[Apart from all too menacing state srveillance and the threat to be turned into a non-being at the whims of the state - by deactivating the card and all that's linked to it, now, it comes to light, anybody, just anybody, from anywhere, can access your data! Just one time payment of Rs. 500.00 for access and Rs. 300.00 for the software to print Aadhaar cards.
Pls., at least, sign the petition online at < https://www.change.org/p/prime-minister-of-india-repeal-the-aadhaar-act-2016 >. One only wonders would the Supreme Court take note!? If not now, then when???] I/III. https://www.change.org/p/prime-minister-of-india-repeal-the-aadhaar-act-2016 Petitioning Prime Minister of India and 1 other Repeal the Aadhaar Act 2016, Delink Aadhaar, & Delete all personal and biometric data Alliance of Protests against Aadhaar The Unique ID, or Aadhaar scheme, infringes on Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, but does not guarantee the sovereignty of the data provider nor the security of the data collected. A substantial portion of this data, central to the scheme's operation, has been collected through coercion including mandating exclusion from essential services; maintained by private operators; and linked with private organizations such as telecom companies and banks. Aadhaar offers a powerful new instrument of state surveillance, going against both the letter and the spirit of Constitutional promises of justice, equality, and liberty by deliberate design - originally as an Executive Order, now legislated through the ill-composed Aadhaar Act, 2016 (which is facing Constitutional challenge having been passed as a Money Bill). We, the people of India, hereby demand that the Government of India, and the various State Governments compensate for the loss of lives and livelihood caused by promulgation of the Aadhaar Scheme (since 2016, the Aadhaar Act), by: 1) Completely halting further enrollment into the Aadhaar scheme and imposing a moratorium on seeding Aadhaar to any welfare schemes, government programs, or corporate services. 2) Striking down the Aadhaar Act, 2016, as it violates the Fundamental Right to Privacy given the lack of limitation of purpose and the arbitrariness in application, and passing legislation to delete all data collected since the inception of the Aadhaar scheme, from the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR), State Resident Data Hubs (SRDH), National Population Register (NPR) or any other databases wherein the Aadhaar numbers may have been stored. 3) For those who have been denied any welfare benefit or subsidy, due to the Aadhaar scheme, amounting to loss of life, liberty, or livelihood, award the highest monetary compensation possible (to the next of kin where need be). Where not linking to Aadhaar has led to a "civil death" - or loss of identity and associated fundamental rights, we demand a full restoration of identity and rights, with a public apology tendered in Parliament by the Prime Minister. We further demand that the following measures be executed urgently: 1) An immediate restoration of the status quo in line with the Supreme Court's orders dated September 23, 2013, and August 11, 2015, - i.e., "the production of an Aadhaar card will not be a condition for any benefits otherwise due to a citizen", and, "...the Aadhaar card scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this [Supreme] Court one way or the other". 2) Allowing residents of India currently enrolled for Aadhaar to (a) "opt-out" of the Aadhaar scheme and have their personal and biometric data deleted from the Aadhaar database, and (b) use other officially valid documents as proof of identity, date of birth, or residence, as the case may be. 3) A Supreme Court-monitored investigation into the exclusions and infringements upon civil liberties caused by Aadhaar, with a view to verifying the claims made by representatives of the Government of India, the Unique ID Authority of India, and other agencies in setting up and promulgating the scheme. 4) Putting in place stringent measures to limit the scope, purpose and utilization of Aadhaar, either as a number in tandem with biometric authentication, or as an identity card displayed on demand. 5) A thorough audit of the Aadhaar database and the security protocols currently in place in order to examine the integrity of the database from the time of creation, including an investigation of the different contractors with whom the data might have been shared; the personnel involved and their communications; and the hardware and systems employed (particularly those managed by third-party/independent contractors), in order to validate assurances that none of the data collected for Aadhaar - in particular biometric data - was at any time stored on external hardware outside the premises of the CIDR. Given the perceived threat to India's sovereignty and national security engendered by sharing or leaking of the Aadhaar database, such an investigation should necessarily involve highly-qualified members of the military and intelligence communities, besides civil society representatives and advocates of civil liberties. 