Looks ok to me

Tom Petch

----- Original Message -----
From: "John G. Scudder" <[email protected]>
To: "t.petch" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Christopher Morrow" <[email protected]>;
<[email protected]>; <[email protected]>; <[email protected]>;
<[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 3:33 PM

P.S. here's what's in my buffer now. I'll issue this as the next version
tomorrow unless there's further discussion to incorporate.

--John

11.  Security Considerations

   This document defines a mechanism to obtain a full dump or provide
   continuous monitoring of a BGP speaker's local BGP table, including
   received BGP messages.  This capability could allow an outside party
   to obtain information not otherwise obtainable.  For example,
   although it's hard to consider the content of BGP routes in the
   public Internet to be confidential, BGP is used in private contexts
   as well, for example for L3VPN [RFC4364].  As another example, a
   clever attacker might be able to infer the content of the monitored
   router's import policy by comparing the pre-policy routes exposed by
   BMP, to post-policy routes exported in BGP.

   Implementations of this protocol MUST require manual configuration of
   the monitored and monitoring devices.

   Unless a transport that provides mutual authentication is used, an
   attacker could masquerade as the monitored router and trick a
   monitoring station into accepting false information, or could
   masquerade as a monitoring station and gain unauthorized access to
   BMP data.  Unless a transport that provides confidentiality is used,
   a passive attacker could gain access to BMP data in flight.  However,
   BGP is not commonly deployed over a transport providing
   confidentiality, so it's debatable whether it's crucial to provide
   confidentiality once the data is propagated into BMP.

   Where the security considerations outlined above are a concern, users
   of this protocol should consider using some type of transport that
provides
   mutual authentication, data integrity and transport protection, such
   as IPsec [RFC4303] or TCP-AO [RFC5925].  If confidentiality is
   considered a concern, a transport providing that as well could be
   selected.


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