of the Hakmu Worker’s District—appears to be well-defended so our search started there. Figure 6. Initial Search Area Showing Surface-to-Air Missile Sites Image © 2011 Google Earth. North Korea’s Final Assembly Facility for TELs Less than one kilometer from a surface-to-air missile site, and 4.6 kilometers northwest of the Jonchon train station (a proxy for central Jonchon), lies a building located at 40°38’44″N, 126°25’58″E that matches one of our models. We will call this structure Site A. Figure 7. Site A Image © 2011 Google Earth. Several interesting details emerge right away looking at the satellite imagery. The Site A building is a close match based on the modeled dimensions and the windows. The building has a single row of high, clerestory windows because the main building has an adjoining structure. The completely windowless opposite side appears to be flush with another hall. The windows at the eastern short end match very closely. The large cupola is revealed to be a curved, fan-like structure (consistent with the arc made by the tip of an erecting missile on a TEL inside). As it turns out, the two different roofs are actually from the same building. Satellite images show that North Korea remodeled the roof at Site A between 2004 and 2011—probably at the same time it negotiated for the export of the KN-08 chassis. Figure 8. Historical Comparison of Site A in 2004 and 2011 Image © 2011 Google Earth. Most conclusive, was the fact that a KN-08 missile could easily be erected on a launcher under the 2011 cupola, where the previous 2004 cupola could only support the shorter Nodong missile.[18] Frank Pabian and Tamara Patton built a model of the KN-08 TEL and missile using parade images and SketchUp. Wanshan’s original marketing materials for the WS51200 chassis also included specifications, thus they were able to scale the model to the correct size.[19] Figure 9. 3D Model of KN-08 TEL and Missile Image: “KN-08 TEL Model,” Frank Pabian and Tamara Patton, 2012. This detail not only provides strong confirmation of the site’s purpose, but indicates that China probably only exported the bare chassis. It would seem the launcher modifications were added here near Jonchon. Figure 10. Erected KN-08 in Model Image: Frank Pabian/Tamara Patton/Melissa Hanham/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Working with 38 North, we purchased new satellite images, including a low-angle view that shows the windows running alongside the south of the building. They are not evenly spaced, presenting the opportunity to match the inside of the building with the outside. The matching window pattern is strong evidence that the KN-08 launchers seen in the video were located in the building at Site A. Figure 11. Window Pattern Visible along the South Side of the Building Image © 2012 Astrium. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]. The windows in one video clip of the Nodong launcher, however, do not seem to match. In particular, one image shows a Nodong with a row of continuous windows behind it. It is possible that the windows were altered when the roof was remodeled. There is, however, another possibility. In addition to the building at Site A, we found a nearly identical building a few kilometers away at what we call Site B (40°36’43″N, 126°25’34″E). This structure appears to be located in the same industrial facility, which is spread out over many square kilometers in the river valleys. This roof was also modified to receive a new cupola sometime before 2011. Figure 11. Historical Comparison of Site B in 2004 and 2011 Images © 2004, 2011 Google Earth. The available evidence strongly suggests these buildings are the ones shown in Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country, as well as described in defector accounts. Based on Kim Jong Un’s visit, as well as the presence of the KN-08 launchers, this would appear to be North Korea’s most important facility for the final assembly of TELs.) Figure 12. Locations of Site A and Site B in the Search Area Image © 2008 Google Earth. Conclusion While much remains unknown about North Korea’s infrastructure for producing ballistic missiles and launchers, a persistent analyst can identify the primary facilities for ballistic missile TEL assembly by referencing various resources—in this case, footage available online, a 3D modeling program, published defector accounts, mapping projects, and satellite images. In isolation, none of these tools would offer much insight into North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Together, they make it possible to establish with high confidence when and where North Korea fixed the erectors and launchers to imported Chinese heavy-duty vehicle chassis. Many of these steps were already possible[20] but labor-intensive (perhaps prohibitively so). Today, nearly all of the necessary information is available to any nongovernmental analyst with a decent internet connection. Satellite images purchased from private companies can simply be downloaded. Questions can be asked, and answered, by email or social media. Images and models can be shared online. Our team operated virtually, using email and Dropbox to connect participants from offices in Monterey, California; Washington, DC; and Vienna, Austria. The result helps answer an interesting policy question—yes, the North Koreans added the KN-08 launch hydraulics—but more importantly, this analysis illustrates both the new realities and opportunities for open source research in the field of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Jeffrey Lewis is Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies. Melissa Hanham a Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at CNS. Amber Lee is a Graduate Research Assistant at CNS. [1] This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-13-1-0012 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC San Diego). The views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by speakers, moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the Naval Postgraduate School nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, or organizations imply endorsement by the US Government. [2] See: Joshua Pollack, “North Korea’s ICBM Unveiled,” Arms Control Wonk, April 15, 2012, http://pollack.