6) Appoint an ombudsman to investigate the rampant identity fraud enabled by promulgation of the Aadhaar scheme without limitation of purpose, particularly in light of the UIDAI's consistent refusal to address public concerns and complaints on instances of fraud. 7) Impose proportionate penalties and punishments on any and all personnel found guilty of leveraging any segment of the Aadhaar scheme, the data collected, or the agencies involved for personal profit, especially to the detriment of civil liberties of the residents of India and the security of the nation. We hold that the Aadhaar scheme was poorly conceptualized, and its promulgation involved, particularly during the early stages, agencies whose credentials are suspect at best and mala fide at worst. Further, the scope of the Aadhaar scheme has been transformed so entirely since its inception as to make it a credible threat to individual civil liberties of the residents - and citizens - of India, and to the security and sovereignty of our country. We urge all relevant parties to immediately take the necessary steps to contain the danger presented by Aadhaar, at the earliest. This petition will be delivered to: Prime Minister of India Supreme Court of India II/III. http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html Posted at: Jan 4, 2018, 2:07 AM; last updated: Jan 4, 2018, 3:37 PM (IST) TRIBUNE INVESTIGATION — SECURITY BREACH Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details Group tapping UIDAI data may have sold access to 1 lakh service providers Rachna Khaira Tribune News Service Jalandhar, January 3 It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI.” Today, The Tribune “purchased” a service being offered by anonymous sellers over WhatsApp that provided unrestricted access to details for any of the more than 1 billion Aadhaar numbers created in India thus far. It took just Rs 500, paid through Paytm, and 10 minutes in which an “agent” of the group running the racket created a “gateway” for this correspondent and gave a login ID and password. Lo and behold, you could enter any Aadhaar number in the portal, and instantly get all particulars that an individual may have submitted to the UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India), including name, address, postal code (PIN), photo, phone number and email. What is more, The Tribune team paid another Rs 300, for which the agent provided “software” that could facilitate the printing of the Aadhaar card after entering the Aadhaar number of any individual. When contacted, UIDAI officials in Chandigarh expressed shock over the full data being accessed, and admitted it seemed to be a major national security breach. They immediately took up the matter with the UIDAI technical consultants in Bangaluru. Sanjay Jindal, Additional Director-General, UIDAI Regional Centre, Chandigarh, accepting that this was a lapse, told The Tribune: “Except the Director-General and I, no third person in Punjab should have a login access to our official portal. Anyone else having access is illegal, and is a major national security breach.” 1 lakh illegal users Investigations by The Tribune reveal that the racket may have started around six months ago, when some anonymous groups were created on WhatsApp. These groups targeted over 3 lakh village-level enterprise (VLE) operators hired by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (ME&IT) under the Common Service Centres Scheme (CSCS) across India, offering them access to UIDAI data. CSCS operators, who were initially entrusted with the task of making Aadhaar cards across India, were rendered idle after the job was withdrawn from them. The service was restricted to post offices and designated banks to avoid any security breach in November last year. Spotting an opportunity to make a quick buck, more than one lakh VLEs are now suspected to have gained this illegal access to UIDAI data to provide “Aadhaar services” to common people for a charge, including the printing of Aadhaar cards. However, in wrong hands, this access could provide an opportunity for gross misuse of the data. The hackers seemed to have gained access to the website of the Government of Rajasthan, as the “software” provided access to “aadhaar.rajasthan.gov.in”, through which one could access and print Aadhaar cards of any Indian citizen. However, it could not be ascertained whether the “portals” were genuinely of Rajasthan, or it was mentioned just to mislead. Sanjay Jindal said all of this could be confirmed only after a technical investigation was conducted by the UIDAI. ‘Privacy at risk’ “Leakage of Aadhaar data reveals that the project has failed the privacy test. At the recently concluded 11th WTO Ministerial Conference, India submitted a written position on e-commerce, opposing the demand for negotiations on e-commerce by the US and its allies. The latter were demanding access to citizens’ database for free. The revelation by The Tribune also means that the proposed data protection law will now hold no purpose, as the data has already been breached. The state governments must immediately disassociate themselves and cancel the MoU signed with UIDAI,” said Gopal Krishan, New Delhi-based convener of the Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties, who appeared before the Special Parliamentary Committee that examined the Aadhaar Bill in 2010. A quick chat, and full access 12:30 pm: This correspondent posing as ‘Anamika’ contacted a person on WhatsApp number 7610063464, who introduced himself as ‘Anil Kumar’. He was asked to create an access portal. 