---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Sukla Sen <[email protected]> Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2021, 08:37 Subject: Re: The strategic logic of the No First Use nuclear doctrine To: john hallam <[email protected]> Cc: Nuclearnews Group <[email protected]>, John Hallam < [email protected]>, Abolition Caucus < [email protected]>
This, apparently, level-headed defence, or rather a campaign in favour, of India's NFU - in the context of serious doubts aired as regards the continuance of the policy by its own Defence Ministers (ref.: < https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/rajnath-singh-s-hint-on-diluting-no-first-use-change-is-message-to-pakistan/story-kzEZhswPwx0dnPefQTkZ3L.html>, < https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/indias-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-in-future-will-depend-on-circumstances-rajnath-singh/articleshow/70699236.cms> and < https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/why-bind-ourselves-to-no-first-use-policy-says-parrikar-on-indias-nuke-doctrine/articleshow/55357808.cms>) and no less, including the incumbent one, is, however, based on a radical reconstruction of the actual history of India going "nuclear". On May 11 1998, by carrying out underground nuclear blasts for the second time, India - under the dispensation of Hindu nationalist Vajpayee, declared itself a nuclear weapons power with a lot of self-congratulatory chest thumping. Vajpayee had occupied power just two months back. The whole thing was carried out - under the personal guidance of Vajpayee, in great hurry and keeping even the Defence Minster (a coalition partner) and all the three service chiefs out of the loop till virtually the very last. *No strategic evaluation or anything remotely resembling was carried out.* *The blasts were done in pursuance of an old ideological project*. >From the horse's mouth: (T)he Prime Minister Vajpayee — in his first interview to the media since taking over, carried on May 25, would observe: *The decision to carry out these tests was guided by the paramount importance we attach to national security. I have been advocating the cause of India going nuclear for well over four decades. My party, the BJP, and earlier the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, had been raising this demand consistently and forcefully for long. Now that we are in the Government, people expect us to translate our long-standing commitment into action. And we have showed them that we mean business*.[48] What must not escape our attention that Vajpayee, as the justification for the blasts — having huge implications, is citing the fact of his advocacy for the Bomb *for well over four decades* — that means since early/mid-fifties. In those days, it is necessary to recall, China was very much a friend and non-nuclear to boot. (China would go nuclear only in 1964.[49]) India had been facing no possible nuclear threat whatever. So, the *advocacy* had nothing to do with *security* (from external aggression) as such. Nor, therefore, do the blasts carried out now. It is because of the Hindutva worldview that looks upon the Bomb as a currency of power, as a symbol of status; in complete trashing of the Nehruvian aspirations to be counted as a global force riding on the moral platform of global peace, equity and justice.[50] The irrelevance of *security,* is further underlined by the fact that the whole process of the blasts, as has already been noted above, had, reportedly, till almost the very last, excluded the Defence Minister and three service chiefs. The very next question, put to Vajpayee, was why the blasts without *wait(ing) for the National Security Council to be set up so it could decide whether the threat perception demanded it or not*. Vajpayee simply evaded it by opting to dwell on the mandate of the National Security Council. Vajpayee’s response to the third query as regards the *compulsion* for the (rushed) tests (within two months of coming to power) is equally instructive: *Important measures that are guided by national security considerations don’t follow immediate compulsions. Rather, they are guided by long-term imperatives based on a sound appraisal of regional and global security realities. It is important for us and the world to know that by conducting the latest tests, India has responded **to a stark regional and global reality that has evolved over the past 50 years*. In simpler words — shorn of his signature verbiage, there was no (known) immediate compulsion other than following the essential Hindutva agenda. That’s from the horse’s mouth. (Excerpted from: <https://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article10134.html>.) So, it's just a fairy tale spun by the author - with all the pretensions of academic seriousness, that the blasts were the end product of a thorough strategic evaluation of India's security imperatives. Be that as it may, the "doctrine" would later be worked out as a sort of post facto (sophisticated) rationalisation of the blasts and also in order to tackle global reactions to the development. The NFU had, conceivably, two objectives: (i) to serve as a course correction - after the initial spell of chest thumping meant for the domestic audience, to establish itself as a "moderate power" to soothen the frayed nerves of the outside world as had been the case with the declaration of a "voluntary" moratorium on further nuclear blasts while evading the CTBT and (ii) to paint Pakistan as the "bad boy" of the region with the full knowledge that it cannot make any such matching declaration in view of the huge asymmetry in terms of conventional weapons of the two perpetually feuding neighbours. (This inability of Pakistan has been duly noted by the author of the subject article.) Sukla On Sat, 21 Aug 2021, 08:37 john hallam, <[email protected]> wrote: > The strategic logic of the No First Use nuclear doctrine > > - RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN > <https://www.orfonline.org/contributors/rajesh-rajagopalan/> > > > https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/strategic-logic-no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-54911/ > > India’s No First Use policy was a result of the lessons that India’s key > strategic thinkers learned in the