On 22 Nov 2013, at 3:43 pm, Christopher Morrow <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 5:48 PM, Geoff Huston <[email protected]> wrote: >> but in our haste to comply with the timelines dictated by DHS's project >> funding >> I guess we've got what DHS were prepared to pay for, and not what we >> actually >> wanted or need. And for many its an unsatisfactory outcome. > > just asking about one part here... so DHS aside, because i'm not sure > that who the funder is is relevant to the work, exactly... what > options are there for securing more than the aspath? As I understand the draft correctly, the draft is saying even if you secure ASPATH along the lines proposed in secure BGP, there are still ways in which an attacker can inject a path that was not intended by the originator. So the question that the draft raises in my head is is it possible to communicate routing policies in a secure manner? > Additionally, the draft in question here still doesn't say how you'd > know 'thats a route leak' more than 1 as-hop away form the 'leak'. (it > also doesn't take into account any of the comments I provided to the > authors :( which is another matter entirely) so we get back to RPSL. But I am still wondering:... Why are we using GROW to host this discussion? What are GROW's intended objectives in considering this draft? [...] And if we are ready to reopen this consideration of requirements for securing the operation of BGP, just how much of this are we willing to re-consider? Is it all the way back to RPSL and RPSS? Geoff _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