12:32pm: Kumar asked for a name, email ID and mobile number, and also asked for Rs 500 to be credited in his Paytm No. 7610063464. 12:35 pm: This correspondent created an email ID, [email protected], and sent mobile number ******5852 to the anonymous agent. 12:48 pm: Rs 500 transferred through Paytm. 12:49 pm: This correspondent received an email saying, “You have been enrolled as Enrolment Agency Administrator for ‘CSC SPV’. Your Enrolment Agency Administrator ID is ‘Anamika_6677’.” Also, it was said that a password would be sent in a separate mail, which followed shortly. 12:50 pm: This correspondent had access to the Aadhaar details of every Indian citizen registered with the UIDAI. Printing Aadhaar card This correspondent later again approached Anil Kumar to ask for software to print Aadhaar cards. He asked for Rs 300 through Paytm No. 8107888008 (in the name of ‘Raj’). Once paid, a person identifying himself as Sunil Kumar called from mobile number 7976243548, and installed software on this correspondent’s computer by accessing it remotely through “TeamViewer”. Once the job was done, he deleted the software drivers, even from the recycle bin. Possible misuse Getting SIM cards, or bank accounts in anyone’s name. Last month, a man was arrested in Jalandhar for withdrawing money from someone’s bank account by submitting a fake Aadhaar card. Sitaram Yechury ✔ @SitaramYechury The perils of making Aadhaar mandatory and linking it to bank accounts, as insisted upon by Modi govt, are visible here. Do we need more proof to stop this madness? http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html … 9:06 AM - Jan 4, 2018 Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details JALANDHAR:It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI. tribuneindia.com 76 76 Replies 584 584 Retweets 737 737 likes Twitter Ads info and privacy Randeep S Surjewala ✔ @rssurjewala ‘AADHAR’ data breached yet again! As every citizen’s personal information is exposed to hackers everyday & ‘Right to Privacy’ is mocked and flouted with impunity, Modi Govt remains immune. Is anyone listening? http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html … 9:29 AM - Jan 4, 2018 Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details JALANDHAR:It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI. tribuneindia.com 133 133 Replies 893 893 Retweets 1,822 1,822 likes Twitter Ads info and privacy Nitin A. Gokhale ✔ @nitingokhale This is dangerous and criminal negligence of data security. Kudos to the reporter for unveiling the racket. A crackdown on the culprits& a corrective step is imperative: Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html … via @thetribunechd 11:01 AM - Jan 4, 2018 Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details JALANDHAR:It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI. tribuneindia.com 9 9 Replies 85 85 Retweets 73 73 likes Twitter Ads info and privacy Congress ✔ @INCIndia Rs 500. That's all it takes for someone to steal the data of a billion citizens. Envisioned by UPA as a tool for inclusion, #Aadhaar has become an identity theft nightmare under the NDA. http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html … 10:32 AM - Jan 4, 2018 Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details JALANDHAR:It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI. tribuneindia.com 118 118 Replies 816 816 Retweets 1,421 1,421 likes III. https://www.thequint.com/news/india/exclusive-aadhaar-dirty-secret-out-add-anyone-as-data-admin Aadhaar’s Dirty Secret Is Out, Anyone Can Be Added as a Data Admin MEGHNAD BOSE14H 16M AGO If you think your Aadhaar data is only in the hands of those authorised to access the official Aadhaar database, think again. Following up on an investigation by The Tribune, The Quint found that completely random people like you and me, with no official credentials, can access and become admins of the official Aadhaar database (with names, mobile numbers, addresses of every Indian linked to the UIDAI scheme). But that’s not even the worst part. Once you are an admin, you can make ANYONE YOU CHOOSE an admin of the portal. You could be an Indian, you could be a foreign national, none of it matters – the Aadhaar database won’t ask. A person of your choosing would then have access to the data of all 119,22,59,062 Aadhaar cardholders. Snipped -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. 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