> Perhaps udpgw instances can be run along side all Tor exit nodes? Isn't the DDoS potential extremely high if Tor allows UDP? Since there's no flow control with the end server, a malicious client can establish multiple circuits, all spamming traffic, turning the exit nodes into a botnet. Tor's fundamental design can't protect against this, right? It's indistinguishable from, say, a massive amount of unidirectional SIP traffic.
Also, I question how usable udpgw would be for realtime voice or video communication from a mobile device. Wrapping traffic meant to be "droppable" into TCP means video frames coming way too late, retransmits within the Tor network and all sorts of other issues the protocols may not be equipped to handle. _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: [email protected] List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: [email protected] Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/archive%40mail-archive.com You are subscribed as: [email protected]
