On Sun, Feb 22, 2009 at 03:21:21AM +0200, Alex Besogonov wrote: > Robert Millan wrote: >>> Making sure, that noone can override it, can be awfully difficult, >>> especially >>> under a physical attacker. A hardware that is at least a bit designed to >>> withstand such an attack can help a lot. >> I'm not sure why is physical security so awfully difficult for you (can't you >> use locks, tamper-proof seals, cameras and alarms?), but most people who're >> in >> the bussiness of protecting physical goods manage to sort it out. > My devices will be installed at clients' locations. It's impossible to > guarantee that all devices will be physically secure. > > If you live in the USA then one day such device might contain your > private data. Would you like it to be stolen?
My private data is safely stored. The stuff Google reads from my Gmail account is *not* private data. If you send your private stuff elsewhere and trust noone can read it because a small chip that's not even under your control told you so, you're being naive... > Reverse engineering the TPM chip is very costly. And I'm not going to > try to protect data from NSA or CIA or another three-letter agency. ...but thankfully, not as much as I thought. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