long decades they spent thinking about > the global experience with nuclear strategy, and the implications for > India’s nuclear policy. > [image: No First Use, nuclear doctrine, strategic logic, deterrence, > control regime, nuclear attack, retaliation, Cold War, nuclear deterrence, > nuclear weapons, nuclear arsenal, counterforce, India, nuclear options, > counter-intuitive, NFU] > Source: iStock/Getty Images > > - COLD WAR <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/cold-war/> > - COUNTERFORCE <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/counterforce/> > - NO FIRST USE <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/no-first-use/> > - NUCLEAR DETERRENCE > <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/nuclear-deterrence/> > - PAKISTAN <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/pakistan/> > - TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS > <https://www.orfonline.org/tags/tactical-nuclear-weapons/> > > India adopted a No First Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine in 2003, but the > counter-intuitive logic of the doctrine was controversial from the very > beginning. The assumption among critics has been that a policy that relied > on retaliation only, in which India will wait until it is attacked before > it uses its nuclear weapons, reflected its general strategic passivity and > political idealism, and was dictated primarily by India’s desire to be a > responsible international actor. > > Nothing could be farther from the truth. Far from being any of these, > India’s NFU policy was a result of the lessons that India’s key strategic > thinkers learned in the long decades they spent thinking about the global > experience with nuclear strategy and the implications of this for India’s > nuclear policy. It was dictated not by passivity or idealism but a deep > realism, an understanding of the limited purpose that nuclear weapons can > play in the strategy of any nuclear weapon power, but particularly that of > one such as India. With the passing of some of the strategic stalwarts who > framed the original policy, all that appears to be holding up the policy is > bureaucratic muscle-memory. This is insufficient to resist ideological > challenges to the policy. It is, thus, time to revisit and reassert the > original strategic logic behind NFU. > > With the passing of some of the strategic stalwarts who framed the > original policy, all that appears to be holding up the policy is > bureaucratic muscle-memory. > > To be clear, it is not being suggested that India’s security managers, > present or past, have rethought the strategic logic of NFU, which remains > the bedrock of India’s nuclear doctrine. If there is a threat to India’s > NFU policy, it comes more from the ideological opposition it faces, not > from any careful reassessment of its strategic logic. > > The central reason behind India’s NFU was the recognition that nuclear > weapons served only a very limited purpose, that of ensuring national > survival. The only real threat to such survival was a nuclear attack. > Nuclear weapons are unique because unlike any other weapon, they could > wreak so much destruction in such a short time that they could potentially > end an entire society in an afternoon. The only way to prevent such > destruction is to threaten similar destruction on any potential adversary, > thus deterring them from pursuing such a course of action. Threatening > retaliation is the only solution because there is no defence against these > weapons. Though there were attempts by deterrence theorists in other parts > of the world to consider the use of nuclear weapons for more limited > tactical purposes than national survival, most Indian nuclear strategists > were rightly skeptical of such possibilities. This drove some of the > strongest proponents of India’s nuclear weapon programme to be also deeply > critical of the kind of elaborate nuclear doctrines and arsenals being > developed by other countries, especially the two Cold War superpowers. It > was not a logic that they wanted India to follow because it made little > sense for anyone, and definitely not for India. > > If the primary purpose — indeed, the only purpose — of nuclear weapons was > deterrence of other nuclear weapons, then threatening retaliation was the > only manner in which these weapons could be used. The threat of retaliation > is of course the essence of deterrence: preventing someone from taking an > action by threatening to punish them if they did. > > NFU was the outcome of this strategic logic. (The other corollary was a > limited nuclear arsenal). If the primary purpose — indeed, the only purpose > — of nuclear weapons was deterrence of other nuclear weapons, then > threatening retaliation was the only manner in which these weapons could be > used. The threat of retaliation is of course the essence of deterrence: > preventing someone from taking an action by threatening to punish them if > they did. Retaliation, by definition, could only be for an action that was > already taken, in this case, a nuclear attack that has already happened. > Deterrence and retaliation automatically meant that there was no logic to > using nuclear weapons first: hence, no first use. Additional benefits also > accrue from NFU: tighter political command over nuclear weapons, a much > more relaxed command and control regime and a much safer nuclear arsenal. > [image: Launch-On-Warning, Launch-Under-Attack, existential threats, > Pakistan, NFU policy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Brahmos, No First Use, NFU]A > Brahmos missile replica is displayed during Republic Day Parade — 26 > January 2009, New Delhi. Photo: Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images > > First use, which is what giving up NFU means, is incompatible with nuclear > deterrence of nuclear weapons. First use can have a non-nuclear deterrence > purpose but only if a non-nuclear threat to national survival exists or is > perceived to exist. Pakistan and Israel are two countries that perceive > such non-nuclear threats to national survival. Israel, given the history of > the Jewish people, the hostility of its neighbours and its own small size, > believes that it faces a non-nuclear but nevertheless existential threat. > Pakistan, similarly, has