<<Ukraine and the West should thus assume that Russia will not accept any defeat. A small Ukrainian victory in, say, the fall of this year might well be followed by another Russian invasion in 2023. Russia would need to regroup its forces, which would be challenging under sanctions. Even more important for Putin than imperial conquest, however, is the preservation of his own power, since autocrats who lose wars often end up in dire straits. Putin might have to temporarily accept being pushed back to his pre-invasion starting point, but he could not countenance the permanent loss of Ukraine. He might continue small-scale fighting, missile strikes, and aerial bombardment until reinforcements—gathered through partial or full mobilization—arrived. Alternatively, Putin could cynically use a cease-fire to buy time for bad-faith negotiations, much as he did before the February invasion. Meanwhile, to deter future Russian attacks, Ukraine would likely have to ask for more weaponry than ever. Assenting to this would be difficult for Western powers, as Russia would be seeking relief from sanctions and taking its usual divide-and-conquer approach to Washington and its allies. For the Western powers, a theoretical solution would be to offer Ukraine security guarantees in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality. But Russia could put those promises to the test in a renewed attack—and sanctions relief, if it ever came to pass, would have to be slow. With Putin’s Russia, the approach must be “distrust and verify.” Another risk is that even a small Ukrainian victory might be preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin. Putin has departed from Cold War precedent by instrumentalizing nuclear weapons for political reasons rather than just for ones related to national security. His menacing statements have come across as bluster. But Putin could up the ante. To scare his adversaries, he could order technical preparations for the potential use of nuclear weapons. The West should react to such threats with deterrence, signaling clearly that Putin would achieve nothing through the use of nuclear weapons. If that does not work, and Putin acts on his threats, then NATO should consider carrying out a limited conventional response, either against Russian forces in Ukraine or within Russia itself. In the meantime, the West needs to build a broad coalition to condemn and deter nuclear saber rattling by linking sanctions and threats of retaliation to Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship. China might not join in, but out of fear of nuclear instability, it might approve of the idea. Finally, even if Ukraine wins small, Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict. Zelensky has indicated as much by saying that postwar Ukraine will resemble Israel in its full-time orientation toward self-defense. Putin, meanwhile, would continue to probe for Western vulnerabilities: much as he responded to Western sanctions in 2014 by meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016, he would likely mix cyberattacks, disinformation, and “active measures,” such as operations that would damage political parties and leaders Russia dislikes, undermine the internal stability of “anti-Russian” countries, and degrade the integrity of the transatlantic alliance and similar such alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The West would be forced to contain Russia for the foreseeable future. After all, the West can do little to influence Russia from within other than to hope for the emergence of less combative Russian leadership.>>
(Excerpted from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.../what-if-ukraine-wins>. -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web, visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/greenyouth/CACEsOZirOCZhy%2B7dGki9QHSjHRQ13P213xtn6pfn-0FnP%2BoL%2Bw%40mail.gmail.com.