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3932/north-koreas-icbm-unveiled. [3] Commenters on the blog Arms Control Wonk worked together to analyze parade footage from April 15, 2012. They quickly identified the WS51200 vehicle and posted announcements about the sale of the vehicles. Joshua Pollack, “North Korea’s ICBM Unveiled.” [4] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press Conference on June 13, 2012,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 14, 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cn; Mark Hibbs, “China and the POE DPRK Report,” Arms Control Wonk, July 2, 2012, http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com. [5] Melissa Hanham, “North Korea’s Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How Chinese Missile Hardware Ended up in North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 31, 2012, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-koreas-procurement-network-strikes-again-examining-how-chinese-missile-hardware-ended-pyongyang . [6] Annex XII includes a copy of the end-user certificate received by China. United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2013/337, June 11, 2013, pg. 80, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/337. [7] United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2013/337, June 11, 2013, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/337. [8] Asahi later obtained documents that suggested from the second shipment of four vehicles in October 2011. Yoshihiro Makino, “Chinese Shipper May Have Ties to N. Korean Arms Dealer,” Asahi, June 25, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201206250007. It would not be unusual to pay 6 million RMB each for the first two vehicles, then less for the next installment of four (18 million RMB total). [9] “中国航天科工研制成功国内最大越野运输车 [CASIC Successfully Develops Country’s Largest Off-road Vehicles,” State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 26, 2011, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2410/n314319/13551197.html; Note: Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Co. Ltd took down its announcement: http://www.wstech.com.cn/en/show.asp?id=734. [10] See also:“九院：首次获大型非公路运输车批量出口订单 [China Sanjiang Space Group (9th Academy): First Order of Heavy-Duty Off-Road Trucks],” China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp., October 19, 2010, http://www.casic.com.cn/n16/n1115/n2888/548509.html; “湖北三江航天万山特种车辆有限公司 [Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.],” China Sanjiang Space Group, 31 March 2011, http://www.cssg.com.cn/Item/235.aspx; “湖北三江航天万山特种车辆有限公司 [Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.],” Yuan’an County Economy, Trade and Information Bureau, July 23, 2009, http://jjsw.yuanan.gov.cn/art/2009/7/23/art_876_25463.html. [11] Rodrigorojo1, “KCTV (Kim Jong Ils Efforts to Defend the Country),” YouTube, uploaded August 24, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQKFC7pK3wc. [12] Michael Madden, “DPRK Documentary Film Shows Kim Jong Il Inspecting Nodong, KN-08 Missiles,” North Korea Leadership Watch blog, August 28, 2013, http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/2013/08/28/dprk-documentary-film-shows-kim-jong-il-inspecting-nodong-kn-08-missiles . [13] 高靑松 中根悠 [Chonson Ko and Yu Nakane], 金正日の秘密兵器工場： 腐敗共和国からのわが脫出記 [Kim Jong Il’s Secret Weapons Factory]. 東京 [Tokyo]: ビジネス社 [Bijineshusha], 2001. [14] “김정일이 죽든 내가 죽든 둘 중 하나 [Either Kim Jong Il or I will die],” DailyNK, December 5, 2005, http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?num=15656&cataId=nk00300. [15] The Gazetteer is available online at: http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html/namefiles.htm. [16] Stephen K. Lwanga, “EPI Coverage Evaluation Survey—2008, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UNICEF, December 2008, http://dev.undprk.matth.eu/content/uploads/2012/04/EPI-Coverage-Evaluation-Survey-2008-DPR-Korea-Final-Report.pdf . [17] www.wikimapia.org; and www.nkeconwatch.com/north-korea-uncovered-google-earth. [18] CNS built a model of the Nodong TEL, using components from: Abel Nightroad, “苏联SS-1c“飞毛腿”导弹发射车(SS-1c ‘Scud B’wMAZ-543 Tel),” 3D Warehouse, January 5, 2010, http://sketchup.google.com/3dwarehouse/details?mid=6c2184e69080ea072d5c0718d7322deb . [19] “外交部回应朝鲜最新导弹发射车来自中国传言 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Respond to Latest Rumors about North Korean Missile Launch Vehicles],” Phoenix News (Hong Kong), April 20, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_04/20/14031451_6.shtml. [20] See for example: Frank Pabian, “Making Discoveries in Virtual Worlds via the Cloud,” Earth Imaging Journal, October 2013, http://eijournal.com/2013/making-discoveries-in-virtual-worlds-via-the-cloud . -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. 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