https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/petition_59f55efa93d43/?zArFdab&utm_source=sharetools&utm_medium=whatsapp&utm_campaign=petition-454858-petition_59f55efa93d43&utm_term=ArFdab%2Ben

I'M SAYING NO TO AADHAAR

Why this is important

Aadhar violates our Constitutional rights and freedoms as citizens.
Aadhar undermines the foundations of our democracy. Aadhar disempowers us
as citizens while giving government the means to control every aspect of
our lives.

We are being forced and coerced to close our eyes to these concerns and
sign up with Aadhar. The government is ignoring and violating the orders of
the Supreme Court to declare Aadhar mandatory for all kinds of activities,
hoping to present it as a fait accompli when the Supreme Curt hears the
Aadhar petitions in a few weeks.

The mess created by Aadhaar is NOT a matter of poor implementation or
“teething troubles” as claimed by the government.

Aadhaar cannot be fixed with some tweaking and tinkering. It is
fundamentally flawed and must be scrapped.

We are no longer willing to stand by and let this scam go unchallenged. We
demand that the Aadhar scheme be completely SCRAPPED.

....

We the undersigned wish to place on record our opposition to the Aadhaar
scheme which is being aggressively pushed by the government in complete
violation of norms, procedures and Supreme Court orders.Many of us have
resisted enrolment. Many of us are already enrolled. But today, we stand
together to say NO To Aadhaar. 1. Aadhaar has been foisted on us under
false pretences. When it started, it was touted as a fool‐proof mechanism
to streamline delivery of social benefits. Then, we were told that it was a
tool for good governance. Then, it was marketed as a weapon to eliminate
corruption. Then we were told that it is the vehicle to create a “digital
society”. It has finally revealed itself in its true colours as an
instrument of surveillance and government control over the lives of
citizens. 2. It is useless. Aadhaar has spectacularly failed to achieve any
of its stated aims of plugging leakages in welfare schemes, of serving as a
single window to access entitlements and benefits, of eliminating
corruption and making life easier for law‐abiding citizens. Official data
and figures confirm that grandiose claims about “huge savings” enabled by
Aadhaar have no basis whatsoever in fact . Not a single government agency
or private company accepts Aadhaar as the sole proof of identity – in every
case, it must be backed up by at least two other documents. 3. It is
destroying the lives of the poor. By making essential services conditional
on Aadhaar, children have been deprived of school admission and mid‐day
meals, pregnant women have been deprived of hospital admission, TB patients
have been denied medicine, workers have been denied job cards under MNREGA,
retired senior citizens have been denied their pensions, and starving
families have been denied foodgrains under the PDS scheme. Aadhaar has now
been made mandatory for more than 50 welfare schemes. Surveys and public
hearings across the country are confirming the scale and seriousness of
exclusions created by Aadhaar.4. It is coercive. Millions of people have
enrolled not because they wanted to or chose to but because they were told
it was required for exercising their rights such as getting a passport,
filing tax returns, operating a bank account, renewing a driving licence,
booking a train ticket, getting admission to an educational institution,
getting an income certificate, registering a land deed and anything else
that anyone chooses to come up with. Once enrolled, there is no way out of
the database. 5. It is technically unreliable. The Aadhaar scheme is based
on the naive and unscientific notion that fingerprints and iris scans are
unique and infallible personal identifiers. This claim has no basis in
fact. The biometric database is full of errors and the authentication
process is riddled with “false positives” and “false negatives”. 6. It is
insecure. The claim that the Aadhaar database is secure and tamper‐proof
has been repeatedly debunked by data security experts, who call it a
“honeypot for hackers”. UIDAI itself has taken action against Axis Bank for
storing and using biometric data for multiple transactions. The Centre for
Internet and Society (CIS) and others who have blown the whistle on the
vulnerability of the Aadhar database have had charges filed against them by
UIDAI. 7. It puts sensitive data into unreliable hands. Thousands of
fly‐by‐night operators have been authorised to run enrolment centres and
collect biometrics and personal data. These private agencies are also
collecting demographic information such as name, age, address, mobile
number, bank account numbers and other personal data. As many as 34,000
operators have been blacklisted for malpractices. Contracts for
de‐duplication and building the database have been given to foreign firms,
some of them closely linked to intelligence agencies in the US and Europe.
Citizens have no recourse in case of leakage, tampering or misuse of their
personal data. 8. It is creating the infrastructure for 24x7 surveillance.
Banks, mobile networks, internet providers and digital payment companies
have been roped in to get their customers onto the Aadhaar database. The
linking of these databases via Aadhaar enables the government to track a
citizen’s geolocation, travel, employment, financial transactions and
social media activities. This tracking, profiling and surveillance can be
carried out without the permission or even the knowledge of the individual,
even if there is no suspicion of any illegality or criminality. And not
only government agencies ‐ private companies such as “BetterPlace” proudly
claim that they are “leveraging multiple data sources, including Aadhaar
...to create a unique profile of every citizen with accurate and
comprehensive personal, professional and social information.” 9. It is
allowing privileged insiders to profit from personal data. The government
is giving private developers free access to the Aadhaar database,
ostensibly so that they can create apps to facilitate social goals. In
fact, these developers, most of whom are Aadhaar “insiders”, are using
Aadhaar data to enrich themselves. For instance, Khosla Labs, the developer
of an “Aadhaar‐based authentication service” (Aadhaar Bridge) was set up by
UIDAI’s former Chief Product Manager and former Head of Technology, and its
present Chief Product Manager. Similarly, AngelPrime, a venture capital
fund that holds Aadhaar “hackathons” to expose developers to Aadhaar,
includes three former employees of UIDAI among its backers. 10. It frees
the government from accountability. The government has insulated itself
from any responsibility or accountability for the mess created by Aadhar.
The Act gives UIDAI possession and control over citizens’ data, but is
silent on the question of liability. The Act does not require UIDAI to
notify or compensate citizens whose data has been compromised, or used for
identity theft and financial frauds. Government agencies and service
providers do not take any responsibility for authentication failures and
the consequent exclusion from entitlements, even when they have fatal
consequences. We are being forced and coerced to close our eyes to these
concerns and sign up with Aadhaar. The government is racing ahead with
making Aadhaar mandatory for all kinds of activities, hoping to present it
as a fait accompli when the Supreme Court hears the Aadhaar petitions in a
few weeks.We are no longer willing to stand by and let this scam go
unchallenged.We demand that the Aadhaar scheme be completely scrapped.

-- 
Peace Is Doable

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