-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi,
I support the adoption of the document. On 9/16/10 5:31 PM, Joe Abley wrote: > become more of a recorded discussion on the relative merits of > unique-origin-AS vs. overloaded-origin-AS than a general > recommendation for one over the other. I agree with the Joe here. There are both pros and cons of Unique-origin-AS vs. single-origin-AS, and it's best to have them documented rather then one approach being preferred over the other. >> >> Detection of route leaks is _much more difficult if a common origin >> ASN could pop up anywhere with any set of adjacent upstream ASNs. Over time, I believe critical infrastructure providers have built their own mechanisms to detect leaks and track the propagation of routes. It would be good to see how it has been handled so far. > > Another practical consideration is that many ASes with whom you might > want to peer (as the operator of an anycast content distribution > system of some kind) will be happy to talk to you if they can reach > your AS in multiple locations, because that fits their existing > peering model. Suggest a different AS in each location and the answer > is no, because you don't meet their multiple-location policy. It will also be a rather large undertaking for existing anycast providers to re-number into unique-origin-AS and deal with 100s if not 1000s of peering sessions, IXP databases and websites. - -gaurab - -- http://www.gaurab.org.np/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAkyS5MEACgkQSo7fU26F3X3M6gCeMWtjK3ifRg0LbQ2rz4jkbTnw PngAnika9t7BaD86aQ1ypwIgNaYV0pnv =Q3LC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
