-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 http://blog.bittorrent.com/2011/06/30/uchat-we-just-need-each-other/
They've actually been working on this in one way or another since 2011 or before. The main problem of course being that is isn't open source, so nothing they do and no effort they exert will actually create trustable security. I think they started messing around with it before the OSS/security correlation really broke the surface and haven't really changed culture throughout development. The Bitmessage dev channel was abuzz with this a few weeks ago too, there's a bit more overlap there. I'm sorry to say it, but if they don't decide to open the source I hope someone decides to reverse engineer it because the general idea is really intriguing. There was also this guy a few years ago: http://blog.technitium.com/2011/07/bitchat-peer-to-peer-instant- messaging.html Although he was setting himself up pretty badly by naming his program "Bitch At" 9_9 ~ghostlands On Wed, 17 Sep 2014 18:41:35 -0100 "Josh Steiner" <[email protected]> wrote: >Looks like BitTorrent is getting into the private communications >game: > >http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/17/6338417/bittorrent-bleep-secure- >chat-app-public-alpha-released > >"Bleep keeps messages encrypted for their entire ride, so >theoretically only their sender and receiver should be able to see >them." > >... > >"Bleep avoids that by sending its communications directly between >the >people who are talking, rather than relying on an intermediary. >That >said, there's still a matter of making that connection between two >people in the first place, as they have to figure out where on the >internet one another actually is. That's handled with a >traditionally >BitTorrent type of network that distributes the information across >the >phones and computers of people hooked into Bleep. BitTorrent says >that >this information is encrypted so that your computer's digital >location >won't be seen by anyone but the party you're actually looking for, >and >no one but the receiving party should even know who you're looking >for >either. Altogether, BitTorrent says that it would be "practically >impossible" to gather metadata on who's talking to who." >_______________________________________________ >Guardian-dev mailing list > >Post: [email protected] >List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian- >dev > >To Unsubscribe > Send email to: Guardian-dev- >[email protected] > Or visit: >https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian- >dev/ghostlands%40hush.com > >You are subscribed as: [email protected] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Charset: UTF8 Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify Version: Hush 3.0 wsBcBAEBAgAGBQJUGkdhAAoJEJRqj8F0y8k517wH/3rlGShv/qqem+lTa9cDgCN18HfN 4cWpM8DG2uDLtIDAoo3UbWSLCzswyw3RLe9UQpGOI69Lyh3rU/V8oAwI560j7MLU52+c tlJG9BQ80ag3Hc0Tm/FKN5py3VX/rP9NavD6jMdNomUYXejvEIJk5+YpLfqeKUiCZ6Z+ TCXDUCiepHRLheW/3ZLF36y0C/hy62SnsGKu4kIkrBec3uVgShEvqWMy2Uli1GtTraqE BWtD8C2LfsIWpccKbqWDfBPlAX5BnodK+Gwvg480Oo729hMSCckWkfkuEym2S5vCyd8r W7Lp1mUyK2UPoFnrLUu3dLN/PDMNyaOcuczFE2J6ASo= =g3DJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: [email protected] List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: [email protected] Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/archive%40mail-archive.com You are subscribed as: [email protected]