always worried that India never fully reconciled > itself to the partition and that it may some day seek to undo it, > especially because of the huge conventional military power differential > between India and Pakistan. Not surprisingly, Pakistan’s nuclear weapon > programme began not as a response to India’s nuclear weapons programme, but > as a response to the demonstration of India’s unambiguous conventional > military supremacy in December 1971. For both Israel and Pakistan, a first > use nuclear doctrine makes sense because of the non-nuclear existential > threats they perceive. It goes without saying, of course, that their > perception may be unrealistic; it is, equally, irrelevant because states > make security choices on the basis of their perceptions. > > Giving up the NFU presumably frees India to use nuclear weapons first, but > under what conditions would India possibly need to use nuclear weapons > first? > > Of the other nuclear powers, only the US and Soviet Cold War first use > doctrines makes some sense. Both worried about a surprise attack, and both > kept their nuclear forces primed to launch at the first sign of a nuclear > attack from the other side. In addition, the US also had extended > deterrence commitments to defend its allies against Soviet and Chinese > attacks, which required the flexibility to launch a nuclear attack first. > There is no such strategic logic for an Indian nuclear first use doctrine. > India perceives neither any existential threats nor fears surprise nuclear > attack nor has extended deterrence commitments. > > A former Indian defence minister argued that India need not say it has an > NFU in order to not bind itself. This is a common misperception: that the > NFU limits India’s options. India’s nuclear options are indeed extremely > limited but they are limited not because of the NFU but because of the > nature of nuclear weapons and the context of India’s strategic needs. This > can be made clear if we consider what nuclear options India gains if it > were not “bound” by the NFU. Giving up the NFU presumably frees India to > use nuclear weapons first, but under what conditions would India possibly > need to use nuclear weapons first? Any Indian first use of nuclear weapons > against another nuclear power means the certainty of nuclear retaliation. > Nothing can prevent such retaliation. And the nature of nuclear weapons > means that the consequences of such a retaliation, even if the retaliation > is relatively minor one involving a few weapons, will be devastating. This > is one reason why nuclear first use makes sense only for countries facing > certain death in any case, either from conventional or nuclear threats. > > Counterforce attacks require perfect intelligence about where the > adversary’s nuclear forces are located so that they can be targeted. Not > even the world’s most powerful states have such intelligence; and India > will pay a heavy cost if even a few weapons of an adversary survives such > an assault. > > This is also why counterforce, which some former Indian officials have > mused about, is such a fantasy. The logic of counterforce — attacking the > adversary’s nuclear forces instead of soft targets such as cities — is that > destroying the adversary’s nuclear forces will prevent an adversary from > being able to attack India with nuclear weapons. But counterforce attacks > require perfect intelligence about where the adversary’s nuclear forces are > located so that they can be targeted. Not even the world’s most powerful > states have such intelligence; and India will pay a heavy cost if even a > few weapons of an adversary survives such an assault. Counterforce attacks > may make some sense in retaliation to an initial nuclear attack, for if > nuclear war has already started there might be some sense in trying to > limit the damage that can be caused in subsequent waves of attacks. But of > course, in such a scenario, counterforce becomes an adjunct to the NFU, not > an alternative. The problems of uncertain intelligence, combined with the > horrible consequences of a mistake, also limits any attempt to even shave > the NFU to adopt options such as Launch-On-Warning or Launch-Under-Attack. > In addition to the very short reaction times in the India-Pakistan theatre > (or even a Sino-Indian one), no political leader will order a nuclear > attack on the mere suspicion that an enemy nuclear attack is underway. > > There is also some understandable frustration in India about Pakistan’s > adoption of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as well as its recourse to > terrorism as a state strategy. While the frustration is understandable, > abandoning the NFU will provide little relief. Terrorism and TNWs are both > an acknowledgement of Pakistan’s conventional military weakness. > Threatening to use Indian nuclear weapons first in response is so > disproportionate that it will lack any credibility. Far more credible will > be the Indian resolve to employ its conventional military superiority to > respond to such threats and demonstrate the emptiness of Pakistan’s > escalation threats because that is what these are. > > Considering both the strategic logic of India’s NFU policy, as well as the > futility of abandoning it, leads to the suspicion that such proposals are > ideologically driven short-cuts to demonstrate Indian “resolve” rather than > a careful response to India’s strategic problems. That would be a shame > because the NFU policy is uniquely suited to India’s circumstances — a > preponderant power in its neighbourhood that faces no existential threats. > > > > > > > > John Hallam > Australian Coordinator PNND > People for Nuclear Disarmament UN Nuclear Weapons Campaigner > Human Survival Project > Co-Convenor Abolition 2000 Nuclear Risk reduction Working Group > [email protected] > [email protected] > [email protected] > 61-411-854-612 > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Nuclear News List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/nuclear-news-list/CAHE2ApTq7o5mMUm5TvqfT0k737AtYYpN68AOiULH-x-G2Jz9Vg%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/nuclear-news-list/CAHE2ApTq7o5mMUm5TvqfT0k737AtYYpN68AOiULH-x-G2Jz9Vg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. 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