On 27 Nov 2013, at 7:54 am, Christopher Morrow <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 9:13 PM, Christopher Morrow > <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> As I read your thoughts I am left with the impression that you hold the >>> view that IDR that inherited the "requirements for securing the routing >>> system" task. Have I got this right? >>> >> >> Your sentence didn't parse for me, one or more words are incorrect, >> somewhere around: >> "view that IDR that inherited" >> >> I believe the path set forth by routing and ops ADs was the 3-4 step >> program above... is that your question? > > Geoff, did I get your question's sense correct or not? I reviewed the mailing lists of all three WGs from November last year, when this came up. and I was searching for a proposed methodology of defining requirements, proposing mechanisms and standardising one of more candidate technologies relating to the issue of path control of the propagation of BGP announcements in order to allow BGP speakers to detect unintended announcements. My search of the list archives was unsuccessful. As I seem to be the only one interested in an answer, I give up. geoff (Of course the net value of the entire effort in "securing" a routing protocol that still cannot discriminate between intended routing announcements and all forms of routing lies is in itself another interesting question, but maybe that's best answered by those folk who will, or will not, turn on this particular set of routing control knobs in their routers.) _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
